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Over 30 years of research in the field of behavioral economics have widened the knowl-
edge about human behavior and decision making. Research in behavioral economics
investigates whether predictions of theoretical models and their underlying assump-
tions hold. It thereby enhances the predictive power of economics. All chapters of
this thesis contribute to this research. While the second and third chapter take a
look at the origin of and subjects’ knowledge about risk preferences, Chapter 4 and
5 analyze aspects of behavioral finance. Chapter 4 deals with financial advice and
Chapter 5 investigates the roots of the herd behavior of financial investors. Survey
data are employed for the analysis in Chapter 2; in Chapters 3 to 5, experimental
methods are applied. All chapters have an empirical focus.
1.1 Risk Preferences
People face risky decisions every day: some are unconscious (crossing the street
on a red light) and some involve long-term and major financial consequences (pen-
sion savings, medical treatments). Risk preferences are an integral part of decision
making. Since the first formalization by Bernoulli (1738), many theoretical models
incorporate assumptions about the subjects’ risk preferences which have a signifi-
cant impact on the outcome of the models. Consider, for example, first price auction
models as surveyed by Kagel (1995). To study risk preferences of individuals in real
world situations, several measures to elicit risk preferences have been developed. Re-
sponses to these risk questions have been found to predict behavior such as smoking,
holding stocks, and occupational choices (Dohmen et al. 2011, Bonin et al. 2007) or
geographic mobility (Jaeger et al. 2010) in large panel datasets. Furthermore, risk
preferences can also explain behavior in economic experiments, such as the trust
game (Lo¨nnqvist et al. 2011).
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However, many questions regarding risk preferences remain. Stigler and Becker
(1977) proposed that preferences are exogenous and stable. This view has been put
into question in recent years and the determinants of individual risk preferences have
been intensely studied. For example, the environment and experiences of people
are found to have an influence on the formation of risk preferences (Dang 2012,
Malmendier and Nagel 2011).
A decisive environment for children is formed by their parents. Intergenerational
links are relevant to understand the correlations of outcomes between parents and
children (Bjo¨rklund 2007, Lochner 2008) and the persistent differences in behavior
across social groups (Doepke and Zilibotti 2005, Glaeser et al. 2002, Kling et al.
2007, De Paola forthcoming). Furthermore, parent-child relationships can have an
impact on the stability of an individual’s risk aversion over time and the dynamics
of risk preferences in a population (Bisin and Verdier 2011).
Recent evidence suggests that risk preferences are partly passed on from parents
to their children. The findings regarding the intergenerational transmission of risk
preferences are mainly based on an individual’s self-assessment of risk aversion,
i.e., parents and children reporting similar risk attitudes in surveys (Charles and
Hurst 2003, Arrondel 2009, Kimball et al. 2009, Hryshko et al. 2011, and Dohmen
et al. 2012). The elicitation and measurement of risk attitudes in surveys and
experiments have been subject to a broad discussion (e.g., Harrison and Rutstro¨m
2008, Deck et al. 2008), and all measures have been found to have merits and
drawbacks. It is thus important to study whether the intergenerational transmission
of risk preferences can also be established in a revealed preference approach. So far,
evidence showing that parents and children exhibit the same willingness to take
risk in real life situations is limited to Shore (2011), who finds that there exists an
intergenerational transmission of income volatility.
Chapter 2 of this thesis studies the intergenerational transmission of risk pref-
erences revealed by an individual’s actual job choice. The riskiness of the job is
measured by the variation of cross-sectional earnings unexplained by human cap-
ital. According to the theory of compensating wage differentials, individuals are
compensated for non-pecuniary features of alternative occupations, inter alia the
risk that arises from pursuing the job (Rosen 1987). The theory predicts that work-
ers opt for the occupation that maximizes their utility. Since the costs of bearing
occupational uncertainty are lower for more risk tolerant individuals, their disutility
of working in a risky job is lower. By employing this sorting effect, it is studied
whether an intergenerational transmission of risk preferences revealed by occupa-
tional choice from parents to children can be observed. The data of the SOEP
2
(German Socio-Economic Panel) survey allows for linking parents and children and
observing their actual choice of job.
The analysis reveals that different male generations of a family indeed exhibit
similar risky behavior. Earnings variations of fathers and sons are correlated posi-
tively and significantly. This effect holds even after excluding child-parent pairs that
work in exactly the same occupation. The magnitude of the effect is similar to the
one found for approaches using self-reported risk preferences. Hence, considering
risky behavior in exactly the same situation yields a similar intergenerational link
as approaches considering stated risk preferences.
The magnitude of the intergenerational link is rather weak, which is also in line
with approaches employing stated preferences. This implies that, while part of the
son’s job choice is potentially influenced by his parents’ riskiness of job, many other
factors also have an effect on the decision. Regarding the impact on intergenerational
mobility and stability of risk preferences across generations, it is not necessarily the
case that parents strongly determine - either genetically or through their behavior -
their children’s preferences. The variation in stated and revealed preferences cannot
be fully explained by parents. There remains substantial room for influence by other
factors, such as sociodemographic characteristics.
The correlation between risk preferences and sociodemographic characteristics
has been actively studied in recent years in several large panel studies (Dohmen et
al. 2011 for Germany, von Gaudecker et al. 2011 for the Netherlands), as well as in
experiments (e.g., Eckel and Grossman 2008). For example, previous studies show
that women are more risk averse than men, older or smaller people are more risk
averse than younger or taller ones.
Given these empirical results about the correlation between risk preferences and
sociodemographics, it is of importance whether the correlations found have a causal
interpretation as well. Chapter 3 answers the question of whether subjects are aware
of the correlation between risk preferences and sociodemographic characteristics and
attach informational value to sociodemographics when assessing the risk attitudes
of others. If this is the case, this is an indication that the relationship between risk
preferences and sociodemographics exceeds mere correlations.
The research question raised is particularly interesting if people who take deci-
sions on behalf of others are considered - e.g., in the financial sector or doctors.
They have to know the risk preferences of the assessed person in order to take
an adequate decision. A major asset is that our sample, besides student subjects,
includes individuals that professionally make those decisions: senior and junior ad-
visors with differing years of counseling experience in the financial sector. It is
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of interest whether their extensive counseling experience increases their knowledge
about decision making, or at least changes it. Secondly, sorting effects into employ-
ment in the financial sector (Bonin et al. 2007, Dohmen and Falk 2011, Haigh and
List 2005) can be studied by comparing junior financial professionals and student
subjects.
As the aim of the study is to analyze how advisors judge the risk preferences of
subgroups of the population, an experiment consisting of two main parts is employed.
In the first part, based on survey data, risk preferences of certain subgroups of
the population are estimated (e.g., older versus younger, female versus male). A
computerized lab experiment is used in the second part. In the first treatment
of the lab experiment, the subjects’ perceived correlations on the risk preferences
of the subgroups derived in part one are elicited (e.g., whether females or males
are perceived as more risk averse). In a second treatment, it is studied to which
sociodemographic information subjects attach informational content.
The results of the experiment show that subjects recognize the correlation be-
tween the sociodemographic variables age, gender, parenthood and family status
and risk preferences. People are not aware how income and education correlate with
risk preferences. When forming beliefs about another person’s risk attitude, sub-
jects are willing to pay for sociodemographic information about the assessed person.
Subjects thus expect informational value coming from sociodemographics. These
findings imply that the link between risk preferences and sociodemographics goes
beyond pure correlations. Furthermore, it shows that risk preferences are indeed
considered to be heterogeneous among people and influenced by sociodemographics.
In particular, the advisor considers an advisee’s self-assessment of risk prefer-
ences to be informative when judging another person. Regarding the differences
in subgroups, senior financial professionals attach less informational content to the
advisees’ self-assessment of risk preferences than the junior professionals or non-
professionals. This is interesting from a regulatory perspective as well, as in previous
years German regulators included the elicitation of the customer’s risk preferences
as a mandatory question into the counseling interview. Especially senior financial
professionals - being well familiar with giving advice and using this question in real
life - trust less in the advisees’ self-assessment of risk preference.
1.2 Behavioral Finance
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 experimentally study the behavior of individuals in fi-
nancial markets. The recent financial crisis has been a major event that concerns
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and challenges economists. When the housing bubble began to burst in 2008 and
thus initiated the global financial crisis, the financial sector with its mechanisms
and incentive structures came under criticism. Excessive risk taking on behalf of
financial investors, the securitization in the mortgage market or the failure of the
rating agencies (Hellwig 2009) are just some examples. Despite the massive deficits
of banks and companies during the crisis and the following recession, also private
investors incurred financial losses (Bucher-Koenen and Ziegelmeier 2011). To a large
extent, their asset holdings were not in line with their risk preferences. Remuner-
ation schemes of financial advisors were partly made responsible for that as they
provided incentives to promote equity-based portfolios (Jansen et al. 2008). In
recent years, regulators have also become concerned about the quality of financial
advice and the incentives for financial advisors. In this context, Inderst and Otta-
viani (2012a) contrast several policy interventions that can enhance the efficiency of
financial advice.
Furthermore, financial instruments are becoming more complex which entails that
financial literacy is required. Knowledge about even basic financial principles is not
necessarily given among the population (van Rooij et al. 2007, Lusardi and Mitchell
2006). Thus advice by professionals is increasingly important (Shiller 2008). A
further aspect is that advice is recognized as helpful by customers and they strongly
demand advice (Schotter 2003). Results yet show that people follow advice too often,
and even for random events, such as a fair coin-flip, they ask for advice (Powdthavee
and Riyanto 2012). These findings suggest that the process of giving advice and in
particular the quality of advice should be of major concern and analyzed in detail.
In order to give good advice and to choose the product that best fits the advisee’s
preferences, the advisor needs to know the preferences of the advised person.
Chapter 4 analyzes the process of the assessment of risk preferences of others in
detail. The main question asked is whether an advisor is able to give “good” advice.
In particular, it is studied whether advisors are capable of correctly assessing the
risk preferences of a specific advisee given sociodemographic information. Of course,
agency problems, which have been discussed in the theoretical literature (Ottaviani
and Soerensen 2006, Inderst and Ottaviani 2012b, or Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer
1985), are of major influence in the counseling interview. However, these models
assume that the advisor is aware of the risk preferences of the advisees or at least
knows about the distribution of risk preferences. The research of this chapter starts
by tackling this assumption. If the advisor’s only goal is to correctly gauge the risk
preferences of the advisee, is the advisor able to do so?
Chapter 4 builds on further treatments of the experiment employed in Chapter
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3. In Chapter 3, the subjects’ perceived correlations on risk preferences of certain
sociodemographic subgroups and the sociodemographics that are considered to carry
informational value are studied. This chapter proceeds a step further as the process
of how advisors assess the risk preferences of individual advisees is analyzed in detail.
Advisors are provided with a set of different sociodemographic information and
furthermore, advisors are able to manipulate which sociodemographic information
is available to them.
Several aspects are studied: First, it is investigated how advisors form beliefs
about the risk preferences of specific advisees. It is analyzed how advisors incor-
porate sociodemographic information into their beliefs and whether the advisors’
beliefs are subject to false consensus regarding their own risk preferences. This
would indicate that they overestimate the extent to which other people are simi-
lar to themselves (Hsee and Weber 1997, Hadar and Fischer 2008). Furthermore,
it is of interest whether the social distance between advisor and advisee, namely
the similarity of advisor and advisee in sociodemographic characteristics, influences
advice. A major question is how precise the advisors’ beliefs are, namely whether
the stated beliefs coincide with the advisees’ actual decision and which information
helps to give precise advice. Again, it is a major asset of our dataset that financial
professionals with varying counseling experience can be observed.
The results of the experiment show, first, that advisors perceive advisees to be
less risk tolerant compared to themselves. When forming beliefs about the risk
preferences of others, a false consensus bias of the advisors is present; the advisors’
own risk preferences positively correlate with their beliefs about the advisees’ ones.
For experienced financial advisors and non-professionals this bias is especially pro-
nounced. Besides the advisors’ own risk preferences, the advisees’ gender and the
self-assessment of risk preference have a major influence on the formation of the be-
liefs. The precision of advice increases if more information is available. Professionals
outperform non-professionals significantly when forecasting the risk attitudes of oth-
ers. Information on family status and the advisee’s self-assessment on risk improve
predictions of risk preferences.
The German regulatory requirement to elicit the advisees’ risk preferences in
the counseling interview is indeed found useful. Advisors use the advisees’ stated
risk preferences in the process of giving advice and the precision of their advice
increases. Although senior professionals trust least in the advisees’ self-assessment
compared to non- and junior professionals as found in Chapter 3, the precision
of their advice is higher than that of non-professionals. Senior professionals are,
however, outperformed by junior professionals. This could be driven by the fact
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that senior and non-professional advisors incorporate their own risk preferences into
the assessment of others. This finding should trouble advisees as well as regulators.
Another interesting aspect - in particular in the context of the current, but also
any other financial crises - is how the behavior of financial investors can lead to the
formation of bubbles (Bikhchandani et al. 1992). From a theoretical perspective,
one reason why bubbles in financial markets can emerge is herd behavior. If investors
follow their predecessors irrespective of their own information, this can be subsumed
by intentional herd behavior. This is found to be inefficient as, e.g., asset prices fail
to reflect fundamental values (Kremer 2008). Explanations for herd behavior are,
e.g., the gain of information (Banerjee 1992, Bikhchandani et al. 1992, Welch 1992),
investigative herding or fads (for an extensive survey on sources of herd behavior see
Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003). A prominent reason for herd behavior - also extensively
studied and referred to in the empirical literature (e.g., Ehrbeck and Waldmann
1996, Chevallier and Ellison 1999) - is attributed to reputational concerns or career
concerns.
Chapter 5 of this thesis analyses whether herding out of reputational concerns
exists in financial markets. Whereas there are already some experimental studies
which test whether and when informational cascades in laboratory financial markets
arise (Drehmann et al. 2005, Cipriani and Guarino 2005), this study is the first to
experimentally investigate whether evidence for herding out of career concerns can
be found. In particular, it is tested whether the predictions of the model by Dasgupta
and Prat (2008) hold. This model concludes that herd behavior by investors can be
detected if career concerns (a` la Scharfstein and Stein 1990) are incorporated into a
sequential financial market model.
While the popular press alludes to herd behavior in financial markets, the em-
pirical literature has difficulties to assign observed herd behavior to the differing
reasons (e.g., Welch 2000, Sias 2004). The lab experiment allows disentangling
the underlying motives for herd behavior by employing differing incentive schemes.
Therefore, the subjects’ behavior is studied in two treatments. First, in the role of
financial investors, subjects take the decision which of two assets to buy without
career concerns. For their investment choice, they observe investment decisions of
predecessors and an informative signal about which asset is the successful one. Their
profit consists of the final payoff of the asset bought minus the price paid for it. In
a second treatment, career concerns are incorporated. In addition to subjects in the
role of investors, principals who set wages for the investors based on the observed
investment choices and the actual outcome of the asset are introduced. Investors
thus receive wages set by the principals besides earning profits from investing in the
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asset. In the first treatment, according to the theory, investors should always follow
their own signal and buy the respective asset. However, in the second treatment
with career concerns, investors should engage in herd behavior and neglect their
own signal if sufficient predecessors bought the same asset and prices are becoming
precise.
The experimental results indicate that herd behavior can be observed in the
treatment with reputational concerns. About half of the investors engages in herd
behavior when theoretically expected by Dasgupta and Prat (2008). Surprisingly,
this imitation can also be observed in the treatment without reputational concerns to
a similar extent. Due to the within-subject design it can be concluded that investors
do not significantly change their behavior between the two treatments. Moreover,
we provide further evidence for investors (irrationally) imitating predecessors. To
understand the underlying mechanisms, wages set by principals are studied. Inter-
estingly, wages are remarkably close to the theoretically derived wages. In addition,
imitative behavior seems to be understood by the principals who adjust wages ac-
cordingly. Nevertheless, the recalculation of the theoretical model with the wages
offered in the experiment reveals that incentives to engage in herd behavior disap-
pear once taking imitative behavior of preceding investors into account.
Regardless of whether incentives for herding are provided, a substantial fraction
of agents engages in herd behavior. From a policy perspective this would indicate
that, no matter which incentives are provided from a reputational perspective, agents
still tend to herd. Furthermore, our results indicate that in order to combat herd
behavior, other underlying mechanisms and incentives than reputation have to be
studied.
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the research of behavioral economics in
several ways. It is shown that the occupational risk a son bears is partly inherited
from the father. Intergenerational transmission can thus explain outcome correla-
tions across generations to some extent. However, as the magnitude of the effect
is low, intergenerational transmission is not sufficient to describe individual risk
preferences. As previous evidence shows, sociodemographics are correlated with
risk preferences. This dissertation builds on this research. It is shown that the
link between risk preferences and sociodemographics exceeds mere correlations and
sociodemographics are regarded to carry informational value.
Analyzing advisors’ behavior in financial markets reveals that, when judging the
risk preferences of others, financial professionals are more successful in giving an
accurate prediction compared to non-professionals. The fact that advisors use their
own risk preferences as a reference point when giving advice can lead to severe
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biases and should be of concern to regulators and customers. Regarding investors’
behavior in financial markets, this dissertation shows that the empirically observed
herd behavior cannot necessarily be attributed to reputational concerns.
The dissertation is organized in such a way that the chapters can be read inde-
pendently of each other. All references are collected in the bibliography. Except for
the experimental instructions, any supplementary materials - if any - can be found




Risk Aversion - A Revealed
Preference Approach
2.1 Introduction
A crucial determinant of almost any decision in life is an individual’s risk tolerance.
In their analyses, economists long proceeded on the assumption of exogenously given
and stable risk preferences. In recent years the traditional view has been challenged.
Attention shifted to the stability of risk aversion over time and across contexts. An
important issue is the source of risk preferences, in particular the role of intergener-
ational transmission. If risk preferences are inherited from parents to children, this
should have an effect on the stability of an individual’s risk aversion over time and
the dynamics of risk preferences in a population (Bisin and Verdier 2011).1
Previous analyses agree that parents’ risk attitudes are positively related to their
child’s one (Charles and Hurst 2003, Arrondel 2009, Kimball et al. 2009, Hryshko
et al. 2011, and Dohmen et al. 2012). The evidence is based on individual’s self-
assessments of their risk aversion, i.e., parents and children reporting similar risk
attitudes in surveys. Evidence showing that parents and children also exhibit the
same willingness to take risk in real life situations is limited. An exception is the
study by Shore (2011) who provides evidence for intergenerational transmission of
income volatility and discusses the importance of similar volatility tolerance for the
link.
A key requirement in the empirical analysis of risk preferences is the validity of
the measure. Every method of quantifying risk aversion has merits and drawbacks.
1This chapter is based on Leuermann and Necker (2011).
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While survey data offer an easy way to learn about individual’s attitudes, responses
suffer from a number of biases (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). Inferring
risk aversion from behavior has the advantage that risk preferences are based on
actual decisions. Constraints on individual’s decisions are taken into account and
assumptions that statements are not just cheap talk rendered unnecessary. However,
revealed preference measures may also present a biased approximation of normative
preferences if decision-making errors are of importance (e.g., Beshears et al. 2008).
The lively debate regarding the appropriate measurement of risk attitudes sug-
gests that it is important to study whether an intergenerational transmission of risk
preferences can also be established in a revealed preference approach. Comparing
results from different methods allows assessing the sensitivity of the effect to the use
of different approaches. A revealed preference analysis gives an insight whether the
link is different when risk tolerance in exactly the same situation is considered.
The present study aims to investigate whether children and parents not only
report similar risk aversion but also behave accordingly. We focus on the willingness
to take risk revealed by an individual’s actual job choice. According to the theory
of compensating wage differentials, individuals are compensated for non-pecuniary
features of alternative occupations, inter alia the risk that arises from pursuing the
job (Rosen 1987). Occupations vary by health risk, risk of fatality, or unemployment
and earnings risk. The theory predicts that workers opt for the occupation that
maximizes their utility. Since the costs of bearing occupational uncertainty are
lower for more risk tolerant individuals, their disutility of working in a risky job
is lower. Assuming that individuals sort into jobs accordingly, their choice reveals
information regarding their risk aversion (controlling for other relevant factors).
This sorting effect allows us to investigate whether the intergenerational trans-
mission of risk preferences is indeed reflected in children’s and parents’ occupation
being similarly risky. We use the cross-sectional variation in income that is not
explained by human capital differences as our main measure of job risk (as proposed
by McGoldrick 1995). Employing data from the 1990 to 2009 waves of the German
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we calculate the unexplained earnings volatility per
occupation on a 3-digit-level of the International Standard Classification of Occu-
pations (ISCO) for West German men. The resulting values are assigned to fathers
and sons, whose information we are able to merge. By excluding child-parent pairs
that work in exactly the same occupation, we rule out the possibility that the link
is due to inherited preferences for a certain job instead of similarity in risk aversion.
The analysis shows that different generations of a family indeed exhibit similar
risk behavior in exactly the same situation. We observe a significantly positive re-
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lationship between fathers’ and son’s earnings variation. In line with the literature
on occupational sorting (Bonin et al. 2007) and on intergenerational mobility of
earnings (e.g., Dahl and DeLeire 2008), the correlation is stronger for older children.
With more experience in the labor market, individuals increasingly sort into occu-
pations representing the risk they are willing to bear and which is similar to their
parents’ one. The result holds in a number of robustness checks, including a test
that takes into account a(n albeit crude) measure of ability. Calculating earnings
volatility per individual, i.e., over time irrespective of the occupation pursued, also
does not change the results.
The magnitude of the effect strongly resembles the one found in studies using self-
reported risk attitudes, i.e., a correlation of 0.1-0.2. Considering risk behavior in
exactly the same situation does not yield a stronger intergenerational link. While it
is possible that in all studies the link is underestimated due to attenuation bias (due
to the limitations which apply to every quantification of risk aversion), a conclusion
indicated by all studies is that the intergenerational correlation in risk aversion is
rather weak.2 With respect to our study, the link might even be overestimated when
other factors than risk aversion drive the similarity in earnings volatility. According
to Cohen (1988), a correlation of 0.1-0.3 is small in terms of effect size (0.3-0.5 is
moderate, >0.5 is large). In the literature on intergenerational earnings mobility, a
correlation of this magnitude is taken as weak transmission (or a “highly mobile“
society). Intergenerational analyses hence explain only a small fraction of where risk
preferences come from.
The remainder is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we review the literature on
intergenerational transmission of risk preferences. The measurement of risk prefer-
ences is discussed in Section 2.3. The procedure and results of the empirical analysis
are reported in Section 2.4, followed by a discussion of our results in Section 2.5.
Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Literature Review
Bisin and Verdier (2005) emphasize that “preferences, beliefs, and norms that govern
human behavior are formed partly as the result of genetic evolution, and partly they
are transmitted through generations and acquired by learning and other forms of
2Decades of studying the intergenerational earnings elasticity have shown that the more at-
tention is paid to attenuation bias, the higher the link that is found (e.g., Solon 2002, Dahl and
DeLeire 2008).
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social interactions.”3 Following this idea, several studies investigate the issue of
intergenerational transmission of risk preferences.
Based on data from the US Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), Charles
and Hurst (2003) find a high similarity in parents and children’s stated risk tol-
erance (according to a hypothetical gamble question). Children reporting “high”
risk tolerance are almost 16 percentage points more likely to have parents whose
risk tolerance is also “high” (highest value of four distinct categories).4 Kimball et
al. (2009), using the same data, account for measurement error in survey responses
and find an intergenerational correlation of 0.14 for fathers and 0.23 for mothers.
Hryshko et al. (2011) find, however, only a significant effect for children and parents
that belong to an extremely risk tolerant or averse group. Children that are “very
risk averse” are 14% less likely to have parents that are “very risk tolerant”. An
explanation for the difference to the first study is that Hryshko and co-authors take
into account the parents’ schooling which seems to have a direct effect on children’s
risk aversion.
Arrondel (2009) studies intergenerational transmission using a measure of risk
aversion created from 27 questions covering different life dimensions (seemingly su-
perficial (e.g., whether the respondents take precautions when weather turns out
nasty), serious (e.g., health) as well as traditional lottery questions) of the DELTA-
TNS-Sofres Survey in France. Regressions of the child’s preference score on the
parents’ one (mothers and fathers are not distinguished as it is a household panel)
reveal an elasticity of roughly 0.2.
A closely related study is the one by Dohmen et al. (2012). The authors pro-
vide evidence based on self-reported evaluations of risk attitudes from the SOEP
in which respondents are assessed on an 11-point scale: “How do you see yourself:
Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to
avoid taking risks?” The authors find that the responses of parents and children
have a significantly positive relationship. This result is observed with respect to the
general willingness to take risks as well as specific domains, i.e., financial matters,
health, car driving, sports and leisure and career. They obtain an intergenerational
correlation of about 0.1-0.2 depending on the specification and risk measure used.
Two studies relate parents’ risky behavior to children’s risk attitudes. Hryshko et
al. (2011) show that parents’ risky behavior in the respondent’s childhood, revealed
3In the following, we refrain from a distinction between genetic and cultural inheritance. Our
interest is in whether intergenerational transmission takes place at all and not via which channel
it occurs.
4In this analysis and other subsequently cited, the magnitude of the effect varies to some extent
with the specification and the variable employed as a measure of risk.
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via family business ownership, has a weakly negative effect on a child’s stated risk
aversion. Based on a sample of Italian students, De Paola (forthcoming) also finds
that the riskiness of the father’s but not of the mother’s job (self-employment/public
sector) matters for the child’s stated risk aversion.
To our knowledge, only one study exists analyzing similarity of risk behavior more
thoroughly. Similar to our approach, Shore (2011) investigates intergenerational cor-
relation of income volatility. He employs the variance of year-to-year income changes
that are unexplained by a regression of wages on a set of sociodemographic variables.
Using data from the PSID, he shows that the correlation between father’s and son’s
earnings volatility is 0.266 (using 4-year changes). Modeling income dynamics, he
also distinguishes between permanent and transitory income volatility. The rela-
tionship between fathers’ and sons’ permanent income volatility is 17.5% while that
of transitory income volatility is 11.7%.5 As also stated financial risk tolerance and
self-employment are correlated across generations in his sample, he concludes that
inherited preferences account at least partly for the established link.
2.3 Measuring Risk Preferences
2.3.1 Stated Versus Revealed Preferences
The above analyses provide valuable insights into the question whether risk attitudes
are transmitted between generations. An advantage of self-reported risk measures
is that they offer an easy way to study people’s attitudes. They suffer from different
drawbacks, however. Common objections to stated measures are that low effort
is exerted on answering questions accurately, the desire of an individual to convey
a certain impression, the absence of having an attitude, etc., bias the preferences
reported by surveyed individuals (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). Furthermore,
the framing of questions matters (Kahneman and Tversky 1981, Kimball et al.
2009).
To gain confidence with respect to their validity, responses have been compared
with experimental or real world behavior. However, analyses dealing with the con-
sistency of individual’s risk attitude across experimentally elicited measures and
survey based ones yield contradictory results (e.g., Deck et al. 2008, Anderson and
Mellor 2009). Dohmen et al. (2011) test the behavioral relevance of self-assessed
risk preferences of the SOEP in a complementary field experiment. The responses
5Assuming that permanent and transitory income volatility are uncorrelated. The results are
higher if perfect correlation is assumed. Shin and Solon (2011), however, discuss the difficulty of
separating the components, see Section 2.4.2.
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to a questionnaire are found to be a significant predictor of the riskiness of choices
with real money at stake. Ding et al. (2010) replicate their study with a sample
of Chinese students and conclude that stated risk attitudes only explain 10% of the
variation in the real money situation. Similarly, while stated risk preferences have
been found to be a significant determinant of actual risk taking behavior (such as
smoking or investments), they only explain a small fraction of the variation in real
world decisions (Barsky et al. 1997, Sahm 2007). Another problem associated with
risk attitudes reported on a qualitative scale - as requested in the SOEP - is that it
is not ideal for comparisons of the degree of risk aversion across individuals.
Another approach is directly inferring risk aversion from behavior on real markets.
Economists long insisted that only actual choices represent actor’s true interests and
allow inferences on people’s preferences (e.g., Samuelson 1938, 1948). Behavior is
not just cheap talk but has real consequences. Assumptions that individuals be-
have as stated are unnecessary. Revealed preferences imply that the constraints
that individuals face when deciding are taken into account. A challenge is, however,
that other determinants of choice have to be separated to provide a valid measure
of risk aversion. Like responses to surveys, choices might present a biased mea-
sure of preferences if analytic errors, myopic impulses, inattention, passivity, and
misinformation influence behavior (Beshears et al. 2008).
Revealed risk preferences - as any other measurement of risk aversion - might
thus be subject to noise. Studying the intergenerational link using revealed risk
preferences allows us to check whether parents and children not only state similar
attitudes but also behave accordingly. A confirmation of previous results would give
some confidence regarding the effect. Another advantage of studying risk behavior
is that the possibility of domain-specific risk preferences can be taken into account.
Recent research suggests that risk preferences differ to some extent in different sit-
uations (e.g., Weber et al. 2002, Barseghyan et al. 2011, Einav et al. forthcoming).
The intergenerational link might be underestimated if different generations of a fam-
ily have different scenarios in mind when responding to survey questions even if the
questions refer to the same domains (Vlaev et al. 2010, Nosic´ and Weber 2010).
Observing risk behavior in the same situation allows us to check whether the link is
stronger when exactly the same context is considered.
2.3.2 Revealing Risk Attitudes by Occupational Choice
With respect to their willingness to take risks, an individual’s behavior on financial
markets, the choice of sports, taking out insurances, or occupational choice is infor-
mative. In this study, we focus on the willingness to take risk associated with the
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choice of job.
According to standard economic theory, an individual chooses an occupation that
maximizes his or her expected utility (Becker 1962). Utility from a certain job is
assumed to be a function of wage, personal traits such as education and experience,
as well as occupational features like working conditions or the exposure to different
types of risk. The theory of compensating (or equalizing) wage differentials postu-
lates that in a competitive labor market, unfavorable working conditions have to be
compensated in order to attract workers (Rosen 1987). Higher risks of future income
growth, unemployment, or health are thus reflected in a wage premium. Since the
costs of bearing occupational uncertainty are lower for less risk averse individuals,
the expectation of monetary compensation makes them more likely to opt for jobs
connected to higher risk.6
A rich body of empirical literature provides evidence for the existence of a wage
premium for income risk (e.g., King 1974, Johnson 1977, Feinberg 1981). Mc-
Goldrick (1995) proposes a way of approximating earnings volatility that domi-
nates in the subsequent literature. The present study is based on this measure.
First, a standard Mincer wage regression including education, experience and other
characteristics (Mincer 1958, 1974) is estimated. The residual from that regression
is exploited to calculate the variation in income within an occupation that is un-
explained by observable differences in the individual’s human capital stock. The
measure is supposed to reflect the income uncertainty of an occupation from an ex
ante perspective. It can therefore be taken as given when making the job decision.
Using this measure, McGoldrick (1995), McGoldrick and Robst (1996), Hartog et
al. (2003), Hartog and Vijverberg (2007) and other studies provide evidence that
compensation of earnings risk, in fact, takes place.
Another requirement for occupational choice being informative regarding an indi-
vidual’s risk aversion is that individuals sort into jobs accordingly. A large number of
studies provide the respective evidence. To only cite a few, agents with low (stated)
risk aversion are more likely to be self-employed (Ekelund et al. 2005) while those
with high risk aversion tend to sort into public sector employment (Guiso and Paiella
2004, Pfeifer 2011). Risk averse workers prefer fixed payments and are less likely
to sort into variable pay schemes (Dohmen and Falk 2011). In contrast, workers
of a real firm with incentive contracts and daily income risk are highly risk toler-
ant (Bellemare and Shearer 2010). DeLeire and Levy (2004) show that the risk of
injuries has a considerable effect on an individual’s choice of job.
6This is an application of the standard model of risk compensation, e.g., Gollier (2001). An
occupational choice model is provided in Jacobs et al. (2009). Levhari and Weiss (1974) more
broadly study the effect of risk aversion on investment in human capital.
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In a study closely related to ours, Bonin et al. (2007) investigate whether the
income risk an individual is willing to take matches his or her stated risk atti-
tudes. As the dependent variable, the authors employ the risk measure proposed
by McGoldrick (1995). Based on data from the SOEP, their analysis establishes a
significantly positive relationship between a higher stated willingness to take risks
and working in an occupations with a higher unexplained variation of income. The
result is confirmed by Hryshko et al. (2011) and Fouarge et al. (2011).
2.3.3 Construction of the Risk Measure
In constructing a measure of earnings risk, we follow the approach established in
the literature. We first estimate a Mincer regression and calculate a measure of risk
from the resulting residual. We use the 1990 to 2009 waves of the SOEP to generate
a measure that allows for variation across observed years within an occupation. The
SOEP is an annual panel of German households which was first conducted in 1984
and has been expanded to East Germany in 1990.7 We only include all waves from
1990 onwards (i.e., the year after full unification) to ensure that differences between
the pre- and post-reunification period do not bias the results.
For categorizing occupations, we use the International Standard Classification
of Occupations 88 (ISCO88) provided by the International Labor Organisation.8
This classification groups jobs by similarity of tasks and required skills. Of the ten
“major groups” of the ISCO88-code, eight refer to one of four skill levels. Major
group 2 relates to tertiary education with university degree, major group 3 to tertiary
education without university degree, major groups 4-8 to secondary education and
major group 9 to primary education. For the managerial major group 1 the range of
tasks was deemed too large to link directly with a particular skill level. For armed
forces (0), information required to categorize occupations was not available for many
countries (Elias 1997). An advantage of occupations grouped according to skills is
that it allows us to check whether individuals with a certain education can choose
between jobs with different wage uncertainty.
We employ the 3-digit-level of the code which is the second-most detailed level,
sorting occupations into 116 groups.9 The unexplained variation of income by oc-
cupational group is calculated for the total period considered. While it would be
interesting to also analyze earnings volatility due to unemployment, our data does
not provide for that. Information on the occupation is only available for individu-
7See [www.diw.de/soep] for further information.
8Documented at [http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco].
9Employing the 4-digit level of the code would imply a substantial reduction of occupations and
sample size.
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als that are actually employed. All occupations for which our dataset contains at
least 100 observations are included in the analysis. This leaves us with 74 different
occupation groups.10
In line with much of the literature dealing with earnings, the sample is restricted
to men (e.g., Solon 2002, Bonin et al. 2007). McGoldrick (1995) finds that women
have a lower percentage of earnings uncertainty attributable to systematic factors.
A women’s choice of job is more likely to be driven by factors that cannot be cap-
tured by the Mincer regression. Besides, female employment opportunities changed
substantially over the last decades.
Since the historical and economic environment varies between the two parts of
Germany, we drop all individuals that lived in the eastern part of Germany prior
to 1989. Riskiness of job was much less an issue and politics severely influenced
the choice of job. Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln (2005) argue that self-selection
due to risk aversion was absent in the German Democratic Republic. Due to path-
dependency, the current job of East Germans might not reflect the riskiness that
they are willing to bear.
The sample is restricted to adults between age 25 and 59 to avoid biases that may
occur in the age-related tails. We only include employees that are full-time employed
and exclude individuals working in compulsory paid community service and self-
employed individuals. The determination of earnings in this sector is typically not
comparable to the earnings of employees. We drop all observations for which income
has been imputed. Finally, we exclude implausible earnings information at the
bottom of the distribution of net earnings by dropping the lowest 1-percentile in
every year.
In our Mincer regression, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the net
monthly income of the individual. Employing the net income has the advantage
that income smoothing due to the tax system is taken into account. Our set of ex-
planatory variables includes the usual human capital variables (education in years,
professional experience in years (2), and tenure in years of employment at the current
employer (2)). In Germany, working in the public sector is usually connected to a
more stable development of income as the conditions of employment are regulated by
federal and state laws. We thus include a dummy indicating whether the individual
is employed in the public sector.11 We include dummies for each occupation per 3
digit-ISCO code, thus controlling for the average payment level in that group. Fur-
10The reduction in occupations is not reflected in an equivalent reduction in observations. We
lose less than 2% of the sample.
11It is also possible to split the sample into employees that are employed in the private and
public sector and re-estimate separate Mincer regressions. Results are unchanged.
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thermore, indicator variables for the German states in which the individual resides
and the year of observation are included.12
Column (1) of Table 2.1 shows the results of the OLS regressions. The variables
explain a large fraction of net monthly earnings. Coefficients are highly significant
with signs as expected. We use these estimates to calculate residuals and compute
the measure of earnings risk as the standard deviation of the residuals in each
occupational group.




















3 digit-ISCO dummies? YES YES
STATE dummies? YES YES
TIME dummies? YES YES
N 51327 11666
F 588.53 205.74
Adj. R2 0.561 0.574
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%. Dependent variable:
log monthly income of the respondent.
The variation of the resulting risk measure ranges from 0.16 and 0.48 with a mean
of 0.28 and standard deviation of 0.068, as shown in the first row of Table 2.2. The
occupational category with the highest earnings risk is ship and aircraft controllers
and technicians (ISCO Code 314) and the one with the lowest encompasses police
12Being interested in the wage uncertainty from an ex ante point of view, we refrain from
including individual-specific fixed effects. Individual specific effects represent or remove time-
invariant effects which may include risk aversion. We also do not know whether the individual
acted on the information captured by fixed effects. We address the issue of a bias due to missing
controls for ability in Section 2.4.2.
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inspectors and detectives (345), as can be seen in Figure 2.1. The earnings risk found
by Bonin et al. (2007) ranges from 0.2 to 0.8. An obvious explanation for those
differences is that we employ a dataset spanning several years and thus containing
many more observations than the single cross-section by Bonin and co-authors.
Estimating a pooled cross-section allows us to control for year-specific effects which
lowers the unexplained variance. Hartog and Vijverberg (2007) show that annual
measures are noisier than those based on several years.
Table 2.2: Mincer Jobrisk
Period # of Occ. Mean sd min max
Baseline Mincer 1990-2009 74 0.2771 0.0685 0.1635 0.4838
1990-1999 50 0.2478 0.0549 0.1314 0.4396
2000-2009 61 0.2840 0.0642 0.1653 0.4813
2005-2009 45 0.2822 0.0640 0.1607 0.4877
Including Ability 1990-2009 42 0.2902 0.0677 0.1616 0.5122
The relationship between income risk and skill-level of the occupation does not
seem to follow a clear pattern. As can be seen in Figure 2.1, for each level of required
skills (according to major groups (MG) of the ISCO code) occupations with different
income volatility are available. The occupations with the largest income variance
are in major group 1 (no specific skill level), 2 (tertiary education with university
degree) and 3 (tertiary education without university degree). These groups also
contain occupations that range among the least volatile. While the gap between
largest and lowest income risk occupations is lower for major groups 4-9 which
require a skill level of secondary education (MG:4-8) or primary education (MG:9),
there is still a menu of occupations with different volatility available. A similar result
is found if earnings risk by the actual education of respondents is considered, as can
be seen in Table 2.3. While the mean and standard deviation is slightly higher for
individuals with university degree, all “degrees” of earnings volatility are available
for the different actual educational levels.13
We investigate whether workers are actually compensated for bearing earnings
uncertainty by adding the calculated risk measure in the Mincer regression. The
results show that the unexplained earnings variation has a large and significantly
positive effect (not reported). We also study the relationship between income volatil-
ity and stated risk attitudes. The risk preference revealed by occupational choice is
more closely related to the self-reported risk attitude with respect to career than to
general risk attitude, in line with the hypothesis of domain specific risk attitudes.
13The empirical literature on the relationship between education and wage variance is ambiguous,
see e.g., Chen 2008.
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Figure 2.1: Income Variance by ISCO Occupation Group
Note: MG = Major group classification of ISCO88.
We refrain from a rigorous analysis of the relationship already performed by Bonin
et al. (2007).
Table 2.3: Income Variance by Actual Vocational Education
Education Mean sd min max
No formal training 0.2523 0.0379 0.1635 0.4838
Training 0.2623 0.0473 0.1635 0.4838
University 0.2990 0.0624 0.1635 0.4838
2.4 Empirical Analysis
2.4.1 Merging Children and Parents
For investigating the intergenerational transmission of the willingness to take earn-
ings risks, we construct a dataset from the SOEP waves of 2001 to 2009. The
findings by Bonin et al. (2007) suggest that occupational sorting according to risk
attitudes is weaker for labor market entrants. Individuals seem to require some time
to collect enough information about their talents and the labor market until sorting
adequately according to risk attitudes. We observe each child-parent pair only once
and, in case of multiple observations in different years, keep the most recent obser-
vation. This has the advantage that children are older and occupational decisions
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presumably more in line with actual willingness to bear risk.
An important restriction is that we drop children and parents working in exactly
the same occupation. The intention is to rule out the possibility that tastes for a
certain job rather than similarities in risk tolerance determine the decision.14 Like
in the Mincer regressions, we restrict the sample to West German men that are
full-time employed, and exclude individuals that are self-employed.
This leaves us with 539 children for which we also have information for fathers
(descriptives are shown in Table 2.4). We merge the information obtained from
Mincer regressions to sons and fathers according to the 3-digit ISCO code of their
occupation. The income volatility of parents as well as that of children contains
the lowest and highest values; means (0.26) and variance (0.05) are stable across
generations. Figure 2.2 provides a first look at the intergenerational relationship
between income volatility of fathers and sons. The figure shows children’s average
earnings risk, for given income volatility of their father without controls for any
observable characteristics. The size of the circles indicates the frequency of children.
The son’s willingness to take risks is clearly increasing in the father’s willingness to
take risks, the simple correlation is 0.157.
Figure 2.2: Income Variance: Sons Versus Fathers
Note: Average earnings variance of child for a given level of
father’s earnings volatility. Size of circles indicates weighting
with the number of children.
14We obtain similar results if we keep these observations or drop parent-child pairs with the
same occupations at higher levels of ISCO-code aggregation.
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistics Transmission Regression
Variable Description Obs Mean SD Min Max
Son’s Jobrisk Generated risk measure son 539 0.2699 0.0473 0.1635 0.4651
Father’s Jobrisk Generated risk measure father 539 0.2637 0.0463 0.1635 0.4651
Controls for Sons:
Age In years 539 25.2004 5.5098 17 44
Year of Birth Year 539 1980.64 6.0995 1961 1991
Married 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.1484 0.3558 0 1
Health Health status 539 2.0278 0.7375 1 4
Education In years 539 11.4499 2.3900 7 18
Tenure In years 539 3.5353 3.9068 0 25.4
Works in Public Sector 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.1132 0.3171 0 1
log net income Logged monthly income in e 539 6.8496 0.6712 4.6052 8.8537
Religion: Catholic 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.3024 0.4597 0 1
Religion: Protestant 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.2301 0.4213 0 1
Religion: other 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.0631 0.2433 0 1
Religion: none 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.0575 0.2330 0 1
Religion: missing 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.3469 0.4764 0 1
Obs. from 2001 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.1095 0.3125 0 1
Obs. from 2002 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.1058 0.3078 0 1
Obs. from 2003 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.0724 0.2593 0 1
Obs. from 2004 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.0686 0.2531 0 1
Obs. from 2005 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.0872 0.2824 0 1
Obs. from 2006 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.0631 0.2433 0 1
Obs. from 2007 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.0705 0.2562 0 1
Obs. from 2008 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.0835 0.2769 0 1
Obs. from 2009 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.3395 0.4740 0 1
Controls for Fathers:
Fathers’ Age In years 539 53.5399 6.0127 36 72
Fathers’ Year of Birth Year 539 1952.42 6.4294 1932 1968
Fathers’ Education In years 539 11.3701 2.1515 7 18
Father married 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.9351 0.2466 0 1
Father in public sector 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.2152 0.4114 0 1
Father log net HH income Logged monthly HH income in e 539 8.1471 0.4150 6.3969 9.3057
Father grew up in:
Large City 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.0835 0.2769 0 1
Medium City 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.0353 0.1846 0 1
Small city 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.1095 0.3125 0 1
Countryside 1=yes, 0=no 539 0.1892 0.3921 0 1




We are interested in whether the correlation between children’s and parent’s risk
behavior can be confirmed when controlling for other determinants. We regress the
child’s risk variable on the parent’s one using four different specifications. Equation
2.1 shows the (comprehensive) model of our transmission regressions:
Child riski = α + β1Father riski + β2Xi + β3Father Xi + εi (2.1)
The dependent variable is the earnings risk associated with the child i’s current
occupation. Our main (independent) variable of interest is the earnings risk of the
father’s current occupation. Model 1 is a bivariate regression. We estimate the model
using ordinary least squares (OLS) and include dummies for the wave from which
the observation is drawn in all regressions. To take into account the possibility that
errors are correlated within occupations, all hypothesis tests are calculated using
standard errors clustered at the occupation-level of the child.
Model 2 adds several personal and labor-market-related variables of the child
(Xi). In various studies, risk preferences have been found to be related to socioe-
conomic characteristics (e.g., Barsky et al. 1997, Sahm 2007, Dohmen et al. 2011).
Furthermore, we aim to control for other factors that determine occupational sort-
ing. We take into account the age of the child, being married, and a set of dummies
for the individual’s religion. Since healthy individuals have been found be more
inclined to take risks, we include an individual’s self assessment of his health status
measured on a 5-point-scale. The (riskiness of the) occupational choice should be in-
fluenced by the individual’s years of schooling and the duration at an employer. We
also include a dummy indicating whether the individual is employed in the public
sector.
In model 3, we add the individual’s net monthly income in logs. We do so in
an extra step as the variable is potentially endogenous.15 A relationship between
risk aversion and income and wealth is assumed by standard microeconomic theory.
The empirical evidence is, however, mixed. While some studies find a negative
relationship (e.g., Hartog et al. 2002), Barksy et al. (1997) show that the willingness
to take risks increases in income and wealth until the middle of the distributions,
and then decreases.
15 One might argue that, if only compensation is sufficient, all workers are willing to accept a
risky job. An alternative is to consider income when calculating the risk measure. We obtain the
same results if we divide the variation of the residual by the mean of log income in the respective
occupation to account for the relative nature of income risk.
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In the fourth specification, we include fathers’ characteristics (Father X). King
(1974) points out that children from wealthy family choose occupations involving
higher occupational risk. The net household income of the parental household is
included as a proxy for the wealth of a family. In addition, we control for the
father’s years of education, his age, whether he is married and works in the public
sector and the residence during the first 15 years of life of the parents to take into
account risk-related effects that stem from growing up in a certain environment.16
Summary statistics are given in Table 2.4.
Baseline Results
The results of the OLS estimates can be found in Table 2.5. In all models, the
effect of fathers’ risk measure is significant at the 1% level and positive as expected.
The magnitude of the effect drops from 0.156 to 0.12 once we include children’s
characteristics and does not change after adding further controls. It is striking that
the coefficient obtained by Dohmen et al. (2012) in the regressions of the child’s
stated risk attitude on their parents’ one (mother and father) also using SOEP data
is of almost equal magnitude.
In line with Bonin et al. (2007), we find that education has a positive effect on
occupational risk tolerance. Tenure at an employer has a weakly negative effect.
Individuals that change their jobs less frequently seem to be less willing to take
income risks. The material endowment does not seem to have an effect. Neither the
individual’s income nor the parent’s one has an effect on the income volatility of the
occupation. We find weak evidence that individuals without church affiliation are
more inclined to take income risk.
To interpret the size of the fathers’ effect, we multiply the coefficient from the
fourth model with the standard deviation of the fathers’ risk measure. An increase
in the father’s income risk by one standard deviation increases the child’s earnings
volatility by 0.006. It implies that an increase in father’s income volatility by one
standard deviation increases the child’s earnings volatility by 0.13 standard devia-
tions for the child. It is similar to the results by Dohmen et al. (2012) who report
that a one standard deviation increase in self-reported risk aversion for both parents
is associated with a total increase of about 0.32 standard deviations for the child.
16While it would be interesting to also include this information for the child, the data is largely
unavailable. The parent’s residence of youth might yet serve as a proxy if the family lived or moved
to the same type of region when the child was young.
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Table 2.5: Intergenerational Transmission: Baseline Results
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Father’s jobrisk 0.156*** 0.127*** 0.126*** 0.122***
(0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.044)
Age 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Married(d) -0.004 -0.004 -0.006
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Subj health (1-5) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Education(yrs) 0.005** 0.005** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Tenure(yrs) -0.001* -0.001 -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Works in public sector(d) -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
log net income -0.002 -0.002
(0.006) (0.006)
Father age (yrs) -0.000
(0.000)
Father education (yrs) 0.001
(0.001)
Father married (d) -0.001
(0.008)
Father in public sector (d) 0.003
(0.004)
Father log net HH income -0.002
(0.007)
Other controls NO YES YES YES
N 539 539 539 539
F 3.277 2.295 2.206 2.283
Adj. R2 0.036 0.097 0.095 0.089
OLS estimation. Robust standard errors clustered at the occupation-level of the child in
parentheses. Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗∗∗ : 1%. Dependent variable is the
variation of the residuals obtained from the regressions shown in Table 2.1 (the earnings risk
of the child’s current occupation). All regressions contain year dummies. Additional controls
are for model (2-3): indicator variables for religion (catholic, protestant, other religion, no
religion, missing). For model (4): as in model (2-3) plus dummies for parent’s location of
residence at the age of 16.
“Life Cycle Effects”
An important question is whether children of all age groups are equally influenced
by their parents’ willingness to take income risks. As suggested by Bonin et al.
(2007), younger children might work in an occupation which is only one step of
the career path necessary to proceed to the occupation in which they actually aim
to work in - and which represents the riskiness they are willing to take. Beshears
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et al. (2008) point out that personal experience with a decision decreases possible
deviations between revealed and normative preferences. The literature on inter-
generational earnings elasticity furthermore suggests that a “life cycle bias” exists.
The intergenerational link is found to be stronger if earnings are observed at similar
ages (Gouskova et al. 2010) or for older children (Haider and Solon 2006, Dahl and
DeLeire 2008).
For this reason, we estimate the transmission regressions using different subsam-
ples. First of all, we split the sample at the age of 25, i.e., the mean age in our
sample. Results are shown in Table 2.6. As can be seen, for children that are 25
years old or older the coefficient on the fathers’ riskiness of the job choice is signif-
icant and with a value of 0.2 larger than in the baseline regressions. In contrast,
the effect is smaller (0.07) and insignificant for children younger than 25. In line
with the literature on intergenerational earnings mobility, the correlation seems to
increase with the age of the child. For instance, Dahl and DeLeire (2008) find that
the intergenerational correlation is 0.04 for 20-year-old, 0.17 for 24-year-old and 0.33
for 30-year-old children suggesting some similarity with our findings.
In the above regressions, we observe the current choice of job of parents and chil-
dren. It would be interesting to study whether parents’ and children’s risk behavior
is alike at a similar stage in their life, i.e., when they are of the same age, have the
same family status etc. Unfortunately, the only occupational information available
for fathers and sons is their job at an early stage of their career. A regression of the
children’s current on the father’s first job (an information requested in the SOEP)
indicate that there is no relationship, as can be seen in Table 2.6. This result is
hardly surprising, several explanations have already been provided above.
Another possibility is to include an historical average of father’s job risk as an
explanatory variable. In the literature on intergenerational earnings elasticity, his-
torical averages of father’s earnings have been shown to reduce the attenuation bias;
the correlation increases when more years of father’s earnings are taken into account
(Solon 2002, Dahl and DeLeire 2008). We follow that approach and calculate aver-
ages of fathers’ earnings risk over the last five years using all observations available
for that period. As can be seen in Table 2.6, the magnitude of the effect is un-
changed compared to baseline regressions. The significance of the effect drops to
the 5%-level once we include further control variables. While we cannot confirm
that using averages increases the link, we also do not find evidence for the contrary.
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Table 2.6: Intergenerational Transmission: “Life Cycle Effects”
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Only children<25
Father’s jobrisk 0.097 0.081 0.075 0.073
(0.058) (0.063) (0.060) (0.059)
Child controls NO YES YES YES
Child income NO NO YES YES
Father controls NO NO NO YES
N 281 281 281 281
F 1.925 2.565 2.594 2.359
Adj. R2 0.022 0.068 0.085 0.082
Only children>24
Father’s jobrisk 0.207*** 0.177*** 0.187*** 0.197***
(0.062) (0.060) (0.061) (0.066)
Child controls NO YES YES YES
Child income NO NO YES YES
Father controls NO NO NO YES
N 258 258 258 258
F 2.434 2.535 2.338 3.933
Adj. R2 0.031 0.087 0.097 0.100
Father’s first job
Father’s first jobrisk 0.070 0.010 0.010 0.000
(0.058) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044)
Child controls NO YES YES YES
Child income NO NO YES YES
Father controls* NO NO NO YES
N 594 594 594 594
F 2.513 2.012 1.961 2.229
Adj. R2 0.008 0.117 0.116 0.123
History of father’s jobrisk
Father’s history of jobrisk 0.148*** 0.128** 0.122** 0.124**
(0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.060)
Child controls NO YES YES YES
Child income NO NO YES YES
Father controls NO NO NO YES
N 350 350 350 350
F 4.854 3.351 3.052 6.441
Adj. R2 0.049 0.087 0.092 0.087
OLS estimation. Robust standard errors clustered at the occupation-level of the child in
parentheses. Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%. Dependent variable is
the variation of the residuals obtained from the regressions shown in Table 2.1 (the earnings
risk of the child’s current occupation). Controls as in Table 2.5.
Stability of the Risk Measure over Time
A problem is that we cannot observe the distribution of earnings risk when the
individual chose his occupation. As a global measure of income risk perceived from
28
an ex ante point of view, the measure calculated using the full period thus seems to be
the most representative. However, it is possible that earnings risk changes over time
(for example due to shocks or structural changes in the economy) and individuals are
constrained in continuous optimization (for example due to incomplete information,
cognitive limitations or transaction costs). Given path-dependencies, individuals
from the parent generation might work in an occupation that is connected to another
risk today then it was when they decided. The income variation from an earlier
period might be a better proxy for the risk they are willing to take.
For this reason, we calculate two separate risk measures, one for each decade that
our sample for the Mincer regressions covers. A comparison of the mean of income
risk in the period from 1990 to 1999 compared to the variance calculated for the
years from 2000 to 2009 shows an increase in unexplained variation of income over
time from an average of 0.24 to 0.28, the change is significant at the 1%-level (see
also Table 2.2, row 2 and 3). This is in line with the literature reporting that men’s
income volatility increased over time (e.g., Bartels and Bo¨nke (2010) for Germany).
We attach the risk measure calculated using the subsample from 1990 to 1999
to parents and assign the earnings volatility based on the years 2000 to 2009 to
children. We thereby try to account for parents and children making their job
choices at different times. Results are largely unchanged; while the coefficient is the
same as in the baseline regression, the significance drops to 5%, as can be seen in
Table 2.7. It is of course a crude approach to address the issue raised above.
Since children observe the current job choice and income variation, it is also
possible that the risk distribution based on the sample from recent years is more
appropriate. Regression with the earnings volatility from 2000-2009 assigned to
parents and children show slightly larger and more significant coefficients; the cor-
relation between fathers’ and sons’ income risk is 0.14, as can be seen in Table 2.7.
While the difference is rather negligible, the result weakly suggests that children
observe the current income volatility of their fathers when making their own choice.
Another objection with respect to earnings variance calculated over one or two
decades is that substantial labor market reforms were introduced in Germany in
the early 2000s. Between 2003 and 2005 several changes came into effect which had
the aim to increase efficiency and decrease the unemployment rate (so called “Hartz
concept”). To increase incentives to participate in the labor market, this inter alia
included cutting unemployment benefits. It is possible that these changes had an
effect on the income volatility. Therefore, we calculate the earnings variance over
the period 2005-2009 (descriptive statistics can be found in Table 2.2) and assign
the measures to parents and children. Results are shown in Table 2.7. As can be
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seen, baseline results are confirmed, the intergenerational correlation is 0.14.
The analyses reported in this section suggest that the period used for calculating
earnings volatility does not have an effect on the magnitude of the intergenerational
link.
Table 2.7: Intergenerational Transmission: Stability of
Risk Measure over Time
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Variance of 1990s=parents, 2000s=children
Father’s jobrisk 0.148*** 0.131** 0.129** 0.124**
(0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.055)
Child controls NO YES YES YES
Child income NO NO YES YES
Father controls NO NO NO YES
N 480 480 480 480
F 8.404 2.738 2.713 1.983
Adj. R2 0.015 0.064 0.067 0.056
Variance of 2000s=parents+children
Father’s jobrisk 0.143*** 0.139*** 0.136*** 0.136***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.042) (0.045)
Child controls NO YES YES YES
Child income NO NO YES YES
Father controls NO NO NO YES
N 506 506 506 506
F 11.092 3.515 3.499 2.581
Adj. R2 0.020 0.086 0.090 0.083
Variance since 2005=parents+children
Father’s jobrisk 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.149*** 0.135***
(0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.043)
Child controls NO YES YES YES
Child income NO NO YES YES
Father controls NO NO NO YES
N 432 432 432 432
F 3.378 2.293 2.307 4.041
Adj. R2 0.038 0.090 0.102 0.095
OLS estimation. Robust standard errors clustered at the occupation-level of
the child in parentheses. Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ :
1%. Dependent variable as explained in the text. Controls as in Table 2.5.
Taking into Account Ability
A possible objection to occupational earnings variance as a measure of risk aversion
is that the residual captures a variety of unobservable factors besides compensation
for income risk. In particular, ability is presumed to be an important determinant
of earnings that can hardly be observed. If earnings heterogeneity is to some extent
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due to information known to and acted on by the individual when making decisions
- while unknown to the researcher - the observed variance in wages is the sum of the
variance of random income components and of ability (as well as the covariance of
the two, see Jacobs et al. 2009).
Cunha et al. (2005) show that earnings variability is a largely reliable measure of
the unpredictable earnings component if the individual only has knowledge about his
cognitive ability (e.g., from cognitive tests). To take such knowledge into account,
we include a proxy for an individual’s ability into the Mincer regression. The only
measure that is available at a larger scale (though still only for a quarter of the
observations used in the baseline Mincer regressions), are grades received during
school. Grades have been requested in the biography questionnaire for persons
entering the SOEP since 2001.17 We include the mean of the individuals’ grades in
mathematics and German lessons in the baseline Mincer regressions. As expected,
the results indicate that better grades in high school have a positive impact on an
individual’s income as can be observed in column (2) of Table 2.1. The number of
occupations for which we are able to calculate the variation of unexplained income
drops (from 74 categories to 42 categories) which also does the sample size for
analyzing the intergenerational link. Nevertheless, the mean, standard deviation
and minimum and maximum value remain similar to the risk measure employed for
the baseline results, as can be seen in Table 2.2.
Results on the intergenerational transmission regressions are shown in Table 2.8.
The positive relationship between fathers’ and sons’ earnings risk is largely un-
changed; the coefficient is 0.11 in the comprehensive model and still significant at
the 5%-level. If the sample is restricted to individuals older than 24, we again find
a coefficient of 0.2 that is significant at the 1%-level (not reported). Removing un-
observed variance due to ability reflected in grades thus does not change previous
results. While we hope to remove some doubts that earnings variance is (partly) due
to ability, we have to acknowledge that grades may not represent all knowledge that
individuals have regarding their ability. The issue is further discussed in Section
2.5.
Income Volatility per Individual
The results might be challenged by a general skepticism regarding our risk measure.
The above approach is grounded on the assumption that an individual contemplating
to opt for a certain occupation considers the wage distribution of that job. When
17“What grade or points did you get in your last report card?” The highest achievable school
grade in Germany is a 1, while a 6 denotes the lowest grade.
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Table 2.8: Intergenerational Transmission: Ability and In-
dividual Income Variance
model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4
b/se b/se b/se b/se
Including ability
Father’s jobrisk 0.125*** 0.130*** 0.120*** 0.111**
(0.045) (0.045) (0.044) (0.051)
Child controls NO YES YES YES
Child income NO NO YES YES
Father controls NO NO NO YES
N 383 383 383 383
F 2.529 2.032 1.946 4.984
Adj. R2 0.037 0.079 0.100 0.093
Individual income volatility(*)
Father’s jobrisk 0.200*** 0.184*** 0.183*** 0.163**
(0.066) (0.066) (0.067) (0.073)
Child controls NO YES YES YES
Child income NO NO YES YES
Father controls NO NO NO YES
N 305 305 305 305
Adj. R2 0.021 0.039 0.045 0.028
OLS estimation. Dependent variable as explained in the text. Controls as in
Table 2.5. Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%. (*) Boot-
strapped standard errors in parentheses to take into account that regressors
have been generated in a previous stage (1000 repetitions). Child controls:
cohort dummies, religion dummies, education (yrs); Child income: mean log
income in observed period; Father controls: cohort dummies, education (yrs),
mean log HH income in observed period, parent’s location of residence at the
age of 16.
making the decision, the individual cannot predict where in the relevant earnings
distribution he will end up. He thus chooses according to the uncertainty he is
willing to accept with respect to his future wages. Income volatility calculated per
occupation over several years seems to be a good proxy for this.18
Another possibility is to employ the realized income path of an individual. The lit-
erature concerned with trends in earnings volatility provides alternative approaches
to calculate individual earnings variation. Many analyses use complicated models
to decompose earnings inequality into permanent and transitory components (e.g.,
Moffitt and Gottschalk 1995, 2008, Haider 2001, Baker and Solon 2003, or also
Shore 2011). These approaches have been criticized for being sensitive to variations
in model specification which makes results to some extent arbitrary (Shin and Solon
2011). As a consequence, many researchers have focused on simple variances of
year-to-year changes of the (residual) income (e.g., Dahl et al. 2008, Dynan et al.
2007, Shin and Solon 2011). Moffitt and Gottschalk (2008) find that simpler meth-
18Ex ante variability is proxied by ex post income, as pointed out by Cunha et al. (2005).
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ods produce approximately the same patterns as more sophisticated methods which
consider autocorrelation. We check whether our results hold using such measure of
income volatility.
First of all, we estimate a Mincer regression as described above (see Shore 2011).
The residual from that regression is used to calculate the difference of the unex-
plained component between two subsequent years. We then calculate the standard
deviation of residual income changes per individual. The same sample selection
outlined in Section 2.3.3 applies. Furthermore, we restrict the sample to all individ-
uals for which we have more than two income differences. Calculating the variance
for children of which many only started working recently requires us to set these
numbers as low as possible. The sample for which we are able to obtain individual
income variance slightly differs; the most important difference is that children are on
average older (average birth year: 1971, above: 1980).19 Given the life-cycle effects
described above, this has to be taken into account when interpreting results.
We regress the son’s income volatility on father’s income volatility. Some ad-
justments apply to the control variables as income volatility now refers to a period
instead of an occupation pursued in a specific year. We include all controls that
are (largely) time-invariant (cohort, education, religion) or can be included as an
average (income).
Table 2.8 shows the results. As can be seen, we find a significantly positive
relationship, the coefficient drops once we include control variables. The correlation
between fathers’ and sons’ individual income volatility in the most comprehensive
model is 0.16. The effect is more similar to the one obtained with the subsample
of individuals older than 24. This can easily be explained by average years of birth
being more similar. Using individual or occupational earnings variance hence does
not seem to have an effect on the result, albeit limitations of comparability due to
differing samples have to be taken into account.
2.5 Discussion
Intergenerational transmission of risk aversion has been established using stated
preferences. The comparison of those studies to our findings shows large similarity
of results. In ours and most of the other analyses, the correlation between children’s
19Differences in the sample are inevitable due to two different restrictions. In the above analysis,
a requirement is availability of information on ISCO-codes which is relaxed here. In the regressions
reported in this section, we require the individual to be observed in at least 3 years. The overlap
of the two samples is too small to impose the restriction that individuals are included in both
samples. This of course limits comparability of results.
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and parents’ risk preferences ranges between 0.1 and 0.2 (Charles and Hurst 2003,
Dohmen et al. 2012, Arrondel 2009, Kimball et al. 2009, Shore 2011). Hryshko et
al. (2011) only find an intergenerational link for persons that belong to an extreme
category.
A conclusion indicated by all studies is that the intergenerational correlation in
risk aversion is rather weak. According to Cohen (1988), a correlation of 0.1-0.3 is
small in terms of effect size (0.3-0.5 is moderate, >0.5 is large). In the literature
on intergenerational earnings mobility, a correlation of this magnitude is taken as
weak transmission (or a “highly mobile“ society). Intergenerational analyses hence
explain only a small fraction of where risk preferences come from.
However, decades of studying the intergenerational earnings elasticity have shown
that the more attention is paid to attenuation bias, the higher the link that is found
(e.g., Solon 2002, Dahl and DeLeire 2008). As has been pointed out above, all
quantifications of risk aversion are potentially subject to noise. If attenuation bias
is also of importance for estimating intergenerational transmission of risk aversion,
the results might provide an underestimation. Uncertainty remains regarding the
existence and magnitude of such effect.
A possible concern specific to our revealed preferences approach is that parents
determine their child’s human capital acquisition. While the literature trying to
identify a causal link between parents’ and children’s education does not provide
clear-cut evidence (e.g., Black et al. 2005), it is reasonable to assume that parents’
to some extent influence the educational track of the child. Due to path-dependency
of the educational system, the correlation might simply reflect parents’ educational
decisions. Our analysis shows that for each skill level differently risky occupations
are available. Even if the educational choice by parents determines the menu of
occupations available to the child, we would expect that parents choose an education
in line with their own risk preferences. This might represent one mechanism of
inheritance of risk preferences. However, to the extent that parents influence their
children’s occupational choice for other reasons, the link would be overestimated.
The analysis is based on the assumption that measured earnings risk is the un-
forecastable component of earnings an individual expects and accepts from an ex
ante point of view. Taking into account ability by including school grades in Mincer
regressions does not change the results. A bias might, however, exist if the indi-
vidual has further information on his ability and acts on it when making decisions.
The theoretical analysis by Jacobs et al. (2009) shows that the sign of the selec-
tivity bias due to ability is ambiguous. Cunha et al. (2005) claim that about half
of the variability in returns to schooling (high school versus college graduation) can
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be forecasted by agents at age 19. Equating earnings variability with uncertainty
hence overstates earnings risk. If the forecastable component increases the earnings
variance equally in all occupations, this should not provide a problem. Another
possibility is that the forecastable component differs, e.g., is lower for occupations
which require lower ability, but is similar for parents and children (e.g., due to similar
ability). This would also imply an overestimation of the link.
We cannot be sure whether the limitations apply, whether they are crucial and
would change our results. The fact that evidence based on different approaches
produces very similar results is, however, reassuring. The joint evidence suggests
that intergenerational transmission of risk aversion is weak.
2.6 Conclusion
The controversy regarding the appropriate measurement of risk aversion suggests
that it is important to study whether children and parents not only report similar
risk attitudes but also show a similar willingness to take risks in their behavior. The
present chapter provides evidence based on a real and major economic decision: the
choice of occupation.
We find that risk behavior, revealed by sons’ and fathers’ willingness to accept
earnings volatility, is significantly correlated across generations. Our study thus
confirms the hypothesis of intergenerational transmission of risk aversion. It is
reassuring that results are not sensitive to the use of different approaches; even
the magnitude of the effect found in different studies is largely similar. Ours and
previous evidence, however, suggests that the intergenerational correlation is rather




Stereotypes and Risk Attitudes:
Evidence from the Lab and the
Field
3.1 Introduction
The correlation between risk attitudes and sociodemographic characteristics has
been actively studied in recent years (Dohmen et al. 2011, von Gaudecker et al.
2011). However, the studies so far only report correlations between risk preferences
and sociodemographics. These findings give rise to the question of whether subjects
are aware of the correlation between risk preferences and sociodemographic infor-
mation. It is of interest whether and to which sociodemographic attributes subjects
assign value, i.e., attach informational content. Therefore, our study allows to pro-
ceed a step further than previous studies by studying how subjects assess the risk
preferences of others. If subjects rely on sociodemographics when forming beliefs
about others’ risk preferences - in particular if this information is costly - this allows
concluding that the relationship goes beyond pure correlations.1
Previous evidence suggests that risk attitudes are important for decision making,
for example for buying stocks or becoming self-employed (e.g., Dohmen et al. 2011).
When making their decisions, however, individuals are increasingly relying on pro-
fessionals - such as doctors in the health domain, insurance agents, and in particular
financial consultants (cf. Allen 2001, Bhattacharya et al. 2012). In recent years,
regulators have become concerned about the quality of financial advice.2 In order
1This chapter is based on Leuermann and Roth (2012a).
2A result of these concerns is e.g., the “Markets in Financial Instruments Directive” of the
European Union, which is - besides other objectives - set up to protect consumers in investment
services. In the US, the “Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010” accommodates these
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to improve financial advice, some countries, e.g., Germany3, introduced a standard-
ized questionnaire in the course of the counseling interview in which advisees are
asked to self-assess their risk attitudes. Our research thus focuses on regulations as
well; we investigate whether this self-assessment it recognized as helpful by advisors,
especially if they are working in the financial sector.
To study these concerns, we conduct an artefactual field experiment4 in which
three types of subjects participate: senior financial advisors, junior financial advi-
sors and non-professionals. In particular, we assess professionals’ knowledge about
decision making and seek to ascertain if they attach importance to other character-
istics than subjects without advice experience. Studying these groups in particular
allows us to explore potential sorting effects into employment in the financial sector
(cf. Bonin et al. 2007, Dohmen and Falk 2011, Haigh and List 2005), especially
as the junior professionals and non-professionals are similar in age and educational
status.
The experiment consists of two main parts. The first part is based on a survey
conducted on the Web and a large-scale survey (SOEP) of Germany. In them, we
estimate risk preferences of certain subgroups of the population (e.g., older versus
younger, female versus male). In the second part, we run a computerized lab exper-
iment. The lab experiment consists of two main stages. In the first stage, we elicit
subjects’ stereotypes (perceived correlations) of risk preferences of sociodemographic
groups (such as gender). Secondly, we inspect which sociodemographic characteris-
tics subjects use in the process of giving advice, namely assessing the risk preferences
of others. By augmenting the subject pool with financial professionals we are able
to study behavioral differences between financial advisors and non-professionals.
The results of the experiment show that subjects recognize the correlation be-
tween particular sociodemographic variables and risk preferences. The subjects are
able to assess how their own risk attitude relates to the mean risk attitude of a
representative population with a high precision. Professionals in general are slightly
more risk averse than the observed non-professionals.
When forming beliefs over another person’s risk attitude, subjects are willing
to pay for sociodemographic information about the assessed person. Subjects thus
expect informational value coming from the sociodemographic information. This
finding provides external validity for studies that find pure correlations between risk
matters.
3The exact wording of the regulations defined by German regulators can be found under §31,4-5
WPHG (Security Trading Act).
4Artefactual field experiments use the tools of a standard lab experiment with a non-standard
subject pool (Harrison and List 2004).
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preferences and sociodemographics.
In particular an advisee’s self-assessment of risk preferences and the advisee’s
gender are considered to be informative when judging another person. However,
senior financial professionals attach less informational content to the self-assessment
of risk preferences than the other subject groups. Surprisingly, the subject group
with the highest counseling experience trusts less in the information requested by
regulators. Our findings are consistent across the treatments and mechanisms to
elicit risk preferences.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: In the next section (Section
3.2), we discuss the literature on risk preferences and advice. Section 3.3 explains
the experimental design of the study. Section 3.4 presents the treatments in detail
and the results, the conclusions follow in Section 3.5. The experimental instructions
can be found in Appendix A.
3.2 Literature
Recent research on risk preferences has detected significant linkages between sociode-
mographic characteristics and risk attitudes. It is largely undisputed that women
are more risk averse than men (e.g., Byrnes et al. 1999, Croson and Gneezy 2009).
By using German micro data (SOEP) Dohmen et al. (2011) in addition find that
individuals are more risk averse if older, married, or with children. The authors
report that individuals are more risk loving if they have a high school diploma or
higher income. However, regarding the relationship of education or income and risk
tolerance, the findings of other literature are ambiguous (cf. Belzil and Leonardi
2007, Barsky et al. 1997, Hartog et al. 2002). In addition, Dohmen et al. (2011)
report that actual behavior is related to answers to risk questions asked; a significant
correlation between stated risk preferences and e.g., holding risky financial assets
such as stocks, smoking, and being self-employed becomes evident. Nevertheless,
these findings report mere correlations.
One strategy to figure out others’ preferences is subsumed by “stereotyping”,
namely subjects’ intuition regarding the variation of a single piece of sociodemo-
graphic information. Regarding the knowledge about the correlation between risk
preferences and sociodemographic information, Eckel and Grossman (2008) study
gender stereotypes. Their results are twofold: First, in line with previous results,
females tolerate less risk than males. And second, the beliefs5 over gender are con-
sistent since women are perceived to be less risk tolerant. In this setup the judged
5In the literature ‘prediction’, ‘forecast’ and ‘belief’ are used interchangeably.
38
person is fully visible to the judging subject. If the belief formation is based on
groups (e.g., males) instead of individuals, subjects overestimate males’ risk toler-
ance, while females’ is correctly assessed (Siegrist et al. 2002). In terms of cultural
stereotypes people perceive Chinese to be less risk tolerant than Americans. Inter-
estingly, the actual experimental data shows that the opposite is true (Hsee and
Weber 1999).
One of the most obvious situations in which advice is of major interest is in
financial decision making. Previous studies suggest that financial professionals are
less prone to behavioral biases, such as anchoring effects when forming expectations
about long-term stock returns (Kaustia et al. 2008). They show a higher degree
of analytical behavior than the general population (Nofsinger and Varma 2007).
Furthermore, there is contradictory evidence regarding the degree of myopic loss
aversion of financial professionals compared to student subjects (Eriksen and Kvaløy
2009, Haigh and List 2005). Financial professionals are better in assessing the quality
of public information, while students more closely follow Bayes’ Rule (Alevy et al.
2007). Nevertheless, artefactual field experiments which allow observing financial
professionals and students in an identical situation are rare.
One reason why financial professionals could systematically exhibit different risk
preferences than other employees is occupational sorting. It is argued that individ-
uals who are willing to take more risk sort into occupations with a higher variance
in income (Bonin et al. 2007, Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln 2005, Grund and
Sliwka 2010) or even with a higher mortality risk (DeLeire and Levy 2004). Typi-
cally, financial advisors are paid with highly premium dependent incentive schemes,
which might attract particularly risk tolerant individuals (Dohmen and Falk 2011,
Masclet et al. 2009).
This study contributes to the existing literature by analyzing subjects’ stereo-
types of risk preferences by varying several sociodemographic characteristics. We
investigate to which characteristics subjects attach informational content when as-
sessing others. We are thus able to extend research on the relationship between risk
preferences and sociodemographics beyond pure correlations. This is the first study
that takes up these questions by an artefactual field experiment as the subject pool
is augmented by junior as well as senior financial professionals. This setup allows
exploring differences in behavior between the subject groups.
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3.3 Experimental Design
Since the objective of this analysis is to investigate how subjects predict the risk
preferences of others, it is vital to prepare the exposition of the given sociodemo-
graphic characteristics thoughtfully. Therefore, the experiment consists of two parts
(cf. Figure 3.1). In the first part we use survey data and evaluate risk attitudes
of subsamples identified by certain sociodemographic variables (e.g., parents vs.
non-parents). In the second part, initiated six months afterwards, a computerized
lab experiment is employed. The lab experiment consists of the treatments SELF,
SINGLE and SIMULT.6 Subjects participating in the first part are denominated as
advisees whereas the subjects of the lab experiment are called advisors. In the lab,
advisors perform one treatment after another. During the experiment there is no
interaction and no feedback about the payoff. Each treatment is performed with
two different risk measures which will be described in Section 3.3.1.
The SELF treatment is the first step in the experiment. When coming to the
lab, advisors are randomly allocated to sit at the computers. After logging into the
experimental software advisors answer questions about their sociodemographics and
their risk attitudes are elicited.
In the second treatment (SINGLE), we study advisors’ knowledge about the
correlation between a single sociodemographic variable and risk tolerance. The
different subsamples from part one are presented to the advisors. Their task is to
decide which subsample makes the riskier choice on average within each subgroup
(e.g., whether they think that parents show a riskier behavior than non-parents). By
this we are able to investigate the advisors’ stereotypes on the effect of the variation
of a single sociodemographic property on risk preferences. With the data from the
surveys (see Section 3.3.2), we compare the risk attitudes of different subsamples
(e.g., whether non-parents are more risk tolerant than parents) and construct the
correct answer.
In the third treatment (SIMULT), we investigate if advisors attach informational
value to the different sociodemographic properties. To accomplish this we choose
eight profiles from the survey-data of part one, which we show to the advisors
successively. The advisor’s task is to predict the risk attitude for each single advisee
presented. The profiles are presented in different modes - RANK and PAY - which
are explained in Section 3.4.3. In contrast to the SINGLE treatment, the advisors
have to judge the risk preferences of an individual advisee instead of assessing the
average decision of certain subgroups. Finally, the payoffs are shown to the advisors
6The instructions of both parts of the experiment can be found in Appendix A.
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and the session is finished.7
Figure 3.1: Experimental Design: Course of Action
3.3.1 Measures of Risk Aversion
Before the treatments are described in detail, we introduce two mechanisms to elicit
risk preferences.
The first measure employed is a variation of the multiple price list design (MPL)
of Holt and Laury (2002) (hereafter: “HL-lottery”). In order to enforce monotonicity
of the risk preferences we use a switching MPL or sMPL instead of the classic design
(Andersen et al. 2006) as depicted in Figure 3.2. In this mechanism a subject is
confronted with ten choices between two lotteries (option A or option B). Option A
pays e2 in the first state and e1.60 in the second state. Option B pays e3.85 in the
first and e0.10 in the second state. The payoff of option A exhibits a lower variance
than the payoff of option B. In the tenth row the amount of the first state is paid
for sure. Hence, a rational individual switches from option A to option B once - at
least at row ten. An increasing row number indicates a higher probability that the
first state is paid out. The more rows a subject opts for option B, i.e., the earlier a
subject switches from option A to option B, the higher the subject’s risk tolerance.
For the subject’s payoff in the lab experiment, one row is randomly chosen. In this
row, the lottery is played according to the subject’s choice.8 For the analysis, we
will use the first row the subject opts for option B as the measure of risk attitudes.
The second mechanism (hereafter: “e100,000 question”) applied is taken from
the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) survey. It provides the opportunity to
cross-check our experimental data with the large-scale data of the survey. The exact
wording is as follows:
7Before the payoffs are presented a further treatment is played. A companion paper explains
this treatment in detail (Leuermann and Roth (2012b) or see Chapter 4). Subjects are not informed
about the content of this last treatment before entering it. We are thus confident that it does not
bias our results.
8Although this elicitation mechanism is widely used in the literature it has its weaknesses
- it is prone to framing effects and intellectually sophisticated (Harrison and Rutstro¨m 2008).
Nevertheless, the mechanism measures risk attitudes outside the lab consistently (Harrison and
List 2004, Harrison et al. 2007).
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Figure 3.2: HL-lottery as Presented to Subjects
e100,000 question Please consider what you would do in the following situation: Imagine
that you had won e100,000 in the lottery. Almost immediately after you collect the winnings, you
receive the following financial offer, the conditions of which are as follows: There is the chance to
double the money. It is equally possible that you could lose half of the amount invested. You have
the opportunity to invest the full amount, part of the amount or reject the offer. What share of your
lottery winnings would you be prepared to invest in this financially risky, yet lucrative investment?
Your Decision e100,000 - e80,000 - e60,000 - e40,000 - e20,000 - Nothing, I would decline
the offer
The elicitation mechanism is an ordered lottery selection design in which subjects
can invest e100,000 into a lottery that doubles or halves the amount with equal
probabilities. In order to provide incentives to take the decision thoroughly in the
lab experiment, for the actual payoff we convert the e100,000 into e2.50, e80,000
into e2 etc. The reliability of this measure has been validated via a lab experiment
with substantial stakes (Dohmen et al. 2011). In contrast to the HL-lottery this
design is very easy but it captures only preferences on the risk averse domain.
For a better comparability, the e100,000 measure is rescaled in the analysis. We
will present the amount invested in an inverse order and refer to it as the amount
not invested in the lottery in units of e10,000. By this, a value of 10 indicates that
nothing is invested whereas the 0 means that e100,000 are invested into the lottery.
Hence, in both measures a higher value indicates a higher willingness to take risk
on a comparable numerical scale.
3.3.2 Part 1: Surveys
Our main goal is to study subjects’ stereotypes of the risk preferences of certain
sociodemographic groups and individuals. Before we are able to elicit these beliefs
we have to collect profiles of individuals containing their risk attitudes and their
sociodemographic information. In order to elicit the mean decision of representative
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subgroups in SINGLE and to present advisees with heterogeneous sociodemograph-
ics in SIMULT it is necessary to obtain sufficient variation within the advisees’
profiles. To collect this data we use two surveys.
First, for the HL-measure we employ a web-based survey which can be easily
distributed to different people via e-mail.9 This is necessary because for the HL-
measure no large-scale data sources are publicly available. The survey collects risk
preferences (in the HL-lottery as well as the e100,000 question) and sociodemo-
graphic information and it ran from November to December 2010.10
Secondly, concerning the collection of decisions for the e100,000 question, we can
make use of a large-scale panel. The SOEP provides representative data on 20,750
individuals containing the relevant sociodemographic information and the e100,000
question.11
The second and the third column in Table 3.1 show the descriptives of the surveys.
The data show heterogeneity within the surveys especially in the categories age,
parenthood and university education. Nevertheless, the subjects in the SOEP survey
are significantly older and thus more often have a partner and children.
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics of Advisees and Advisors
Part 1: Reference Decisions Part 2: Lab Experiment
Web survey SOEP survey Non-prof. Junior Prof. Senior Prof.
Variable mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
N 84 - 20750 - 77 - 52 - 38 -
Year born 1979 10.0 1959 17.71 1986 6.29 1989 1.06 1973 11.0
Gender (female=1) 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.18 0.39
Partner (yes=1) 0.41 0.62 0.77 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.43 0.66 0.48
Parenthood (yes=1) 0.20 0.40 0.62 0.49 0.05 0.22 0.02 0.14 0.47 0.51
High income* (yes=1) 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.07 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.31
Uni degree (yes=1) 0.59 0.50 0.21 0.41 0.94 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.63 0.49
Counsel. exp. (years) - - - - - - 1.02 1.07 10.97 8.27
Risk indexΥ 3.54 1.81 1.90 2.13 5.26 1.39 5.08 1.52 4.68 1.71
HL∆ 5.30 1.78 - - 6.81 1.56 6.33 1.78 6.32 2.08
100,000ψ 7.61 2.70 9.08 1.98 4.70 3.29 6.00 2.44 6.89 3.18
* refers to a monthly net income above e6,000 (approx. $8,460) .
Υ Self-stated risk (0=risk averse to 10= fully prepared to take risks) regarding financial matters.
∆ refers to the row in which option B was chosen for the first time in the HL-lottery.
ψ refers to the the amount not invested into the lottery in the e100,000 question.
3.3.3 Part 2: Lab Experiment
The experimental sessions took place from April 2011 to January 2012. In total 167
subjects in the role of advisors participated.12 In the subject pool of the lab experi-
9See Appendix A.1 for details.
10Participants were recruited via e-mail and were asked to further distribute the survey. For the
completion of the web-based survey we raﬄed off e50 among the participants.
11We use data from 2009. See [www.diw.de/soep] for more details.
12The experiment involves no interaction among the advisors, each advisor is therefore considered
to be an independent observation.
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ment we have three types of advisors: senior professional advisors, junior professional
advisors and non-professionals. The non-professionals are mainly students recruited
via the AWI-lab at Heidelberg University where all sessions with non-professionals
were run.13 The senior professional advisors were recruited from a German financial
advisory agency and from local banks. The junior advisors come from a banking
specific advanced training institution.14 After finishing high school, the junior pro-
fessionals enter a study program in financial advisory. This takes place at an applied
university, and practical counseling makes up 50% of their education. Since these
advisors are currently students, their age and educational level are comparable to
the non-professional advisors.
An experimental session lasted approximately 50 minutes, on average advisors
earned e11.92. Detailed information on the subject pool is shown in Table 3.1 in
columns four through six. A first observation of relevance is that, while the gender
division between junior professionals is nearly half-half, there are significantly less
female advisors among the senior professionals. This could either be a result of
women leaving their job for family reasons. On the other hand this could also indi-
cate that women, being more risk averse than males on average, avoid the premium
dependent financial sector and sort into other occupations.
A detailed description of all treatments will be given along with the results in
the next section.
3.4 Description and Results
This chapter describes the different treatments in detail and presents the results. In
Section 3.4.1 we report the advisors’ risk preferences (SELF). Then we discuss the
treatment SINGLE. In this treatment advisors were called to predict the effect of a
variation of a single sociodemographic variable on others’ risk preferences (stereo-
types). In Section 3.4.3 we present the treatment SIMULT that investigates which
characteristics (out of a given set of characteristics) are important to the advisors.
Finally, we check whether choices in the SIMULT treatment are consistent with the
knowledge exhibited in the SINGLE treatment.
13The experiment is programmed on a PHP-platform.
14We ran seven sessions with professionals - three in the lab and four on-site - under identical
conditions.
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3.4.1 SELF: Advisors’ Risk Preferences
Procedure The SELF treatment elicits the advisors’ own sociodemographics and
their risk tolerance. First, advisors answer the questions about their sociodemo-
graphics. Then they play the e100,000 question and the HL-lottery. Both measures
are incentivized as described in Section 3.3.1.
Results The distributions of the advisors’ choices in both risk elicitation mechan-
ims are presented in Figure 3.3, separately for each advisor group.15 The two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for distribution equality reveals that we cannot observe a
statistically significant difference between choices of senior and junior professionals
for the e100,000 question. On the contrary, non-professionals exhibit a significantly
different distribution compared to both groups of professionals. This is also backed
by the means of the choices in every subgroup. The amount not invested is signif-
icantly lower for non-professional advisors (around e47,000) than for professionals.
Again, no difference between senior and junior professionals can be observed; junior
professionals do not invest e60,000, senior professionals around e69,000 (cf. Table
3.1) on average. Compared to the mean choice of the SOEP survey population (cf.
Table 3.1), we find that all advisor groups are less risk averse on average.
No obvious pattern of advisors’ risk attitudes in the HL-lottery for the different
types exists, neither for the distribution of choices nor for the means as presented
in Table 3.1. The intersection of the risk neutral prediction (black solid line) with
the actual distribution of subjects’ choices in Figure 3.3 indicates that up to 13% of
the advisors exhibit risk loving choices.16 On average, however, the advisors exhibit
risk averse preferences.
Apparently, the relative payoffs - namely the earnings in the experiment compared
to the actual income - of advisors in the experiment could matter. In particular se-
nior professionals with a significantly higher income could be affected. However,
previous evidence suggests that even unincentivized lottery choices correlate with
actual behavior or behavior in incentivized choices (Dohmen et al. 2011). If the ac-
tual income matters, junior professionals should exhibit preferences similar to those
of non-professionals, as their income is similar. However, we observe that junior
and senior professionals exhibit similar choices, which underlines the occupational
sorting argument.
15Recall that for the e100,000 question we present the amount not invested in the lottery. For
the HL-lottery, the row in which option B is chosen for the first time is presented. An increasing
row number indicates a higher degree of risk aversion.
16This is similar to Holt and Laury (2002), who find 20% of subjects to exhibit risk loving choices.
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Figure 3.3: SELF: Advisors’ Risk Attitudes in e100,000 Question and HL-lottery
3.4.2 SINGLE: Variation of a Single Characteristic
Procedure At first, after finishing the SELF treatment, advisors move on to SIN-
GLE. In the first task, we are interested in finding out whether advisors are able to
locate their own risk attitudes in the (representative) distribution of risk preferences.
We ask the advisors to assess whether their own decision in the two preference elic-
itation tasks is riskier, less risky, or bears the same risk compared to the advisees’
average decision in the surveys of part 1. Advisors are informed that in a pretest,
subjects answered the e100,000 question and the HL-lottery.17
Secondly, we study stereotypes of risk preferences of different subsamples. The
exact wording and the different subsamples are presented in Table 3.2. The ad-
visors’ task is to predict correctly the subsample that makes the riskier decision.
To determine whether the advisors’ stereotypes are correct, we use the data from
the surveys of part 1. The average decisions of different subsamples formed in the
17For the HL-lottery we use the average choices in the web survey to determine the advisees’
average decision, for the e100,000 question choices from the SOEP survey are employed. However,
only the SOEP survey constitutes a representative sample of the German population. As mentioned
above, no large representative surveys are available for the HL-lottery.
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categories ‘age’, ‘gender’, ‘family status’, ‘education’, ‘parenthood’ and ‘income’ are
computed. Two subsamples are formed per category, i.e., characteristic. For these
we calculate the average decisions and infer which subsample takes the riskier de-
cision. For example, we compute the average decision among advisees that are 40
years old and above and the average of advisees that are below 40 years of age. The
averages are computed for both risk measures separately.
In Table 3.2 an asterisk (triangle) indicates the subgroup that makes the decision
that embodies more risk for the HL-lottery (the e100,000 question).18
In total, there are fourteen questions to answer: One regarding the assessment of
the advisor’s own risk preferences compared to the mean decision of the reference
group and six about the specific subgroups, each for both risk measures. Each
question pays e0.25 if answered correctly and zero otherwise.
Table 3.2: SINGLE: Average Choices of Subsamples
e100,000 question: Which group invested more money in the lottery?
HL-lottery: Which group switched to option B earlier?
Category Choice 1 Choice 2 Choice 3
Age younger than 40*∆ 40 and older both equal
Gender male*∆ female both equal
Family status single*∆ partner/married both equal
Education university degree*∆ no university degree both equal
Parenthood having no children*∆ having children both equal
Net income up to e1,000* more than e1,000∆ both equal
The riskier average decision (= the correct answer) as computed from the web survey (HL-lottery) and the
SOEP survey (e100,000 question) is denoted by an asterisk (*) for HL and by a triangle (∆) for the
e100,000 question.
Results: Risk Preferences Relative to the Population Mean Figure 3.4
shows the percentage of advisors which are able to locate themselves correctly in
the distribution of risk preferences. The figure is split up into the different subject
groups and the two elicitation instruments. On the left, the fractions of correct
answers in the e100,000 question are presented. The results indicate that over three
quarters of the non-professionals and the junior professionals rank their risk tolerance
relative to the mean choice of the subjects in the web survey and SOEP survey
correctly.19 For senior professionals this value is lower but still amounts to 63%.
Decisions in the HL-lottery in the right part show a similar pattern. Approximately
18The decisions of two samples differ only in the income variable. This is in line with the
ambiguous findings in the literature. Hartog et al. (2002) find that risk aversion decreases in
income and wealth. In contrast to that, Barsky et al. (1997) identify an inverse U-shape relation
of risk aversion and income.
19As there are three possible answers, random answering would result in 33% of correct answers.
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60% of the professionals and 67% of non-professionals assess their risk tolerance
correctly. However, no statistically significant difference can be observed between
the subgroups.
Figure 3.4: SINGLE: Advisors’ Self-Assessment Compared to Reference Group
Note: The columns denote the percentage of advisors that are
able to correctly answer the question ”What do you think, did
people in the pretest invest more, less or the same amount re-
spectively switch earlier, later or at the same point as you?”
split by the mechanism of elicitation. Answers of the partici-
pants in the SOEP and web survey are framed as pretest.
Results: Risk Preferences and Stereotypes Table 3.2 outlines the different
subsamples and their attitudes towards risk. In Figure 3.5 we present the fraction of
advisors who are able to identify this correlation correctly in the experiment. The
column labeled ‘avg. correct’ displays the average of correct answers summarized
over all six categories. It is followed by the fraction of correct answers in the six
different subsamples.
On average, for the e100,000 question, the stereotypes of the junior professionals
coincide significantly more often with the correlations in the subsamples studied in
part one than for the other subject groups; the stereotypes of the non-professionals
significantly coincide more often than the stereotypes of senior-professionals. Re-
garding the HL-lottery, again junior professionals on average answer the most ques-
tions correctly, followed by non-professionals and senior professionals. Over both
elicitation mechanisms, junior professionals recognize the correlation between so-
ciodemographic information and risk preferences with significantly higher precision
than non-professionals or senior professionals.
Considering the category ‘gender’ in Figure 3.5, nearly all advisors are aware of
the fact that men tolerate more risk than women; in the e100,000 question even
100% of junior professionals judge this correctly. On the other hand, in the HL-
lottery mechanism 61% of the senior professionals correctly believe that males, on
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Figure 3.5: SINGLE: Distribution of Correct Answers
Note: The columns denote the percentage of advisors that are able to correctly answer the question “What do
you think, on average, which of the two groups invests more/ switches earlier, or do both groups switch at the
same time/ invest the same amount?”. The categories below the columns denote the correct answers, namely the
subgroups that are found to take riskier decisions in the SOEP and web survey. The column “avg. correct” averages
the correct answers over the six characteristics per risk elicitation mechanism.
average, tolerate more risk. Considering the categories ‘age’, ‘family status’ or ‘par-
enthood’, around 70% to nearly 100% of advisors assess the statistical relationship
in the e100,000 question correctly. The percentage of correct answers is lower for
the HL-lottery in these categories with around 50 to 90%.
Whereas the data delivers fairly clear results for the first four categories, in the
‘education’ and ‘income’ category the results are less clear.20 Approximately 20%
of the non-professionals and 30 - 40% of the professional groups identify the effect
of a university degree correctly.21 While in the e100,000 question 50% to 65% are
aware of the correct correlation with ‘income’, for the HL-lottery less than 30% of
answers are accurate. The ‘income’ category is a special case as the correct answer
is “high income” to the e100,000 question and “low income” to the HL-lottery. Our
study finds that only 7% recognize this pattern correctly and answer that a different
subgroup exhibits the riskier choice.
By choosing the answer “both groups switch at the same time/invest the same
20If advisors chose their answers randomly from the three possible answers, the percentage of
correct answers (in expectation) would amount to 33%. In both mechanisms beside for income and
education a t-test rejects the null-hypothesis that the presented fractions equal 33% at reasonable
levels of significance. If we consider that people randomly answer except for the answer “both
equal”, this would amount to a 50:50 chance of answering. In all categories, the fractions of correct
answers of junior and non-professionals are significantly different from 50% except for income and
education.
21Regarding education, the correlations found in the literature are - as for income - ambiguous.
Dohmen et al. (2011) show that higher educated people are more risk tolerant. In contrast to that,
Belzil and Leonardi (2007) find only modest evidence for the hypothesis that higher risk tolerance
relates to higher education levels, whereas Barsky et al. (1997) find a U-shaped relationship
between completed years of education and the willingness to take risk.
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amount” advisors indicate that they do not or cannot attach any informational
value to this sociodemographic information. Figure 3.6 shows the percentage of
advisors per subgroup and preference elicitation mechanism averaged over all cat-
egories choosing this option. The results indicate, first, that junior professionals
significantly pick this option less frequently, namely on average in 7% (e100,000
question) and 14% of cases (HL-lottery). The other groups choose this option nearly
twice as often. Second, in the HL-lottery, the option “both groups switch at the
same time/invest the same amount” is employed significantly more often than in
the e100,000 question.
In summary, we find that advisors are able to identify their own risk attitude
relative to the risk preferences of the average choices in the surveys. The stereotypes
regarding gender, age, partner and parenthood widely coincide with the correlations
of the surveys, while this is not the case for income and education. Overall, junior
professionals appear to have the highest degree of coherence in the stereotypes.
Figure 3.6: SINGLE: Distribution of Answer “Both Equal” in e100,000 Question
and HL-lottery
Note: Answer the question “What do you think, on aver-
age, which of the two groups invests more/switches earlier,
or do both groups switch at the same time/invest the same
amount?” with “both groups switch at the same time/invest
the same amount”, averaged over all categories and split by
advisors’ type and elicitation mechanism.
3.4.3 SIMULT: Which Characteristics are Important?
In this section we analyze the sociodemographic characteristics to which (if at all)
advisors attach informational value when assessing the risk attitude of an advisee.
Procedure In contrast to the SINGLE treatment, in SIMULT the advisors have
to assess individual profiles of advisees. We chose eight profiles from the web survey
data of part one to use them as advisee profiles. Each profile contains data on seven
sociodemographic characteristics as shown in Table 3.3. The advisors are informed
which menu of information is provided for each category. The advisor’s task is
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to assess the advisee’s choice in the two risk measures correctly. If the advisor’s
prediction is correct, it pays off e0.50 for each risk measure. Each advisor has to
assess all eight advisee profiles. An example for such a profile would be a married
man with children and university degree, aged 64, and with an income over e6,000.
However, to the advisor not the whole set of sociodemographic characteristics
is necessarily available when making the prediction. We used two modes (RANK,
PAY) in order to present the advisees’ information to the advisors. Each advisor
has to assess four advisee profiles in RANK and four advisee profiles in PAY. The
order of the eight profiles is randomly assigned.
Table 3.3: RANK and PAY: Categories Provided
Age age in years
Education university, advanced training, training, studying economics, in
training, no formal training
Family status single, partner, married, divorced, living separated, widowed
Gender male, female
Net income up to e1,000, e1,001-e3,000, e3,001-e6,000, more than e6,000
Parenthood having children, having no children
Risk Index Self-assessment of risk with the question: Regarding financial mat-
ters, are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks
or do you try to avoid taking risks?(0=risk averse to 10=fully
prepared to take risks)
RANK We are interested in the informational value advisors attach to the dif-
ferent sociodemographic characteristics. In this mode, advisors can influence the
probability with which characteristics are shown to them. We ask the advisors to
rank the seven characteristics of Table 3.3. The ranking has to be stated at the
beginning of the treatment. For example, an advisor states: 1. age, 2. gender, 3.
income, 4. risk index,.... In the following the computer draws a random number
between 1 and 7. If, for example, the number is two and the ranking is as in the
example above, the advisor would see the following information about the advisee:
age: 64 years old, gender: male.
As presented in the timeline in Figure 3.7, each advisor states the ranking once
before assessing the four advisees. The same advisor’s ranking is applied to all
four advisees. However, for each advisee we draw a separate random number that
determines how many characteristics are seen. This means that advisors could see
the ‘age’ and ‘gender’ of the first advisee but ‘age’, ‘gender’ and ‘income’ for the
second advisee. The probability that a category is visible is strictly higher if ranked
higher. The category ranked first is definitely seen.
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Figure 3.7: Course of Action in RANK and PAY
PAY In the second mode PAY advisors can freely choose which characteristics are
presented to them. In contrast to RANK, the advisors have to pay for each category
in each profile (cf. Figure 3.7) separately. The characteristics are priced according
to a convex pricing rule. While the first characteristic costs e0.01 buying all seven
characteristics amounts to a total price of e0.99.22 This means, for example, that
an advisor pays e0.06 if he or she wants to see ‘age’, ‘gender’ and ‘income’. For
each new profile advisors can make their payment decision, which amounts to four
decisions. Advisors can win a maximum of e1 per profile by assessing both risk
questions correctly. The total price of the characteristics therefore never exceeds
the maximum earnings. In contrast to the RANK treatment, it is not possible to
obtain a ranking over the bought characteristics in this treatment. The advisor’s
observed decisions to buy a characteristic indicate the informational value coming
from this sociodemographic characteristic.
Results: RANK As outlined above, in the RANK treatment advisors state a
ranking to affect the probability that a category is visible. Figure 3.8 displays
the average rank of these categories assessed by the three groups of advisors sep-
arately.23 Table 3.4 shows the significance of differences between ranks according
to the Joanes’s rank sum test24 and displays the average position of the ranked
category.
For the highest average rank, we observe agreement among the groups that ‘risk
index’, the self-assessment of risk preferences regarding financial matters, is on av-
erage the most important category. While 64% of the non-professionals and 58% of
the junior professional choose ‘risk index’ on the first position, only 32% of senior
22Price for the second characteristic: e0.02, the third: e0.03, the fourth: e0.06, the fifth: e0.12,
the sixth: e0.24, the seventh: e0.50. Since advisors earn at least e4 before entering the treatments
in SIMULT, we insure that there are non-negative net earnings. Advisors are informed about this.
23For the interpretation, a “higher” average rank indicates that the respective variable is ranked
at a position that is revealed more often. A rank of 2 is thus “higher” than a rank of 3.
24This test takes the difference in the total rank sum of the categories as an indicator of significant
differences in ranks (Joanes 1985).
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professionals do so. In addition, the average rank of the risk index is significantly
lower for senior professionals than for the other two groups. All advisors on av-
erage agree that ‘gender’ and ‘income’ are ranked on the second or third position,
while for ‘family status’, ‘education’, ‘parenthood’ and ‘age’, no clear pattern can
be observed.
Figure 3.8: Decisions in RANK & PAY
RANK: Average Rank of Category PAY: Bought Category
Table 3.4: RANK: Joanes Rank Sum Test of Differences in Decision on Ranking
*** indicate a significance level of 1%, ** of 5% and * of 10% (cf. Christensen et al. 2006)
The rank sum test in Table 3.4 confirms these findings. It indicates that the av-
erage rank of the risk index is significantly different from the rank of ‘age’, ‘parent-
hood’, ‘education’, ’family status’ and ’income’ at the 1%-level for non-professionals
and junior professionals. However, the average rank sum is not significantly differ-
ent from ‘gender’ for non-professionals. The rank of gender is significantly different
from ‘age’, ‘parenthood’, ‘education’ and ‘family status’ at least at the 10%-level
for non-professionals and junior professionals. Junior professionals consider the in-
formation regarding the correlation between risk preferences and parenthood as less
valuable, because this category significantly ranks at the last position. Regarding
senior professionals, the significance of the differences in the ranks is lower, although
‘risk index’, ‘income’ and ‘gender’ are significantly different from several other cat-
egories, especially, ‘age’ and ‘parenthood’.
We check whether the fact that advisors do not or cannot attach informational
content to a variable in the SINGLE treatment, i.e., choosing “both groups switch
53
at the same time/invest the same amount” as an answer, has an influence on the
ranking decision. Table 3.5 shows the results of an OLS regression. As a dependent
variable we include the rank of a certain category. The independent variables carry
a value of one if in the treatment SINGLE, the advisor’s answer is “both equal”
for the specific category.25 Standard errors are clustered at the advisors level and
separate regression for the answers in the HL-lottery and the e100,000 question
of the SINGLE treatment are executed. Furthermore, we control for the advisors’
type by including dummy variables for junior and senior professionals. The positive
sign of the coefficient ‘SINGLE’ indicates that if the informational content of a
sociodemographic variable is not clear to the advisor, indeed, the variable ranks
lower. In other words, if an individual attaches informational content to a category,
the category is likely to rank at a higher position. The results thereby confirm
consistency of behavior across treatments. The coefficients are remarkably close in
both regressions, consistency across mechanisms is thus confirmed as well.
Table 3.5: RANK: Informational Content and Decision on Ranking







Controls for advisors’ type YES YES
Note: OLS regression. *** indicate significance at the 1%-
level. Dependent variable: Rank of sociodemographic variable
in treatment RANK. Six choices (the effect of the risk index
has not been asked in the SINGLE treatment) in the SINGLE
treatment per risk elicitation mechanism and 167 advisors in
total sum up to 1002 decisions. SINGLE takes a value of one
if the decision in the SINGLE treatment is “both equal” for
the respective category. Clustered standard errors on advisors
are employed. Category left out when controlling for advisors
type: Non-professional.
Optimal Ranking Given the design of the experiment, the optimal ranking deci-
sion is of interest. A prerequisite to answer this from a theoretical standpoint would
be information on the subject’s perceived correlations between the ranked charac-
teristics. However, this information can not be observed. Therefore, we provide an
empirical explanation to this. An advisor expects to see four (3.5 which is rounded
to the next integer) categories. Given the SOEP data, we run regressions for any
25Note that in the SINGLE treatment, the effect of the variable ‘risk index’ has not been an-
swered.
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combination of four variables to explain the e100,000 question. The combination
of ‘risk index’, ‘gender’, ‘age’ and ‘education’ jointly explain most of the variation
of the answer in the e100,000 question. Hence, from an empirical perspective, it
would be an optimal strategy to place these four variables on the first four ranks.
Figure 3.8 shows that ‘risk index’ and ‘gender’ are - on average - on the first two
ranks. ‘Education’ and ‘age’, however, are not allocated optimally.
Overall, the results of the RANK treatment show that the ‘risk index’ ranks at
the first position, and is observed as the most important characteristic on average.
‘Gender’ and ‘income’ rank with lower significance at the second or third position
by all groups of participants. For all other categories no clear-cut and statistically
significant distinction between ranks can be identified. Although especially for ‘in-
come’ and ‘education’ the knowledge about the correlation with risk preferences
as shown in the SINGLE treatment is less pronounced as for the other categories,
‘income’ is chosen at a high ranks. The senior professionals’ choices indicate a less
obvious ranking among the categories. Results from the SINGLE treatment and the
RANK treatment are consistent as categories with unknown informational content
in the SINGLE treatment (i.e., choosing the answer ‘both equal’) rank lower in the
RANK treatment.
Results: PAY Since the advisor is free to buy each sociodemographic variable for
every advisee profile separately, in total, four payment decisions have to be made.
On average, 2.93 categories per profile are bought. The average number of categories
seen in the RANK treatment is 3.88. Thus advisors in the PAY treatment have sig-
nificantly less variables at hand than in the RANK treatment. Non-professionals buy
2.74 categories, junior professionals 2.91. In contrast, senior professionals purchase
significantly more categories, on average 3.33. Over the four decisions, the number
of categories bought does not differ significantly. The percentage of advisors buy-
ing certain categories is similar over the four purchase decisions of the treatment.
This indicates that advisors are confident in their choice of categories. It is also
reasonable since the advisors do not get any feedback about their success in the
assessment, so learning effects from being informed about the correct belief cannot
occur. However, subjects might discover which characteristics are more helpful than
others when forming their belief, but given the results, this is obviously not the case.
Averaged over all four rounds, Figure 3.8 shows the fraction of subjects that buy
a certain category for every subject group. Table 3.6 shows the significance levels of
a paired t-test on the purchase differences in the bought categories. The row named
‘position’ indicates the position of the characteristic according to the percentage
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Table 3.6: PAY: Test of Differences in Categories Bought
*** indicate a significance level of 1%, ** of 5% and * of 10% of a paired t-test.
of advisors buying it. In line with the RANK treatment, ‘risk index’ is the most
important category, bought significantly more often than any other category (in
83% of the cases). While most of the advisors choose the ‘risk index’, the second
largest group of advisors buys ‘gender’. For non-professionals, the distribution of
the categories in the PAY treatment is similar to the distribution in the RANK
treatment. ‘Gender’ ranges at the second position and is bought significantly more
often than the ‘income’ category. For ‘education’, ‘family status’, and ‘parenthood’
no clear-cut statements can be made.
For the junior professionals, the categories can be divided into two subgroups in
which no significant purchase differences can be observed. The categories ‘gender’,
‘income’ and ‘age’ are bought in more than 45% of cases. In contrast ‘education’,
‘family status’ and ‘parenthood’ are less valuable to this advisor group and bought
significantly less often (each less than 27%). For the senior professionals, as observed
in the RANK treatment, the distribution of choices is rather uniform apart from the
risk index. ‘Gender’, ‘income’, ‘age’, ‘parenthood’ and ‘family status’ are bought in
40% to 53% of the cases, and only ‘education’ is bought significantly less often (30%)
than ‘age’ and ‘income’. Consistent with the RANK treatment, senior professionals
buy the ‘risk index’ significantly less often than advisors of the other two groups.
Most important, the fact that on average three categories are bought demon-
strates that advisors attach informational value to sociodemographic information.
Our results suggest that advisors perceive a causal relationship between the cat-
egories, i.e., characteristics, they buy and the risk measure. This finding gener-
ates external validity for the empirical literature that finds correlations between
sociodemographic information and risk attitudes, but so far cannot report a causal
interpretation (cf. Dohmen et al. 2011, von Gaudecker et al. 2011).
As in the RANK treatment, we check whether the fact that advisors do not attach
informational content to a variable in the SINGLE treatment has an effect on the
purchase decision. Table 3.7 shows the results of a probit regression. Here, as the
dependent variable we include the investor’s choice to buy a certain category for the
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first profile of treatment PAY.26 In line with previous findings, the results indicate
that if the informational content is not clear to the advisor, indeed, the variable is
bought up to 16.3% less often.
Table 3.7: PAY: Informational Content and Categories Bought




Pseudo R2 0.019 0.013
Controls for advisors’ type YES YES
Note: Probit regression, results are marginal effect. *** indi-
cate significance at the 1%-level. Dependent variable: Choice
to buy a category in the first round of treatment PAY. SIN-
GLE takes a value of one if the decision in the SINGLE treat-
ment is “both equal” for the respective category. Clustered
standard errors on advisors level. Category left out when con-
troling for advisors type: Non-professional.
To strengthen our results and to verify that behavior in the overall experiment
is consistent, we investigate whether choices in the RANK and PAY treatments
coincide. Figure 3.9 presents the fraction of advisors in PAY that buys a category
given its rank in the RANK treatment.27 The figure indicates, e.g., that 88% of
advisors in the PAY treatment buy the category which they rank on the first position
in the RANK treatment. The higher a category ranks, the higher is the probability
that it is bought. Characteristics at the seventh rank are bought by less than 15%
of advisors. The differences between the purchase decisions of rank one to six are
significantly different at least at the 10% level. No significant difference can be
observed for the last two ranks.
The results from the PAY treatment are threefold. First, they back the findings
from the RANK treatment. ‘Risk index’ carries the highest informational value for
the subjects as it is bought most often. ‘Gender’ (48%), ‘income’ (43%) and ‘age’
(43%) are bought more often than the categories ‘education’ (24%), ‘parenthood’
(23%) and the ‘family status’ (26%). Second, while non-professionals exhibit a clear
pattern similar to the RANK treatment, no clear distribution can be found for junior
and senior professionals.
Finally, we find a consistent behavior across treatments. Categories for which
advisors choose “both equal” in SINGLE are bought significantly less often. Cate-
gories that are ranked at higher positions in RANK are bought significantly more
often in PAY.
26Regressions with the purchase decisions in round 2 to 4 reveal similar results.
27We display the choice for the purchase decision of the first profile. Figures for purchase decisions
2 to 4 are similar.
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Figure 3.9: RANK and PAY: Fraction that Buys Category Dependent on Rank of
Category
3.5 Conclusion
The results of this study contribute to the existing literature in several ways. A
major advantage of our data is that we observe decisions of three relevant groups of
subjects: non-professionals, junior financial professionals and senior financial pro-
fessionals.
All subject groups show stereotypes of sociodemographics on risk preferences
that largely coincide with the true correlations. Subjects are able to identify the
relationship of risk attitudes and gender, age, family status and parenthood correctly.
Interestingly, subjects are aware of how their own risk preferences rank compared
to the mean of a representative sample of the population.
Our design allows to investigate to which sociodemographic characteristics sub-
jects attach informational value when assessing the risk attitude of another person.
Especially, gender and a person’s self-assessment of risk preferences turns out to be
a major source of information. We find that subjects pay to gain information on
sociodemographics of the person evaluated. This clearly demonstrates that subjects
attach an informational value to the characteristics they buy. Hence, such a behav-
ior provides external validity to the strand of literature that finds only correlations
between risk preferences and sociodemographic characteristics.
We find significant differences in the behavior of different subject groups. Pro-
fessionals are slightly more risk averse than non-professionals. Junior professionals
exhibit the most accurate stereotypes. With respect to regulatory issues, a person’s
self-assessment can be a useful tool. However, we find that especially experienced
professionals are less willing to make use of it. The fact that the group with the high-
est counseling experience trusts less in the self-reported risk measure is interesting
from a regulatory perspective as well.
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Chapter 4
Does Good Advice Come Cheap?
- On the Assessment of Risk
Preferences in the Lab and the
Field
4.1 Introduction
Every day, people have to decide among multiple risky options. An important aspect
is that people make a decision not only based on their own knowledge and experience,
but also based on advice. Especially in the financial sector, products are becoming
more and more complex and at the same time, financial literacy is limited (van
Rooij et al. 2011). Thus, individuals are increasingly relying on professionals - such
as financial consultants, insurance agents, but also doctors in the health domain -
when making their decisions (cf. Allen 2001, Bhattacharya et al. 2012).1
An integral determinant of individuals’ decision making are their risk prefer-
ences. Behavior such as financial decisions, smoking and occupational choices can
be predicted by risk preferences (e.g., Dohmen et al. 2011).
These developments give rise to the question of whether an advisor is capable
of assessing the risk preferences of an advisee correctly. This is the aim of this
study. We analyze whether good advice is possible if risk preferences are not obvious
to the advisor. Explicitly, we abstain from any agency problems on which the
theoretical literature has focused so far (cf. Ottaviani and Soerensen 2006, Inderst
and Ottaviani 2012b, or Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer 1985). Our objective is to start
a step earlier. If the advisor’s only goal is to correctly gauge the risk preferences of
1This chapter is based on Leuermann and Roth (2012b).
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the advisee, is the advisor able to do so?
Advice is usually given by professional advisors. Therefore, we employ an artefac-
tual field experiment2 in which three types of subjects participate: senior financial
advisors, junior financial advisors and non-professionals. These groups allow us to
explore potential behavioral differences, in particular as the counseling experience
differs and sorting of employees into the financial sector could be an issue (cf. Bonin
et al. 2007, Dohmen and Falk 2011, Haigh and List 2005)
Several aspects are studied: First, we inspect how advisors form beliefs about the
risk preferences of specific advisees given sociodemographic information. We also
check whether advisors’ beliefs are subject to false consensus (Hsee and Weber 1997,
Hadar and Fischer 2008) regarding their own risk preferences. This would indicate
that they overestimate the extent to which other people are similar to themselves.
Furthermore, we investigate how precise the advisors’ beliefs are. Instead of analyz-
ing whether the advisors’ stated beliefs coincide with the advisees’ actual decisions,
we make use of the data of a German large-scale representative survey (SOEP) in
order to generalize our result. Therefore, we compare the advisor’s belief with the
average decision of subjects in the SOEP data conditional on the sociodemographic
characteristics of the observed advisees.
In the experiment, subjects in two different roles participate: advisors, or sub-
jects who form beliefs, and subjects on whom beliefs are formed - advisees. Our
experimental design incorporates these two roles as it consists of two main parts.
First, we use a web-based survey to collect data on potential advisees. In the second
part, we run an artefactual field experiment consisting of four treatments. In the
first treatment, we elicit the advisor’s own risk attitude. In the subsequent treat-
ments, we vary the information available to the advisor when forming beliefs about
the risk preferences of a specific advisee as collected in the survey of part one. In
the second and the third treatment advisors are able to draw on several sociodemo-
graphic variables. In the last treatment, the advisor is provided with the advisee’s
picture instead of sociodemographic information.
The results of the experiment show that a false consensus bias of the advisors
is present. Indeed, the advisors’ own risk preferences positively correlate with their
beliefs on the advisees. Interestingly, this is especially pronounced for experienced
financial advisors and non-professionals. Besides the advisors’ own risk preferences,
the advisees’ gender and the self-assessment of risk are considered to be important
by the advisors when forming beliefs. In general, advisees are perceived as less risk
2Artefactual field experiments use the tools of a standard lab experiment with a non-standard
subject pool (Harrison and List 2004).
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tolerant than the advisors are themselves.
In a further step we investigate whether the advisors’ beliefs coincide with the
advisees’ actual choices. We find that information on family status and the advisee’s
self-assessment on risk improve predictions of risk preferences. Furthermore, the pre-
cision increases if more information is available. Professionals exhibit a significantly
higher accuracy in the forecast than non-professionals.
Our analysis is the first to observe the process of forming beliefs about risk
preferences of others based on several sociodemographics in detail. We can explicitly
control for the available information. A major advantage is the subject pool of
financial advisors.
The remaining chapter is structured as follows: In the next section (Section 4.2),
we discuss the literature on risk preferences and advice. Section 4.3 explains the
experimental design, while Section 4.4 presents the results. In Section 4.5 we provide
several robustness checks with an alternative risk measure followed by concluding
remarks in Section 4.6. The experimental instructions can be found in Appendix A.
4.2 Literature
When making risky decisions subjects strongly react to advice (Allen 2001, Schotter
2003). Furthermore, people prefer to have advice when making a decision. Surpris-
ingly, this is even true when it is common knowledge that the advisor does not have
any information advantage in the field of the decision (Nyarko et al. 2006, Schotter
and Sopher 2007). A prominent example is that subjects even demand advice for
the outcome of a fair coin-flip (Powdthavee and Riyanto 2012). One explanation
why subjects are keen on advice is that during the advice process people rethink
their decision problem more in-depth and are therefore able to make better decisions
(Schotter 2003).
To give good advice it is essential for the advisor to know the advisee’s prefer-
ences. Recent research on risk preferences has detected significant linkages between
sociodemographic characteristics and risk attitudes. It is largely undisputed that
women are more risk averse than men (e.g., Byrnes et al. 1999, Croson and Gneezy
2009). Furthermore, individuals are found to be more risk averse if they are older,
married, or have children (Dohmen et al. 2011). Regarding the relationship of ed-
ucation or income with risk tolerance the findings in the literature are ambiguous
(cf. Belzil and Leonardi 2007, Barsky et al. 1997, Dohmen et al. 2011, Hartog et
al. 2002).
In contrast to the above research that studies actual correlations, advisors form
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their beliefs according to their perceived correlation between an advisee’s sociode-
mographics and his or her risk attitude. One strategy to figure out somebody’s
preferences is stereotyping. Eckel and Grossman (2008) study gender stereotypes.
In their study, females tolerate less risk than males as found previously. Further-
more, the beliefs about gender are consistent since women are perceived to be less
risk tolerant. If, instead of individuals’ stereotypes, groups’ stereotypes are elicited,
subjects overestimate the risk tolerance of the male group, while the female group
is correctly assessed (Siegrist et al. 2002). In terms of cultural stereotypes, people
perceive Chinese to be less risk tolerant than Americans. Interestingly, the actual
experimental data shows an opposite correlation (Hsee and Weber 1999).
Studying the beliefs on others’ risk preferences is particularly interesting with
respect to financial decision making. Regarding financial advice, Faro and Rot-
tenstreich (2006) inspect how subjects predict others’ risky choices. Their findings
show a systematic bias towards risk neutrality when estimating the risk preferences
of others. In their experiment - in contrast to the setting of Eckel and Grossman
(2008) - the advisors have to assess how a randomly chosen subject decided. Hsee
and Weber (1997) study differences between a subject’s own risk preferences and the
subject’s beliefs about others’ risk preferences. The authors show that the differ-
ences increase with social distance. If subjects have to assess an abstract, randomly
chosen subject from the session, the self-other discrepancy occurs. It is absent if the
judging subject has visual contact with the judged subject. No further information
is transmitted in both situations, the judging subject is unknown to the judge.
Another aspect that is raised in the literature is the false consensus bias in belief
formation (Hsee and Weber 1997, Hadar and Fischer 2008). Subjects’ beliefs about
the risk preferences of another person are consistently biased towards their own risk
attitude. A restriction of these studies is that no monetary incentives are used to
elicit the advisors’ risk aversion or the advisors’ belief. Daruvala (2007) explores
gender differences in beliefs when predicting risk preferences of others. She finds
that gender stereotypes as well as the subject’s own risk attitudes affect the belief.
However, there is no incentive compatible mechanism applied to elicit the beliefs
on others in this design. Chakravarty et al. (2011) inspect risk taking in delegated
decisions by using lottery gambles. The subjects have to judge the risk preferences
of other participants of the experiment. Judging and judged subject are seated in
different rooms, and again, no further information on the judged subject is provided.
When making the lottery decision for this anonymous advisee, advisors exhibit a
significantly higher risk aversion compared to their own risk attitude. In addition,
the increase in risk aversion is relative to their own risk preferences, which again
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supports the false consensus hypothesis.
There is evidence that financial professionals exhibit a different behavior in de-
cision making than the average population (Haigh and List 2005, Nofsinger and
Varma 2007, Slovic et al. 1999). People choose their job according to their pref-
erences (Dohmen and Falk 2011). It is argued that individuals which are willing
to take more risk sort into occupations with a higher variance in income (Bonin
et al. 2007, Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln and Schu¨ndeln 2005) or even with a higher mortality
risk (DeLeire and Levy 2004). The premium dependent incentive schemes in the
financial sector could be a reason for the sorting of financial professionals.
This study contributes to the literature in several ways: First, in our experiment
advisors are provided with a set of sociodemographic characteristics of specific and
vivid advisees. In the literature so far, only a single sociodemographic information
is presented and varied. Based on this information, advisors form their belief about
the risk preferences of the advisees. We can study the advisors’ belief formation
process while explicitly controlling for the information available. Second, incentives
are provided for the elicitation of the advisors’ risk preferences and beliefs, while
this is not the case in previous studies. A major advantage of our approach is the
subject pool consisting of financial professionals and non-professionals. This allows
us to study behavioral differences of subjects familiar and unfamiliar with giving
advice.
4.3 Experimental Design
The experiment investigates beliefs about the risk preferences of others.3 This in-
volves two distinct roles: subjects who form beliefs (advisors) and subjects about
whom beliefs are formed (advisees). Therefore, our experimental setup consists of
two main parts (cf. Figure 4.1).4 In a first part, we collect data on risk preferences
of advisees in a web-based survey as described in Section 4.3.2. From this data, we
choose the advisees that are presented to advisors in the second part. We augment
this information by survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to
control for representativity as discussed in Section 4.3.3.
In the second part, we run an experiment consisting of four treatments. When
entering the lab the advisors are randomly assigned to a computer and then log on
to the experimental software. All treatments are played one after another without
interaction between the advisors. Hence, we treat each subject as an independent
3In the literature ’prediction’, ’forecast’ and ’belief’ are used interchangeably.
4The instructions of both parts of the experiment can be found in Appendix A.
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observation. The payoffs of the whole experiment are shown after all treatments
are finished to avoid learning effects. At first treatment SELF is played, which asks
for the advisors’ sociodemographic information and their own risk attitude using
two risk measures.5 These two risk tasks are described in Section 4.3.1. In the
second (RANK) as well as in the third treatment (PAY) advisors forecast the risk
preferences of four advisees’ profiles, each chosen from the web survey of part 1. For
each advisee profile we present a screen with the advisee’s sociodemographic infor-
mation. Subsequently, the advisor is asked to predict the advisee’s actual decision
in the same two risk measures used in SELF. RANK and PAY differ in the way the
sociodemographics are presented to the advisor. A detailed description is given in
Section 4.3.3. The last treatment (PICT) is similar to RANK and PAY. However,
advisors are provided only with four pictures of advisees instead of sociodemographic
information.
Before we describe the experiment in detail, we introduce the used risk measures
in the following section.
Figure 4.1: Experimental Design: Course of Action
4.3.1 Measures of Risk Aversion
The experiment uses a well-studied, easily understandable lottery question to mea-
sure risk preferences. The exact wording is as follows:
e100,000 question Please consider what you would do in the following situation: Imagine
that you had won e100,000 in the lottery. Almost immediately after you collect the winnings, you
receive the following financial offer, the conditions of which are as follows: There is the chance to
double the money. It is equally possible that you could lose half of the amount invested. You have
the opportunity to invest the full amount, part of the amount or reject the offer. What share of your
lottery winnings would you be prepared to invest in this financially risky, yet lucrative investment?
Your Decision e100,000 - e80,000 - e60,000 - e40,000 - e20,000 - Nothing, I would decline
the offer.
5SELF is followed by a further treatment that is discussed in a companion paper (Leuermann
and Roth (2012a) or see Chapter 3). We do not expect interference for the presented results as
the advisors do not receive any feedback from this further treatment.
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The elicitation mechanism is an ordered lottery selection design in which subjects
can invest up to e100,000 into a lottery that doubles or halves the amount invested
with equal probabilities.6 It is called “e100,000 question” in the following and is
borrowed from the SOEP panel. This provides the opportunity to cross-check our
experimental data with the large-scale data of the survey. The reliability of this
measure has been validated via a lab experiment with real money at stake (Dohmen
et al. 2011).
Beside this risk measure, all treatments are played with the measure of Holt
and Laury (2002) (in the following: HL-lottery) in addition. The results serve as
robustness checks and allow to generalize our results with respect to the risk measure
employed. A detailed description of the HL-lottery and the results are presented in
Section 4.5.
4.3.2 Part 1: Surveys
Our main objective is to study how advisors assess the risk preferences of specific
advisees. As we analyze how the variation of sociodemographic information is incor-
porated into the assessment of the advisees’ risk preferences, it is crucial to achieve
sufficient sociodemographic heterogeneity in the pool of advisees.
To collect the subject pool from which the advisees’ profiles are then selected, we
ran a web-based survey in November and December 2010.7 This allows us to generate
a heterogeneous sample in several sociodemographic characteristics. Furthermore,
we ask the participants about their sociodemographics and elicit their choices in the
HL-lottery and the e100,000 question.
In the course of the experiment, we make use of the fact that the e100,000 ques-
tion is also part of the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) survey to generalize
our results.8 This large-scale dataset surveys approximately 20,750 subjects yearly
and is therefore a powerful and representative tool for our purpose. At first, we
will compare the advisees selected for presentation to the advisors with subjects in
the SOEP to ensure that the advisees do not differ from the population in general.
Second, in Section 4.4.4 we analyze whether the advisors’ beliefs coincide with the
advisees’ actual choices. To assess whether advisors’ beliefs are correct, the mean
6In order to provide incentives to take the decision in the lab experiment thoroughly, for the
actual payoff we convert the e100,000 into e2.50, e80,000 into e2 etc. Scale: To improve read-
ability, in the analyses, we present the data in ‘e10,000 invested’ such that the data is scaled from
0 to 10.
7Participants were recruited via e-mail and were asked to further distribute the survey. Among
all participants who completed the web-based survey we raﬄed off e50.
8Cf. [www.diw.de/soep] for further information. The e100,000 question was included in the
year 2009.
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risk preferences of a subsample of the SOEP population comparable in sociodemo-
graphics to the actual advisee is taken as a benchmark. This allows us to conclude
whether advisors are able to assess average advisees.
Restrictively, while the SOEP survey is a representative sample of the German
population, this does not hold for the web survey as can be observed by comparing
the descriptive statistics of the sociodemographics in Table 4.1, column two and
three. However, the heterogeneity of sociodemographic characteristics within these
two pools is large compared with a sample that mainly consists of students as Table
4.1 (compare column ‘non-professionals’, which mainly consists of students) shows.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of the Subjects in Surveys and Lab Experiment
Part 1: Surveys Part 2: Lab Experiment
Web survey SOEP survey Non-prof. Junior prof. Senior prof.
Variable mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
N 84 - 20,750 - 77 - 52 - 38 -
Year born 1979 10.0 1959 17.71 1986 6.29 1989 1.06 1973 11.0
Gender (female=1) 0.57 0.56 0.52 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.18 0.39
Partner (yes=1) 0.41 0.62 0.77 0.42 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.43 0.66 0.48
Parent (yes=1) 0.20 0.40 0.62 0.49 0.05 0.22 0.02 0.14 0.47 0.51
High income* (yes=1) 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.07 0 0 0 0 0.11 0.31
Uni degree (yes=1) 0.59 0.50 0.21 0.41 0.94 0.25 1.00 0.00 0.63 0.49
Counsel. Exp. (in years) - - - - - - 1.02 1.07 10.97 8.27
Stated risk attitudeθ 3.54 1.81 1.90 2.13 5.26 1.39 5.08 1.52 4.68 1.71
HL∆ 5.30 1.78 - - 6.81 1.56 6.33 1.78 6.32 2.08
100,000ψ 2.38 2.70 0.91 1.98 4.70 3.29 4.00 2.44 3.11 3.18
* refers to a monthly net income above e6,000 (approx. 8,460$).
θ Subjects chose on a scale from 0 (=risk averse) to 10 (=fully prepared to take risks).
∆ refers to the row in which option B was chosen for the first time in the HL-lottery (for details see Section 4.5).
ψ refers to the the amount invested into the e100,000 question in e10,000.
Selection of Advisees for RANK and PAY In total, eight profiles are used
in RANK and PAY - four for each treatment. These profiles are chosen from the
web-based survey and are displayed in Table 4.2.












64 university married >6,000 male yes 1 2 2.55 5
38 training single 1,001-3,000 female no 2 0 0.83 6
25 econ student partner <1,000 male no 5 4 1.29 6
30 training married 1,001-3,000 male yes 1 4 1.01 8
36 adv. training single 3,001-6,000 male no 1 2 3.24 5
57 university married 3,001-6,000 female yes 0 4 0.62 7
41 university divorced >6,000 female no 1 2 2.50 5
21 econ student single <1,000 female no 4 0 1.59 4
θ Advisees chose on a scale from 0 (=risk averse) to 10 (=fully prepared to take risks)
∆ refers to the row in which option B was chosen for the first time in the HL-lottery (for details see Section 4.5).
ψ refers to the the amount invested into the e100,000 question in e10,000.
The sequence in which these eight profiles are shown to the advisors is random.
This means a profile could appear as the second advisee to be assessed in RANK
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but also as the fourth in PAY, for example. Nonetheless, every advisor sees all eight
profiles in random order in RANK or PAY.
Within the described experimental design it is vital to choose the set of our
advisees thoughtfully. The eight advisees are chosen out of the 84 subjects of the
web survey in order to achieve a balanced and diversified sample over age, education,
family status, income, gender, and parenthood as presented in Table 4.2. The
column ‘100,000’ depicts the individual choices in the e100,000 question whereas
the column ‘HL’ refers to the actual choices of the advisees for the HL-lottery.
Furthermore, we have to assure that our advisee sample is approximately coherent
with the population. We thereby ensure that the advisee is not exceptional in his
or her risk preferences and correctly assessing the advisee is a feasible task for the
advisor. The large SOEP panel allows to accomplish this issue. We reduce the
whole SOEP population to subjects that are similar to our specific advisees in the
sociodemographic characteristics age, education, family status, income, gender, and
parenthood as presented in Table 4.2. From this subsample we calculate the average
of the answer to the e100,000 question. Consider for example the advisee in the
second row of Table 4.2. In order to compute the risk tolerance of the ‘representative
counterpart’ of this advisee (consider column ‘SOEP mean’), we compute the mean
of the answers in the e100,000 question given a subsample of all SOEP observations
with that characteristics.9 This subsample contains all females, aged between 32 and
43, who are single, have an income between e1,000 and e3,000 and as education a
training. On average, people with these characteristics invest e8,300 in the lottery.
In our opinion the described procedure minimizes the advisees’ deviations from
the population mean as we only choose advisees who are similar to the population
mean. This can be observed when comparing the column ‘100,000’ and ‘SOEP
mean’. We thereby assure that the subjects to be judged are not exceptional and
it is therefore not impossible to assess their risk preferences. At the same time it
provides the opportunity to let advisors judge real individuals.
Advisees for PICT In contrast to the preceding treatments, advisors exclusively
receive visual information on the advisees in treatment PICT. Figure 4.2 displays
an anonymized version of the advisees’ pictures presented in the PICT treatment.
Table 4.3 shows the advisees’ gender and choices in both lotteries. As above, the
column ‘100,000’ denotes the actual choice in the e100,000 question, whereas ‘HL’
displays the choice for the HL-lottery. Again, we compute the average answer in the
e100,000 question based on a subsample of the SOEP data. Therefore, we assume
9Means are weighted with a dataset-specific weighting function which considers cross-sectional
personal weights of each subject.
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gender and age to be observable to the advisors. In order to determine the ‘SOEP
mean’ variable, we consider all SOEP panel participants which are born between
1976 and 1988 and have the respective gender.10 In the experiment, advisors either
have to assess four male advisees or four female advisees, which will be randomly
determined per session.
Figure 4.2: Treatment PICT: Pictures Presented
female 1 female 2 female 3 female 4
male 1 male 2 male 3 male 4
Table 4.3: Risk Attitudes of Advisees in Treatment PICT
Gender 100,000ψ SOEP meanψ HL∆
female 2 1.13 4
female 6 1.13 5
female 4 1.13 4
female 4 1.13 7
male 6 1.69 4
male 0 1.69 3
male 6 1.69 6
male 6 1.69 8
ψ refers to the the amount invested into the
e100,000 question in e10,000.
∆ refers to the row in which Option B was
chosen for the first time in the HL-lottery.
4.3.3 Part 2: Lab Experiment
The experimental sessions took place between April 2011 and January 2012. In
total, 167 subjects in the role of advisors participated.11 In the subject pool we
10The actual advisees in PICT are born between 1978 and 1985; this information is not trans-
mitted to the advisors.
11The experiment involves no interaction among the advisors, each advisor is therefore treated
as an independent observation.
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have three types of advisors: senior professional advisors, junior professional ad-
visors and non-professionals. The non-professionals are mainly students and hired
via the AWI-lab at Heidelberg University where all sessions with non-professionals
were run.12 The senior professional advisors were recruited from a large German
financial advisory agency and from local banks. The junior advisors were recruited
from a banking specific advanced training institution.13 After finishing high school,
the junior professionals enter a study program in financial advisory at an applied
university which contains practical counseling in up to 50% of time. Since these
advisors are students, regarding age and education, they are comparable to the non-
professional advisors. Detailed information on the advisor pool and descriptives are
given in Table 4.1. The experiment lasted approximately 50 minutes. The average
payoff was e11.92.
In the following we present the four treatments (SELF, RANK, PAY, PICT).
RANK, PAY and PICT differ in the way the information is provided to the advisor.
As discussed in the previous section, the information in RANK and PAY is drawn
from the following categories of the advisees’ sociodemographic characteristics: age,
education, family status, income, gender, having children and self-assessment of risk-
taking in financial matters. The possible realizations of these variables are shown
in Table 4.4. In PICT only visual information is provided.
Table 4.4: Information/Categories Provided in RANK and PAY
Age age in years
Education university, advanced training, training, studying economics, in
training, no formal training
Family status single, partner, married, divorced, living separated, widowed
Net income up to e1,000, e1,001-e3,000, e3,001-e6,000, more than e6,000
Gender male, female
Parenthood having children, having no children
Risk Index Self-assessment of risk with the question: Regarding financial mat-
ters, are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks
or do you try to avoid taking risks?(0=risk averse to 10=fully
prepared to take risks)
Treatments
Procedure Treatment SELF In the SELF treatment, the advisors’ own so-
ciodemographics and their risk preferences are elicited. At first, advisors answer the
12The experiment was programmed on a PHP-platform and accessible via a Web Browser.
13We ran seven sessions with professionals - three in the lab and four on-site. In all sessions, the
conditions (no communication among participants, space between computers, the visual presenta-
tion of the experiment) were identical.
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questions on their sociodemographics. Subsequently, first they play the e100,000
question followed by the HL-lottery.
Procedure Treatment RANK The task in this treatment is to assess correctly
the risk preferences of an advisee. As discussed above, for this purpose we chose
eight advisee profiles providing sociodemographics as shown in Table 4.4. Out of the
eight profiles, four are randomly selected to be presented to the advisors in RANK.
However, in RANK (as well as in PAY) the advisors are able to influence with
which probability the respective sociodemographic information about the advisee
is provided to them. At the beginning of the RANK treatment, as depicted in
Figure 4.3, advisors are asked to state a ranking over the seven sociodemographic
characteristics (e.g., 1. age , 2. gender, 3. income, 4. risk index,... ) and advisors
are informed that based on the revealed sociodemographic information they have
to assess certain advisees. In the following the computer draws a random number
that determines how many categories are disclosed.14 If, for example, the random
number is two and we are dealing with the advisee of the last row of Table 4.2, the
computer displays the following information: age: 21 years old and gender: female.
After the presentation of the advisee’s characteristics, the advisor has to assess
how this specific advisee has decided in the e100,000 question and the HL-lottery.
For this advisee the correct answers would be 0 for the e100,000 question and 4 for
the HL-lottery (see Table 4.2). If the answers are correct, the advisor is paid e0.50
for each risk task.
In total, this procedure is repeated for four advisee profiles. The ranking stated at
the beginning is kept for all profiles. However, for each profile a new random number
is drawn and, of course, a new advisee profile is presented. Hence, the advisors
evaluate four profiles one after another before moving on to the PAY treatment.
Figure 4.3: Course of Action in Treatments RANK, PAY and PICT
Procedure Treatment PAY In the PAY treatment, advisors can freely choose
which and if characteristics out of the available seven are presented to them. In
contrast to RANK, the advisors have to pay for each category they want to see in
14The random number is drawn from a uniform distribution on the interval [1,7]. Hence, the
category on the first rank is observed for sure.
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each round separately (cf. Figure 4.3). The characteristics are priced according to
a convex pricing rule. The first characteristic costs e0.01 while buying all seven
characteristics amounts to e0.99 in total.15 When entering the PAY treatment, the
advisor is asked which categories he or she wants to buy. If, for example, the advisor
wants to see age and gender, the total price amounts to e0.03. On the next screen
the categories are shown (e.g., age: 21 years old and gender: female for the above
example) and the advisor is asked to assess the risk preference of this profile. Again,
the advisor earns e0.50 for each correctly assessed risk task. On the subsequent
screen, the advisor is asked to buy the sociodemographic characteristics for the next
profile. As in RANK, this procedure is repeated for four profiles in total. Out of
the eight profiles of Table 4.2, the remaining four after the RANK treatment are
presented to the advisors. However, the advisor is able buy different categories for
different profiles.
Procedure Treatment PICT As mentioned above, in the PICT treatment solely
visual information is the basis for the advisor’s prediction. After finishing the PAY
treatment, advisors enter the PICT treatment. First, advisors open an envelope
containing a sheet of paper showing four pictures. The task is then the same as in
the treatment before. The advisors are asked to assess the risk preferences of the
depicted advisees one after another. Again for every correct prediction e0.50 are
paid off.
The advisors exclusively have the information provided on the photo available.
In each session either four males or four female photos are used. Which gender is
presented is randomly assigned. Although we do not explicitly provide any further
sociodemographic information, at least gender and possibly age can be inferred from
the pictures. The photos show individuals who are of similar appearance and are
dressed alike. By holding the age, gender and the style of clothing constant we force
the advisors to form their beliefs given the characteristics of the face only. In Figure
4.2 the anonymized pictures can be found. Overall, out of the 167 advisors there
are 91 advisors judging the pictures of women and 76 advisors judging the pictures
of men.
15Price for the second characteristic: e0.02, the third: e0.03, the fourth: e0.06, the fifth: e0.12,
the sixth: e0.24, the seventh: e0.50. As the minimum earnings that are generated before the PAY
treatment amount to e4, net losses are excluded.
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4.4 Results
After introducing the different treatments, in this section we present the results. We
contribute to four questions. Section 4.4.1 studies differences in the belief formation
in the different treatments and sheds a light on self-other discrepancies. Secondly,
in Section 4.4.2 we investigate how information on the advisee’s sociodemographic
characteristics affects the advisor’s belief. Section 4.4.3 studies how differences in
sociodemographic characteristics between advisor and advisee influence the advi-
sor’s deviation from his own risk preferences when forming his belief. Finally, in
Section 4.4.4 we inspect if the advisors’ beliefs are correct. For this we combine
representative survey data with lab data.
4.4.1 Self-Assessment and Beliefs
In this section, we analyze how the advisors’ own risk preferences relate to their
beliefs. The term self-other discrepancy refers to a systematic misperception between
the advisor’s own risk tolerance and the perceived risk tolerance of the advisee.
This effect is found by Hsee and Weber (1997) but also discussed by Eckel and
Grossman (2008), Faro and Rottenstreich (2006) and Eriksen and Kvaløy (2009).
Regarding the process of giving advice it is important to analyze whether advisors
judge themselves to be more or less risk tolerant than the advisees evaluated.
In order to investigate this effect, we present the advisor’s self-assessment in the
e100,000 question (SELF) compared to their beliefs separately for the three treat-
ments RANK, PAY and PICT in Figure 4.4. The decisions are aggregated for all
three groups of advisors. The first column ‘SELF’ indicates the advisor’s own de-
cision. The second column denotes the beliefs for the RANK treatment, the third
represents the beliefs for the PAY treatment and the fourth and last stands for the
beliefs in the PICT treatment. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test does not detect a statis-
tical difference between the beliefs in RANK and PAY at the 1%-level. We conclude
that the way we let advisors rank and select the sociodemographic information does
not affect the belief formation.
However, we find statistically different distributions for the comparison of all
other pairs, e.g., SELF vs. RANK and PAY as well as PICT vs. RANK and PAY
at the 1%-level. The results indicate that the advisors on average take more risk in
their own decisions compared to the beliefs about their advisees’ risk preferences. In
other words, the advisors perceive their advisees to be less risk tolerant. If analyzed
individually, 80% of the beliefs in RANK and PAY exhibit either the same risk or
are more risk averse than the advisors’ own choice. A self-other discrepancy indeed
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exists.
Interestingly, the choices of PICT are not statistically different from the choices
in SELF. This could be due to the fact that in PICT less information is provided.
As a proxy, advisors use their own risk preferences in these cases.
Figure 4.4: Advisors’ Own Risk Preferences and Beliefs in Treatments (e100,000
Question)
4.4.2 How Do Advisors Form Beliefs?
In order to analyze how the advisors assess others’ risk preferences based on so-
ciodemographics, we set up three regression models which are presented in Table
4.5. The data of RANK and PAY are pooled in the regressions since we do not find
statistically significant differences in the beliefs.16 As the 167 advisors have to judge
four randomly chosen advisees in each treatment, the pooled decisions sum up to
1,336 observations.
We run an OLS regression in which the dependent variable is the belief on the
eight advisees.17 However, how much and which information is available to each
advisor when forming the belief depends on the ranking and the random number
(RANK) or on how many categories are bought (PAY). The empirical models have
to incorporate different states of available information of the advisor when making
the prediction. Therefore, we include two major sets of variables. The estimated
models thereby allow to evaluate how advisors adopt their beliefs when information
on different categories is available.
16Furthermore, we control for potential differences with a dummy variable.
17Remember that for a better readability, in the analyses, we present the belief in the e100,000
question in ‘e10,000 invested’ such that the beliefs is scaled from 0 to 10.
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Table 4.5: Regression Results: Belief Formation
Model (1) (2) (3)








Year of birth -19.48 -15.26 -12.2
15.63 15.16 15.11
No uni degree 0.222 0.171 0.166
0.230 0.210 0.205
Single -0.00252 -0.0251 -0.0312
0.185 0.171 0.170
Low income -0.00822 -0.0794 -0.0812
0.159 0.148 0.148
Male 0.666*** 0.651*** 0.654***
0.224 0.201 0.198
No children 0.206 0.413** 0.414**
0.193 0.177 0.176















Year of birth 0.00989 0.00776 0.00623
0.00794 0.0077 0.00767
Uni degree -0.0261 -0.00661 -0.0164
0.246 0.231 0.224
Partner -0.269 -0.188 -0.185
0.216 0.207 0.208
High income 1.409*** 1.429*** 1.458***
0.240 0.237 0.231
Female -1.118*** -1.133*** -1.158***
0.218 0.218 0.217
Children -0.654*** -0.748*** -0.766***
0.251 0.246 0.243










Self · junior -0.142**
0.0696
Self · senior 0.103
0.0905
Junior -0.667** -0.422** 0.146
0.189 0.176 0.295
Senior -0.653** -0.265 -0.587*
0.282 0.241 0.317
Rank -0.0709 -0.0885 -0.0886
0.0982 0.0971 0.0970
Constant 3.781*** 2.756*** 2.742***
0.351 0.333 0.341
N 1,336 1,336 1,336
R2 0.43 0.474 0.483
Adjusted R2 0.419 0.464 0.472
Advisee FE yes yes yes
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, robust standard errors clustered
at advisors’ level. Dependent variable: advisor’s belief in e100,000
question. 1{seen = 1} indicates a characteristic is visible. {soc dem}
indicates the realization of the characteristic. The left-out category is
1{seen=0}.
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The dummy variables in the upper part (1{seen=1}) bear a value of one if the
corresponding characteristic is visible. The variables in the part below (1{seen=1}·
{soc dem 6=0}) are interaction terms carrying the value of the variable itself and are
interacted with the upper dummy variables. Thus the value of the characteristic
shows up only if it is observable.18 The omitted category in this specification is ‘not
seen’ (1{seen=0}). Hence, this allows us to interpret the results as the marginal
effects of the specific characteristics if it is observed. In this specification the coef-
ficients of the upper set of dummy variables reflect the effect if the actual value of
the variable is zero (e.g., the effect on male, as the gender dummy variable has a
value of 0 for male and 1 for female).
Additionally, by including dummy variables for the junior and senior professionals
respectively, we disentangle deviations in the behavior of the groups being familiar
with giving advice. Since the unit of observation is the advisor, the errors are
clustered on the level of the advisors.
Given the econometric specification, we compute the scope of adjustment of the
advisors’ forecast dependent on the observable information. Generally, we expect
the signs to be coherent with recent literature such as Dohmen et al. (2011) who
used the same risk measure; we expect an advisor’s belief to be more risk averse if an
advisee is female instead of male. A companion paper (Leuermann and Roth 2012a)
that uses the same subjects reports that especially males, younger people, singles and
non-parents are on average associated with a higher degree of risk taking. Advisors
are thus expected to form their beliefs according to the known correlations. While
model (1) serves as the baseline specification, model (2) and (3) include advisors’
risk preferences in addition.
The regression results show that the risk index and the gender coefficients are
highly significant for both sets of controls in all models. By evaluating the gender
variable in model (1) we find that advisors increase their forecast for the e100,000
question by e6,660 on average if a male is assessed. The investment decreases by
e4,520 if a female is indicated.19 In effect, males are expected to invest e4,520
more in the lottery than females. A Wald test on the joint significance over both
sets of controls ({socdem = 0} + {socdem 6= 0} = 0) reveals joint significance at
the 1%-level (see Table 4.6). The correlation between gender and risk preferences
18Note that the value of the sociodemographic information on ‘income’, ‘education’ and ‘family
status’ is converted into a dummy variable to ease the interpretation. ‘Income’ is divided into high
income (value=1) and low income (value=0), ‘education’ into advisees with (value=1) or without
(value=0) university degree and ‘family status’ into having a partner (value=1) and not having a
partner (value=0).
19To calculate the total effect, we have to sum both the male and female coefficient; the total
effect turns out to be negative.
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as suggested by the literature is thus incorporated into the advisor’s belief.
Table 4.6: Wald Test on Joint Significance (P-values) of Coefficients in Table 4.5
Model (1) (2) (3)
H0 : {socdem = 0}+ {socdem 6= 0}=0
Year of Birth 0.4207 0.3155 0.4207
Education 0.3891 0.3461 0.3891
Family status 0.2277 0.2350 0.2277
Income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Gender 0.0022 0.0046 0.0022
Parenthood 0.1400 0.1692 0.1400
Risk index 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
A similar statement can be made for the variable risk index. The variable ‘risk
index’ in the upper part has the value of one if the advisee’s risk index is zero
and visible to the advisor. The fact that it shows up to be significant decreases
the investment by approximately e33,650.20 We find that on average the advisors
increase their investment forecast by e8,850 for each point the advisee’s risk index
variable increases. Both coefficients are jointly significant (see Table 4.6).
Regarding the income variable, we observe that advisors adjust their belief only
if an advisee with high income is observed.21 The interaction dummy variable in-
dicating high income reports that the amount invested in the lottery increases by
e14,090 and is jointly significant with the variable indicating low income (see Table
4.6).22
In addition to the advisee fixed effects we incorporate advisor attributes in model
(2). The ‘Self’ variable contains the advisor’s own risk attitude. This variable turns
out to be highly significant. This is an interesting finding since the forecast is not
only made on the grounds of the provided information about the advisees but is
also related to the advisor’s own risk attitude. Especially the size of the coefficient
shows the considerable influence of the advisor’s preferences. Together with the
dependent variable, this variable is located on the same domain. For every e1,000
an advisor invests into the lottery, he or she expects the advisee to invest e183
more, on average. This implicates that an advisor’s own risk attitude serves as a
reference point for judging others. The inclusion of further advisor’s characteristics
20The advisees’ choices of risk index range from 0 to 5 (Table 4.2).
21Note: High income refers to a monthly net income of e6,000 and more. Regarding the cor-
relation between income and risk preferences, results in the literature are ambiguous (see Section
4.2).
22For the information on parenthood, we can observe that the effect is significant if the advisor
observes that the advisee has children. Nevertheless, the Wald test on joint significance in Table
4.6 proves that this is not significant.
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(e.g., gender, age) shows a stable influence of the advisor’s risk preferences (not
reported).
In model (3) we are interested in whether professional experience changes the extent
to which advisors base their belief on their own risk preferences. Similarly to the ‘self’
variable we include two more interaction variables: ‘Self · junior’ and ‘Self · senior’.23
These variables interact the advisor’s risk preferences with a dummy variable of the
respective advisor’s type. This specification allows to analyze systematic differences
of the influence of the advisors’ own risk attitude on the beliefs in the different
advisor groups. The coefficient of ‘self’ stays largely unchanged when comparing
model (2) and model (3). Hence, the non-professional advisor expects, on average
and ceteris paribus, an advisee to invest e186 more into the lottery for every e1,000
the advisor invests himself.
The junior professionals’ advice decisions are not based on their own risk pref-
erences because the coefficients ‘self · junior’ and ‘self’ are jointly not significant
as proven by a Wald test. In contrast to that, senior professionals show no sig-
nificantly different behavior compared to the omitted category ‘non-professionals’.
The false consensus bias is thus driven by senior professionals and non-professionals,
while junior professionals seem to abstain from using their own decision as reference
point.
As suggested above, pooling the data of RANK and PAY is not an issue since
‘Rank’ is insignificant in all models. The variables controlling for the advisor’s
type indicate that professionals compared to the non-professional advisors generally
believe that advisees invest a lower amount in the e100,000 question.
In conclusion, this analysis demonstrates that advisors adjust their beliefs ac-
cording to the available information. In particular, the significant variables show
the presumed signs. Furthermore, we conclude that they use their own risk attitude
as a reference point. Hence, this matches the findings of Chakravarty et al. (2011)
and others who report a correlation between advisors’ and advisees’ preferences.
4.4.3 Does Social Distance Matter?
In this section we trace a question raised by Hsee and Weber (1997). Arguably,
the self-other discrepancy described in Section 4.4.1 could be caused by the social
distance of advisee and advisor. The reasoning can be summarized as follows: If an
advisor recognizes an advisee to be similar in observable characteristics, the advisor
alleges the advisee to have similar preferences. Hence, the deviation between the
advisor’s preferences and the advisor’s belief should depend in the sociodemographic
23The omitted category is ‘non-professional’.
77
Table 4.7: Regression Results: Social Distance
Model (4)












































Dummy if char. seen yes
Advisee FE yes
Results of Random effects model, * p<0.1; **
p<0.05; *** p<0.01, dependent variable: absolute
difference between advisor’s belief and advisor’s own
risk preferences. 1{seen=1} indicates if a character-
istic is seen.
similarities - or social distance. We interpret the social distance as the absolute
difference between the advisor’s and the advisee’s sociodemographic characteristics.
Following this argument, the belief and the advisor’s own lottery choice should
coincide if both, advisor and advisee, share the same gender or family status, for
example.
In order to evaluate this hypothesis, we estimate a regression shown in Table
4.7. The dependent variable is the absolute difference between an advisor’s self-
assessment and the belief on the advisee. As independent variables we include
the absolute differences between the advisor’s and the advisee’s sociodemographic
characteristics, derived for each category separately. To account for the experimental
design, these variables are interacted with a dummy variable which is equal to one
if the specific category is visible in the experiment (cf. Section 4.3.3). In a similar
manner as in the models (1) to (3), additionally we include a set of dummy variables
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that indicates if the particular variable is seen by the advisee.24 Furthermore, we
control for differences between the treatments and the different advisor groups.
Considering the results of model (4) in Table 4.7, we find significant effects for
the variables risk index and children. Hence, the absolute difference in the risk index
between advisor and advisee positively correlates (ceteris paribus) with the absolute
difference between the self-assessment and the belief. These results indicate that
advisors perceive the risk index as a reliable measure and adjust their beliefs and
their behavior according to this variable. With respect to the variable children, the
positive sign of the significant coefficient can be interpreted as follows: If advisors
recognize that they do not share the parenthood status with the advisee, they update
their belief as they deviate from their own preferences. In the analyses above, gender
turned out to be a major predictor for the risk preferences of others. Interestingly,
there is no significant gender effect in model (4).
Similarly to the findings in Section 4.4.2, there is a significantly different behav-
ior of the professionals compared to the non-professional advisors, as the respective
control variables show. The self-other discrepancy is found to be smaller for pro-
fessionals than for non-professionals. Junior and senior professionals deviate from
their risk preferences to a smaller extent than non-professionals. This does not
contradict our findings regarding the false consensus bias derived in the previous
section. There, our interest is in the correlation between advisors’ risk preferences
and beliefs, while in this part we analyze the absolute difference.
4.4.4 Prediction Error
One of the research questions raised in the introduction is whether the advisors’
beliefs coincide with the advisees’ actual risk preferences. In other words, we analyze
if the advisors’ beliefs are correct. Furthermore, we inspect whether and which
information is a prerequisite for forming precise beliefs. In order to answer this
question we combine our experimental data with the large-scale heterogeneous data
from the SOEP. This allows us to generalize our results and to make statements on
a representative level.
Derivation of Prediction Errors In a similar manner as described in Section
4.3.2, we compute the risk preferences of ‘representative counterparts’ of the advisees
in order to make use of the higher predictive power of the SOEP data. However,
in contrast to Section 4.3.2 we have to take into account that not all characteristics
are visible to the advisor when making the prediction. Hence, the subsample on
24In contrast to the former models, these dummy variables are not displayed and interpreted.
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which the conditional average of the answer to the e100,000 question is based has
to be adjusted to the available information for every single assessment. Take for
example the advisee in the second row of Table 4.2. If the advisor sees all seven
characteristics, this could be due to the fact that the random number is seven in
RANK or the advisor buys all seven categories in PAY. In this case, the conditional
mean is computed as described in Section 4.3.2 and would amount to an investment
of e8,300. However, if the advisor buys only gender, or alternatively, ranked gender
first and the random number is one, the subset contains all female observations.
On average, panel participants of the SOEP with this characteristic invest e6,878
in the lottery. In the PICT treatment, only the gender and potentially the age is
observable. By studying all males or females being 25 to 35 years old, the ’represen-
tative counterparts’ are constructed for the PICT treatment. Hence, for every single
observation, we have to compute this average, given the observed characteristics.25
By the above procedure we obtain a value for every observation which proxies
the advisee’s actual decision. In order to analyze if the advisor’s belief is correct,
we compute the advisor’s prediction error. For this we take the squared difference
of the advisor’s belief and the computed average choice from above. This difference
serves as the dependent variable for the analyses below.
Results In Figure 4.5 we show a quantile plot of the prediction errors by treat-
ment. The pooled prediction errors for the RANK and PAY treatment are displayed
in the left figure, while the right figure shows the prediction errors for the PICT
treatment. The 45◦-line represents the benchmark case of a uniform distribution of
the prediction errors over the quantiles. Several aspects are noteworthy: First, the
quantiles derived for the PICT treatment are closer to the 45◦-line compared to the
RANK and PAY treatment. While only about 20% of advisors exhibit a squared
prediction error of 20 and larger in RANK and PAY, in PICT this amounts to over
50%. Hence, for the treatments RANK and PAY, the precision of the advisors’
assessment is found to be higher. Second, in the RANK and PAY treatment the
advisors’ predictions are fairly accurate. Approximately 60% of the observations
exhibit a squared prediction error below four. In other words: As the scale on the
y-axis is squared, in 60% of the cases the belief deviates from the actual average
choice by e20,000 or less.
Given the strong differences in RANK and PAY compared to PICT, indeed either
the amount of sociodemographic information provided or which categories are re-
vealed might enhance precision. The visual appearance turns out not to be a major
25In order to ensure representativity we employ a dataset-specific weighting function which
considers cross-sectional personal weights of each subject.
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Figure 4.5: Quantiles: Prediction Error in RANK, PAY and PICT
source of information when predicting the risk preferences. We thus expect that if
the advisor has more or particular information available this leads to lower predic-
tion errors.26 As the information available is varied in the treatments RANK and
PAY, consequently, we analyze these treatments in detail. In Table 4.8 we present
the results of two regression models. In these models we investigate if more and
which categories help to decrease the advisor’s prediction error.
As discussed above, as dependent variable the squared difference between the
advisor’s belief and the conditional average for the respective advisee is employed.
In model (5) and model (6) we include two different types of explanatory variables.
In model (5) the variable ’sum seen’ measures the number of sociodemographic
characteristics that is visible to the advisor when making the prediction. In model
(6) the sum of visible characteristics is split up into the different categories. For
each category a dummy variable is included which indicates a one if the category is
uncovered. As a second set of variables in both models we include controls for the
treatment and the advisor’s type.27 Furthermore, both models correct for advisee
fixed effects and employ robust standard errors clustered on advisors.
In model (5) we find the variable ‘sum seen’ to be significant at the 1%-level.
The negative sign indicates that if more categories are available, the precision of
the prediction increases. The marginal effect of -0.652 is economically relevant as
the mean of the squared prediction error amounts to approximately 8.7. Hence, a
finding is that indeed the amount of information plays a significant role for giving
precise advice.
26A companion paper (Leuermann and Roth 2012a) reports that advisors largely interpret the
information in line with the correlations found in the data.
27Note: For the advisor’s type the omitted category is ‘non-professional’.
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Table 4.8: Regression Results: Prediction Errors
Model (5) (6)
























Junior prof. -4.599*** -4.011***
1.253 1.118








Adjusted R2 0.156 0.211
Advisee FE yes yes
Results of OLS regression, * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, ro-
bust standard errors clustered at advisors’ level, dependent variable:
squared difference between advisors belief and actual choice of rep-
resentative advisee calculated from SOEP. 1{seen=1} indicates if a
characteristic is seen.
When considering model (6) we find a negative coefficient for the category risk
index, significant at the 1%-level. This indicates that if the advisee’s self-assessed
risk preference is visible to the advisor, the squared prediction error decreases by
approximately nine units. This confirms that the risk index variable possesses a
significant predictive power. This is also true for the family status variable as it
decreases the squared prediction error by 2.1 units on average. The results indicate
why the prediction error is found to be larger in PICT. None of the sociodemographic
categories provided in PICT - age and gender - significantly reduce the prediction
error in RANK and PAY.
A further considerable result of this analysis is obtained with respect to the the
advisors’ types. The prediction error of the junior professionals shows up to be sig-
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nificantly lower compared to the reference group of (omitted) non-professionals. In
model (5) this coefficient has a relevant impact with a value of -4.6. When comparing
the two groups of professionals we find the junior professionals to have significantly
lower prediction errors compared to the senior professionals. The coefficient of the
senior professionals is not significantly different from the reference category of non-
professionals. Both groups of professional advisors perform significantly better in
model (6) compared to the non-professionals. In addition to junior professionals,
also senior professionals have a significantly lower prediction error at a significance
level of 10%.
A further observation in these models is that they explain 16% to 21% of the vari-
ation in the prediction errors. Compared to other studies analyzing risk preferences
and their determinants, this is remarkably high.
In summary, these models demonstrate that if more information is available the
prediction quality of advice increases. The variables risk index and parenthood
improve the prediction of risk preferences. A major results is that professionals
outperform non-professionals in making precise predictions. Interestingly, young
professionals beliefs’ are even more precise than the beliefs of the senior professionals.
4.5 Robustness Checks
As outlined in Section 4.3.1, the whole experiment is executed with a second risk
measure (the HL-lottery) which serves as robustness check. In the following para-
graphs we reproduce the previous analyses to back the arguments made in the Sec-
tions 4.4.1 to 4.4.3. For Section 4.4.4 we can not provide a robustness check since
the alternative risk measure is not available for the SOEP dataset. All mentioned
tables and figures can be found in the appendix following immediately after this
chapter in Section 4.7.28
4.5.1 Risk Measure of Holt and Laury (2002)
The alternative method we employ is the multiple price list design (MPL) of Holt
and Laury (2002). In this risk task the subject has to decide in ten rows between
two lotteries (option A and option B) as depicted in Figure 4.6. In each row, except
for the last row, option B has a higher payoff variance than option A. The expected
payoffs are increasing with the row number. Therefore, an individual with monotone
preferences either chooses option B in every row or switches from A to B. The more
28The results are robust for using a structural maximum likelihood estimation (Harrison and
Rutsto¨m 2008) of a utility function (U(x) = xr) with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
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rows a subject opts for option B, the higher is the subject’s implied risk tolerance.
A risk neutral individual would choose option A in row one to four and switch to
option B for row 5 to 10. In order to enforce monotonicity of the risk preferences we
use a switching MPL or sMPL instead of the classic design (Andersen et al. 2006).
That is, a subject does not state ten separate decisions but has to announce in which
row he or she chooses option B for the first time. For the subject’s payoff in the
lab experiment one row out of the ten is chosen randomly with equal probability.
For this row, the lottery chosen by the subject (either option A or B) determines
the payoff. The computer draws a lot according to the winning probabilities and
determines the money won by the subject.
Although this elicitation mechanism is widely used in the literature it has its
weaknesses - it is prone to framing effects and intellectually sophisticated (Harri-
son and Rutstro¨m 2008). Nevertheless, it is well-studied in many different contexts
and is extensively used in previous studies, which allows comparability to previous
results. Recent research shows that risk preferences are not stable across mecha-
nisms (e.g., Anderson and Mellor 2009), a second mechanism thus allows a broader
generalizability of our results. Furthermore, it is documented that the mechanism
measures risk attitudes outside the lab consistently (Harrison and List 2004, Harri-
son et al. 2007). Yet another drawback of the e100,000 question is that it captures
only preferences on the risk averse domain.
Regarding the procedure in the lab experiment, directly after stating the belief
in the e100,000 question, the advisor’s belief in the HL-lottery is elicited. Advisors
have to answer in which exact row the presented advisee first chose option B. Both
questions of risk elicitation have to be answered directly after the sociodemographic
information or the picture is presented to the advisor. The beliefs formed in both
measures are comparable as they are formed on the same advisees.
4.5.2 HL-lottery: Self-Assessment and Beliefs
Figure 4.7 shows the distributions of the advisor’s beliefs and the advisor’s own risk
preferences as in Section 4.4.1. In contrast to the e100,000 measure, the HL-measure
allows to reveal risk-loving preferences. Approximately 12.6% of the advisors switch
from option A to option B before row 5 and therefore exhibit risk-loving behavior.
These results are comparable in size with the results reported by Holt and Laury
(2002).
In general, we find a significant relationship between the beliefs in the HL-lottery
and the e100,000 question. The rank correlation coefficient of the beliefs in the two
measures amounts to 0.52 and is statistically significant at the 0.1%-level. Hence,
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the observed distribution of the beliefs in the HL-lottery (Figure 4.7) is comparable
to the distribution of the beliefs in the e100,000 question (Figure 4.4).
In Figure 4.4 we find that advisors judge the advisees to be less risk tolerant
compared to their own risk attitude in the RANK and PAY treatment. This result
is detected in the robustness check as well since the dashed lines lie above the solid
black line, as can be observed in Figure 4.7. A sign-test approves this result at
a significance level of 1%. 72% of advisors’ beliefs are less risky or equally risky
compared to the advisors own risk preferences. Furthermore, a Wilcoxon test does
not detect any difference between SELF and PICT. Therefore, the statistical findings
of the robustness check are in line with the results of Section 4.4.1.
4.5.3 HL-lottery: How Do Advisors Form Beliefs?
In the following section we present the robustness checks for the question of Section
4.4.2. For this we replicate the analysis above with the HL-lottery and re-estimate
the empirical models (1) to (3) and refer to them as (1a) to (3a) in Table 4.9 and
4.10. If we find coefficients to exhibit an opposite sign compared to Section 4.4.2,
our results are similar, as for the HL-lottery, a higher number indicates that the
advisee is supposed to switch later and thus reveals a higher risk aversion. Aside
from the sign, the dependent variables of both risk measures range on a scale from
0 to 10.
For model (1a), which analyzes the specification of (1), we find similar effects.
Again the risk index, gender and income variables are significant at the 1%-level.
All mentioned coefficients are jointly significant at the 1%-level as well.
In model (2a) we incorporate advisors’ own risk preferences (‘Self’) in addition
to the advisee fixed effects. In line with model (2a) the coefficient is significant and
of relevant magnitude.
Model (3a) includes indicator variables for the different advisors’ groups. In
model (3) we find no false consensus effect for the junior advisors. In contrast to
that, in model (3a) these advisors exhibit a false consensus. However, it is not
statistically different from the non-professionals. The same is true for the senior
professionals.
These robustness checks largely confirm the results of Section 4.4.2. We find
differences in the magnitude of the false consensus for the junior professionals.
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4.5.4 HL-lottery: Does Social Distance Matter?
As a final validation, in Table 4.11 we provide the robustness check for Section
4.4.3. In general, model (4a) shows comparable results as model (4). Especially,
for the variables of interest - the interaction terms - we find the same pattern as
in the baseline model as risk index and parenthood turn out to be significant and
comparable in size. The same result can be identified for the dummy variables of
the advisors’ groups, although the signs of the coefficients of these variables differ.
Consistently, the baseline model and the robustness check show that sociodemo-
graphic differences between advisor and advisee cause a deviation of the advisors’
beliefs from their own risk attitudes.
4.6 Conclusion
This study investigates how advisors form beliefs about the risk preferences of ad-
visees. Advice, especially in the financial sector, is important as people increasingly
make their investment decisions after consulting a professional advisor. Hence, an
accurate prediction of an advisee’s risk preferences is vital for good advice. The
results of this study contribute to the existing literature in several ways.
We find that the risk tolerance an advisor assigns to an advisee significantly
depends on the advisee’s self-assessment of risk preferences. Besides, the self-
assessment, gender and income have a significant impact on the advisors’ assessment
of the advisees’ risk preferences. A salient finding is that advisors employ their own
risk preferences as a reference point when giving advice.
Interestingly, the beliefs show a higher risk aversion than the advisors’ own risk
preferences. For the process of giving advice this indicates that - abstracting from
any incentive problems arising in the advice process - advisors in general do not
assess people to be more risky than they are themselves.
As a result of our analysis we find that advisors update their beliefs on the ad-
visee’s risk preferences according to their social distance to the advisee. If advisors’
and avisees exhibit a different parenthood status or risk index, the advisor’ beliefs
deviate significantly from their own risk attitude which we interpret as an updating
process.
When analyzing the prediction errors we find that more available information re-
duces prediction errors. Especially the visibility of the risk index and family status
improves the prediction. By using the large-scale data of the SOEP to construct
choices of representative advisees, we provide robustness for this result. Sociodemo-
graphic information is helpful for advice to become more precise. Good advice is
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thus not cheap, it needs sociodemographic information. Information about family
status and the advisees’ self-assessment of risk preferences, however, can be obtained
easily in a counseling interview.
The fact that professional advisors are able to predict the risk preference with
higher precision is good news for costumers of financial advisors. Furthermore,
theoretical studies that solely focus on agency problems and incentives that arise
in the counseling interview often take as given that the advisor is aware of the risk
preferences of the advisee. Given our study, this assumption should be viewed with
some caution.
A major asset of this study is the rich dataset. We investigate whether the
financial professionals’ behavior differs from non-professionals. Interestingly, junior
professionals emerge as a group that stands out for two reasons. First, their advice
is less dependent on their own risk preferences, and second, the prediction is more
precise than in any other group. Hence, extensive counseling experience does not
necessarily lead to a better outcome in terms of prediction accuracy.
The presented results are fairly robust as the additional analysis with the measure
of Holt and Laury (2002) shows.
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4.7 Appendix: Additional Material for Robust-
ness Check
4.7.1 Risk Measure: HL-lottery
Figure 4.6: sMPL Mechanism (HL-lottery)
4.7.2 HL-lottery: Self-Assessment and Beliefs
Figure 4.7: Advisors’ Own Risk Preferences and Beliefs in Treatments (HL-lottery)
4.7.3 HL-lottery: How Do Advisors Form Beliefs?
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Table 4.9: Regression Results: Belief Formation in HL-lottery
Model (1a) (2a) (3a)








Year of birth 13.95 15.22 15.22
13.79 13.35 13.09
No uni degree -0.12 -0.272* -0.267*
0.187 0.164 0.161
Single -0.16 -0.179 -0.197
0.192 0.164 0.165
Low income 0.0865 0.047 0.0399
0.149 0.143 0.142
Male -0.246 -0.232 -0.203
0.164 0.142 0.142
No children -0.177 -0.155 -0.12
0.161 0.144 0.145















Year of birth -0.00725 -0.00785 -0.00785
-0.00697 -0.00676 -0.00662
Uni degree 0.123 0.27 0.262
-0.196 -0.182 -0.178
Partner 0.24 0.253 0.275
-0.199 -0.18 -0.176
Female 0.706*** 0.643*** 0.644***
-0.131 -0.12 -0.12
High income -0.636*** -0.613*** -0.636***
-0.215 -0.212 -0.206
Parenthood 0.291 0.297 0.286
-0.204 -0.195 -0.197















Junior prof. 0.0235 0.198 0.384
0.203 0.181 0.920
Senior prof. -0.661** -0.467* -1.647*
0.324 0.267 0.947
Rank 0.02 0.0395 0.0326
0.0863 0.0838 0.083
Constant 6.916*** 4.082*** 4.404***
0.264 0.454 0.529
N 1,336 1,336 1,336
R2 0.23 0.353 0.36
Adjusted R2 0.216 0.341 0.347
Advisee FE yes yes yes
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01, robust standard errors clustered at
advisors’ level. Dependent variable: advisor’s belief in HL-lottery.
1{seen = 1} indicates a characteristic is visible. {soc dem} indicates
the realization of the characteristic. The left-out category is 1{seen =
0}.
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Table 4.10: HL-lottery: Wald Test on Joint Significance (P-values) of Coefficients
in Table 4.9
Model (1) (2) (3)
H0 : {socdem = 0}+ {socdem 6= 0}=0
Year of Birth 0.256 0.256 0.247
Education 0.988 0.988 0.971
Family status 0.647 0.647 0.625
Income 0.014 0.014 0.009
Gender 0.003 0.003 0.002
Parenthood 0.460 0.460 0.378
Risk index 0.000 0.000 0.000
4.7.4 HL-lottery: Does Social Distance Matter?
Table 4.11: Regression Results: Social Distance in HL-lottery
Model (4a)













































Results of Random effects model, * p<0.1; **
p<0.05; *** p<0.01, dependent variable: abso-
lute difference between advisor’s belief and advi-
sor’s own risk preferences. 1{seen=1} indicates
if a characteristic is seen.
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Chapter 5
Reputational Herding in Financial
Markets: A Laboratory
Experiment
“They [equity investors] are not paid to make money, or even to beat the
market. Rather, they are paid not to do worse than their peers. Going down
with the market would not be so bad for them; missing out on a rally like
in 2009, when stocks doubled in barely two years, would be catastrophic for
their career. That is the logic of the way they are paid - usually, as a pro-
portion of their assets under management - and of the way they are judged
- against their peers and public stock indices.”(Financial Times, Comment by
J. Authers, “Dangers of market herd stampedes”, 30.11.2011.)
5.1 Introduction
Motivation The popular press frequently alludes to herd behavior as a potential
source of mispricing in financial markets.1 Also, there is a substantial academic lit-
erature (both theoretical and empirical) on this phenomenon. Perhaps surprisingly,
even under full rationality, herding might arise in financial markets, and market
prices might fail to converge to true values even in the long-run. One strand of the
literature suggests that this might be due to “social learning” on part of individual
investors (see e.g., Park and Sabourian 2011, Avery and Zemsky 1998). In particular,
these authors introduce information cascade models (in the spirit of Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992, Banerjee 1992, Welch 1992) into a Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) style sequential asset market, and they show that, despite a flexible market
1This chapter is based on Leuermann and Roider (2012).
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price, rational herd behavior might occur.2
As the introductory citation above suggests, another potential source of ratio-
nal herd behavior are reputational concerns of individual investors vis-a-vis out-
side observers (e.g., potential future employers). In particular, Dasgupta and Prat
(2008) introduce career concerns (in the spirit of Scharfstein and Stein 1990) into the
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model. There, investors are of various (unobservable)
ability types. Dasgupta and Prat (2008) show that, following a number of trades in
the same direction, the profit from acting on one’s own information becomes smaller
and smaller as prices get precise. At the same time, if one’s own information runs
counter to the behavior of previous investors, acting on the own signal implies a
reputational loss, which might make it rational to herd. Intuitively, if several pre-
decessors have bought the same asset, with a high probability, a trade contrarian
to predecessors decisions and according to the own signal turns out to be worthless
and the investor incurs a reputational loss as he is observed as an investor with low
ability. He thus considers following predecessors and neglects his own information to
not harm his reputation. From that moment onwards, prices remain constant and
all subsequent investors follow the crowd.3 Of course, besides payoff externalities
from information-based or reputation-based herd behavior, there might be still other
explanations for herding. For example, herding might also be driven by irrational
investors following their “animal spirits” as Akerlof and Shiller (2010) have put it.
From an empirical perspective, there is by now a large literature on potential herd
behavior and its likely causes in financial markets (for surveys, see e.g., Bikhchan-
dani and Sharma 2000, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh 2002, or Hirshleifer and Teoh
2003). In particular, various authors have investigated whether there is reputational
herding (due to career concerns) by investment newsletters (see e.g., Graham 1999),
macroeconomic forecasters (see e.g., Lamont 2002, Ehrbeck and Waldmann 1996),
security analysts (see e.g., Hong and Kubik 2003, Hong, Kubik, and Solomon 2000,
Welch 2000), mutual fund managers (see e.g., Massa and Patgiri 2005, Chevalier
and Ellison 1999), or institutional investors (see e.g., Sias 2004). So far, the empiri-
2Avery and Zemsky (1998) consider a setup with two dimensions of uncertainty and two states of
the world. A trader has private information not only about the assets’ value, but also about event
uncertainty that might change the value of the asset substantially. With these two dimensions,
prices might fail to reflect all privately observed information and herding might arise. Park and
Sabourian (2011) show that, even with one-dimensional uncertainty, herding may arise if there are
more than two states of the world.
3In another approach, Dasgupta and Prat (2006) consider career concerns in a static asset
market with two periods and focus on the effect on the trading volume. Trueman (1994) studies the
incentives of analysts to herd in their earnings forecasts and finds herding on the sequential forecasts
as well. For further theoretical models consider Zwiebel (1995), Huddart (1999), Prendergast and
Stole (1996), and Villatoro (2009).
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cal evidence seems to be mixed.4 Moreover, while in the theoretical models private
information plays a crucial role, in empirical studies it is, in general, impossible
to control for private information of individual actors. Also, it is frequently dif-
ficult to observe the performance incentive, which, in general, will also motivate
behavior. Consequently, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2003) point out that, with empir-
ical studies, it will always be difficult to disentangle the mixture of reputational
effects, informational effects, direct payoff externalities, and imperfect rationality.
As a consequence, we turn to the laboratory to test Dasgupta and Prat’s (2008)
theory of reputational herding experimentally. This way we can also control for the
information and incentives faced by decision makers.
Experimental Setup In this chapter, we experimentally test whether herd be-
havior occurs out of reputational concerns. We therefore design an experimental
setup similar to the theoretical model of Dasgupta and Prat (2008). Their theory
suggests that investors engage in herd behavior5 if they face reputational concerns
and asset prices get precise.
In the experiment, subjects in the role of financial investors take the decision
which of two assets to buy. The subjects’ investment behavior in two treatments
is studied via the strategy method. While in a treatment investment, subjects take
their decision in the absence of career concerns, in a treatment reputation, career
concerns are incorporated endogenously. For their investment choice, investors ob-
serve investment decisions of predecessors and a signal about which asset is the
successful one. Investors can be of two types. Either they are of good type and
receive an informative signal about the assets’ value or they are of bad type and
receive an uninformative signal. Subjects are not aware of their type.
In the first treatment investment, the investor’s profit consists of the final payoff
of the asset bought minus the price paid for it. In this setup, according to the
theory, investors should always follow their own signal and buy the respective asset
(i.e., there should be sincere trading). The second treatment reputation additionally
introduces principals who set wages for the investors based on the observed invest-
ment choices and the actual outcome of the asset. Investors thus receive wages set
by the principals besides earning profits from investing in the asset. In this second
treatment with career concerns, investors should engage in herd behavior and ne-
4For example, Sias (2004) and Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) fail to find evidence for
reputation-driven herd behavior, while in Welch (2000) clustering of behavior might be due to
informational or reputational reasons.
5Herd behavior, in our setup, refers to the case in which investors follow the investment deci-
sions of predecessors regardless of their own signal. The investors’ behavior thus does not carry
informational value and asset prices do not converge to the true liquidation value.
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glect their own signal if a sufficient number of predecessors bought the same asset
(and hence, prices are becoming sufficiently precise).
In particular, our experiment focuses on the following questions: First, do in-
vestors exhibit herd behavior out of reputational concerns? And second, is wage
setting in line with theory? Do principals recognize herd behavior out of reputa-
tional concerns and incorporate this into the assessment of investors’ trading qual-
ities? By employing differing incentive schemes - with and without (endogenous)
reputational concerns - we thus aim at disentangling the underlying motives for herd
behavior.
Results The experimental results show that, as suggested by Dasgupta and Prat
(2008), herd behavior can be observed in treatment reputation. About half of the
investors engages in herd behavior when theoretically expected. Surprisingly, even
in treatment investment, herd behavior occurs to a similar extent. We find evidence
that an (irrational) imitation of predecessors is present on behalf of investors.
In a second step, wages set by principals are studied to understand the underlying
motives of investors. Interestingly, wages are remarkably close to the theoretically
derived wages. In addition, imitative behavior seems to be understood by the prin-
cipals who adjust wages accordingly. Recalculating the theoretical model with the
wages set by the principals in the experiment reveals that these wages offer incentives
to engage in herd behavior. However, when calculating the underlying incentives
while additionally taking earlier investors’ imitative behavior into account, incen-
tives to herd disappear. Thus, the lack of reputational incentives might rather be
attributed to noisy behavior on the part of earlier investors.
Moreover, regardless of whether incentives for engaging in herd behavior are
provided, a substantial fraction of agents exhibits herd behavior. This contradicts
previous experimental findings which show that in a setup with flexible market prices
(similar to e.g., Avery and Zemsky 1998), herd behavior does not occur.
Outline The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. The related liter-
ature is discussed in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, we introduce Dasgupta and Prat’s
(2008) model and present the theoretical predictions. In Section 5.4, we outline
the experimental design, and the experiment’s results are presented in Section 5.5.
Section 5.6 contains concluding remarks. In the subsequent appendix in Section 5.7,
the theoretical predictions are recalculated for the prices and parameters set in the




The present analysis contributes to three strands of the literature.
First, our study is related to various experiments that investigate the incentive
effects of career concerns (i.e., concerns for one’s reputation). However, in con-
trast to the present study, this literature has focused on career concerns in labor
markets. In particular, Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2006) and Koch, Morgenstern, and
Raab (2009) experimentally investigate Holmstrom’s (1999) seminal model, where
through providing effort an agent tries to influence the perception of potential em-
ployers regarding his unknown ability, which has an impact on his future wages
(“signal jamming”).6
Second, there is a recent experimental literature on herd behavior in finan-
cial markets with flexible prices. However, so far this literature has mainly fo-
cused on purely information-based explanations for rational herding.7 For example,
Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005) and Cipriani and Guarino (2005) confirm
Avery and Zemsky’s (1998) prediction of no herding in a simple financial market with
(one-dimensional) uncertainty over two potential states of the world (but they also
find evidence for (irrational) contrarian behavior). Park and Sgroi (2009) find sup-
port for Park and Sabourian’s (2011) prediction of rational herding and contrarian
behavior in financial markets with more than two possible states of the world. We
differ from this literature by considering Dasgupta and Prat’s (2008) model where
rational herding is not driven by informational externalities, but by reputational
considerations of investors.
Third, there is the empirical literature on reputational herding in financial mar-
kets. As discussed above, it will always be difficult to disentangle various explana-
tions for herd behavior with empirical data. This is especially true as most of the
leading theories rely on the presence of asymmetric information (or certain proba-
bility distributions over states of the world), which is hard to observe empirically.
We complement this literature by testing Dasgupta and Prat’s (2008) theory of
reputational herding under controlled conditions in a lab experiment.
6While in Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2006) experiment gift-exchange might also play a role, Koch,
Morgenstern, and Raab (2009) focus on career concerns and provide support for the theoretical
predictions.
7Beginning with Anderson and Holt (1997), there is a vast experimental literature on
information-based herding in settings with fixed prices (which, however, does not directly ap-





We consider a simplified version of Dasgupta and Prat (2008) to make it suitable for
a laboratory experiment. The sequence of events is illustrated in Figure 5.1 below.8
There are three risk-neutral investors i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and four dates t ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Investors have to decide sequentially which of two assets A or B to buy, and at date
t = i it is investor i’s turn to buy either one unit of asset A or one unit of asset B.9
Only one of the assets will turn out to have a value of 10 points10 at date t = 4,
while the other will have a value of zero points. Both states v ∈ {A,B} (i.e., which
asset has a value of 10 points) occur with equal probability, and this is known to
investors. The state of the world is the same for all three investors. As additional
information, each investor receives a private signal si ∈ {a, b}. The signal’s pre-
cision depends on the respective investor’s type, where each investor has an equal
probability of being either “good” or “bad”. In the case of a good investor, we
have σg = Prob(s
i = a|v = A) = Prob(si = b|v = B) = 0.9, while in the case of
a bad investor we have σb = Prob(s
i = a|v = A) = Prob(si = b|v = B) = 0.5.
For each investor, the signal is drawn independently conditional on the state and
the investor’s type. That is, while a good investor receives additional information
by observing the signal, a bad investor’s signal is uninformative. Denote the asset
bought by investor i by V i ∈ {A,B}.11
The state of the world, as well as the investors’ types, is determined at the
beginning of the game. Investors do not learn their type throughout the game,
and the state of the world (and hence, investors’ payoffs) is only revealed after all
investment decisions have been made. When making his investment decision, each
investor can rely on three pieces of information: (i) his privately observed signal, (ii)
the current market prices for assets A and B, and (iii) the investment decisions of
earlier investors (if there are any) as well as the history of market prices these earlier
investors have faced. How market prices for the assets are determined is explained
8The basic structure of the model, as well as the informational environment, is common knowl-
edge. All instructions of the experiment can be found in Appendix B.
9Dasgupta and Prat (2008) consider the choice between buying or (short) selling a single asset.
In line with other experiments on herding in financial markets (see e.g., Drehmann, Oechssler, and
Roider 2005, Cipriani and Guarino 2005) we consider the strategically equivalent choice between
buying either A or B, which seems to be easier to explain to experimental subjects.
10The presentation of the theoretical model incorporates the currency used in the experiment -
points.
11Note that we do not introduce uninformed (noise) traders. This simplification does not affect
the theoretical predictions but makes it easier to explain the setting to experimental subjects.
Market break-down is not an issue as in the experiment subjects have to buy one of the two assets.
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Figure 5.1: Sequence of Events without Reputational Concerns
in more detail below.
5.3.2 No Reputational Concerns of Investors
In a first step, we consider a benchmark setting where the investors do not have
reputational concerns because they only derive a profit from buying one of the






V i , v) ≡
{
10− piV i if V i = v
−piV i if V i 6= v
(5.1)
for V i, v ∈ {A,B} and i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Market prices are set by a risk-neutral, competitive market maker who efficiently
incorporates all publicly available information (i.e., the history of trades) as well as
the investor’s decision to buy the respective asset. Hence, the market price of asset
A at time i is given by
piA = 10 · Prob(A|H i, buy A) (5.2)
where H i denotes the history of observable decisions of all earlier investors up to
time i. Likewise, the price of asset B is equal to piB = 10 · Prob(B|H i,buy B).12
In line with earlier results by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Avery and Zemsky
(1998), if investors are only motivated by profits from trading, all trading will be
sincere (i.e., all investors will act according to their signal), and hence investors
12Other experiments (such as Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider 2005, Cipriani and Guarino
2005) have assumed that the market maker does not condition the price on the kind of order he
receives (and hence, is not fully profit-maximizing). We deviate from this and assume the price
setting rule (5.2) because it facilitates more “extreme” prices earlier on in a given sequence of
investors. From a theoretical perspective, this will lead to the emergence of reputational herding
even in a sequence of only three investors (see Section 5.3.3 below).
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reveal their private signal through their investment decision to the market maker,
who will adjust prices accordingly. To see this, suppose that the market maker
believes that trading is sincere and that investor i has received signal si = a. In
this case, the price of A will equal the investor’s expected value of A, and hence
buying A yields him an expected profit of zero. However, buying B would yield a
loss because the market maker would assume that the investor has received signal
b and set a price that exceeds the investor’s expected value of B. Consequently, it
is optimal for the investor to trade sincerely, i.e., to buy asset A (recall that the
investors do not have the option not to trade). Likewise, after a signal si = b only
an investment in asset V i = B is optimal. To summarize:
Proposition 1 (Dasgupta and Prat 2008, Section 3) In the absence of rep-
utational concerns, investors always follow their signal and trade sincerely, i.e.,
V i = A if si = a and V i = B if si = b for all i. That is, there is no rational herding.
Prices are as in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Prices for Assets A and B
i H i piA p
i
B
1 — 7.0 7.0
2 A 8.4 5.0
2 B 5.0 8.4
3 AB or BA 7.0 7.0
3 AA 9.3 3.0
3 BB 3.0 9.3
5.3.3 Investors with Reputational Concerns
Dasgupta and Prat (2008) augment the model as outlined in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2
by reputational concerns of investors. More precisely, in addition to the payoff from
buying a certain asset, at date t = 4 each investor i receives some wage ri that is
determined at the end of the game, i.e.,
piiR ≡ piiI + ri. (5.3)
Dasgupta and Prat (2008) assume that the investors are fund managers and the
wage ri is given by an outside market’s posterior belief that investor i is a good type
(i.e., an investor whose signals have informational content). The outside market
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(i.e., potential future employers) observes the entire history HT of trades and prices
as well as the realized true state of the world v (i.e., which of the two assets is
successful). Consequently, in contrast to Section 5.3.2 investors have an incentive
to be perceived as a good type, and for investor 3 it will be optimal to disregard his
private signal and to herd whenever both predecessors have bought the same asset.
The intuition is as follows: If early investors follow their signal, the price incorpo-
rates their private information and moves towards the true liquidation value. Over
time, however, price movements become smaller. In particular, profits from trading
according to one’s signal stay zero, and profits from trading against one’s signal stay
negative, but decrease in absolute terms. At the same time, a trader who observes
a signal contrarian to earlier price movements (and hence the most likely outcome
of the asset) faces endogenous reputational costs: if he would follow his signal, with
a high probability the asset he buys would turn out to be worthless and he would
be perceived as a bad investor who has received an uninformative signal. Thus,
as prices become sufficiently precise (and profits from trading sufficiently small),
investors start to follow predecessors out of reputational concerns.
Wage Setting Process by Principals In practice, whether reputational herding
indeed emerges depends not only on the behavior of investors, but potentially also
on the wage setting behavior by the outside market. Consequently, in contrast
to Dasgupta and Prat (2008) we consider an explicit wage setting process where
investor i’s wage is determined in a sealed-bid, first-price auction among six risk-
neutral “principals”, where investor i’s wage ri is determined by the highest bid.
The sequence of events is identical to Section 5.3.1 up to date t = 3, as can be
observed in Figure 5.2. It only differs from t = 4 onwards.
Figure 5.2: Sequence of Events with Reputational Concerns
As in Dasgupta and Prat (2008), principals can observe the entire history of
trades and prices as well as the realized true state of the world v. The winning
principal has to pay his bid and additionally gets 20 points if and only if investor
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i happens to be good (otherwise he gets 0 points).13 The remaining five principals
get a payoff of zero each. In the appendix in Section 5.7, we show that if, at date 4,
principals hold a (common) belief r that investor i is of good type, the principals’
bidding strategies in symmetric equilibrium are 20 · r (i.e., bids are equal to the
respective investor’s “expected value”).14 Hence, in analogy to Dasgupta and Prat
(2008), in equilibrium investor i receives a reputational payoff of ri = 20 · r.15
Dasgupta and Prat (2008) show that the belief r that principals hold about a
given investor only depends on this investor’s equilibrium strategy and the realized
true state of the world (but not on the behavior of other investors). Intuitively,
this is the case because principals can observe which of the assets turns out to be
successful, and investors’ signals are mutually independent given the true state of
the world v (see Dasgupta and Prat 2008, Proof of Proposition 1). Consequently,
(with one notable exception to be discussed below) equilibrium wage bids take on
only two values: they are equal to 12.86 points if the respective investor chose the
successful asset, and they are equal to 3.33 points if the respective investor chose the
unsuccessful asset. The exceptions are the wage bids for an investor 3 who invests
in the same asset as both of his predecessors (i.e., if H4 ∈ {AAA,BBB}). Such
an investor engages in rational herding, and hence his behavior does not reveal his
signal. As, from an ex-ante perspective, both types of the investor are equally likely,
such an investor 3 receives a wage offer of 0.5 · 20 = 10 points.
Market Prices Set by the Market Maker The possibility of rational herding
raises an issue with respect to price setting by the market maker in the experiment.
From a theoretical perspective, it will turn out that, even in the presence of reputa-
tional concerns, in equilibrium both investor 1 and 2 trade sincerely. Consequently,
for them a profit-maximizing market maker will set asset prices as spelt out in Table
5.1. However, for the case of investor 3 a profit-maximizing market maker might
suspect herd behavior (if H3 ∈ {AA,BB}) and confront investor 3 with market
prices that deviate from Table 5.1. In the experiment, this would be problematic as
earlier studies have shown that price levels per se influence subjects inclination to
follow their own signal (see e.g., Cipriani and Guarino 2005, Drehmann, Oechssler,
and Roider 2005). In particular, there is evidence for contrarian behavior, where
13In case of a tie, each of the highest bidding principals wins with equal probability.
14In addition, there is an asymmetric equilibrium, where at least two principals bid 20 · r, while
the remaining principals bid less than that. However, the investor’s reputational payoff is not
affected and again given by ri = 20 · r.
15Note that in Dasgupta and Prat (2008) the weight of reputational concerns in an investor’s
payoff function is determined by the parameter (1 − β), where β constitutes the payoff fraction
from investment in the asset. By fixing the value of the good investor to 20 and the successful
asset’s payoff to 10, (1− β) equals 23 in our setup.
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subjects are more likely to act against their signal and a preexisting trend, if prices
are higher. This price effect would make it difficult to compare our treatments with
and without reputational concerns. To rule out this confounding effect, we assume
that even if investors’ payoffs are given by (5.3), the market maker sets market prices
according to Table 5.1.16 In the appendix in Section 5.7, we show that theoretical
predictions with respect to the behavior of investors (and hence with respect to wage
setting by principals) remain unchanged.17
In particular, as a theoretical benchmark in the presence of reputational con-
cerns we focus on the “most revealing equilibrium” as derived by Dasgupta and
Prat (2008), in which investors maximally condition their trades on their private
information (see Dasgupta and Prat, 2008, Section 4.1):
Proposition 2 (Dasgupta and Prat 2008, Proposition 4) Assume that mar-
ket prices are given by Table 5.1 and that investors have reputational concerns.
Then, in the most revealing equilibrium, investors 1 and 2 trade sincerely. Investor
3 trades sincerely unless both of his predecessors have invested in the same asset, in
which case he herds. The wage bid that a principal submits for investor i = 1, 2 is
equal to 12.86 (3.33) if the respective investor has bought the successful (unsuccess-
ful) asset. The wage bid that a principal submits for investor i = 3 is equal to 10 if
H4 ∈ {AAA,BBB}. Otherwise, investor 3 receives wage bids equal to 12.86 (3.33)
if he has bought the successful (unsuccessful) asset.
5.4 Experimental Design
Recruitment and Subject Pool The experiment was conducted in five sessions,
which ran in May and June 2011 in the AWI Lab at the University of Heidelberg.
Participants were recruited via Orsee (Greiner 2004). In total 90 subjects partici-
pated; 18 in each session. The entire experiment was paper and pencil based. Each
session lasted approximately 120 minutes. Participants earned 13.95 Euro on aver-
age. Altogether, 44 females (48.89%) and 46 males participated. The average age
was 21.68 years, and the average number of semesters studied 3.75. Of the partic-
ipants, 35.6% were economics majors, while the second largest group consisted of
16Recall that the role of market maker is played by the experimenter, and hence potential losses
are not an issue.
17Intuitively, as argued above, equilibrium wage bids by principals for a given investor do only
depend on this investor’s equilibrium strategy as well as on the realized true state of the world. In
the appendix (Section 5.7), we show that, given equilibrium wage bidding strategies of principals,
equilibrium investment strategies of investors are the same independent of whether one sets market




Implementation Upon entering the laboratory, all 18 participants of a given ses-
sion were informed that investment decisions in two completely independent rounds
had to be taken. A translation of the experimental instructions can be found in the
Appendix B.18
In the first round subjects played a treatment investment, and in the second
round subjects played a treatment reputation. The (benchmark) treatment invest-
ment corresponds to the setting without reputational concerns described in Section
5.3.2. That is, all subjects acted as investors, their payoff function was given by
(5.1), and this was common knowledge among participants. Treatment reputation
corresponds to the setting with reputational concerns of investors described in Sec-
tion 5.3.3. Subjects learned about the details of treatment reputation only after
they had completed the first round. In each session of treatment reputation, six ran-
domly selected subjects acted as principals, while the remaining 12 subjects acted as
investors. Investors’ payoff function was given by (5.3), principals made wage offers
for investors as described in Section 5.3.3, and again this was common knowledge
among participants.19 As discussed in Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3, in both treatments
market prices for the two assets were set according to Table 5.1.20
Both rounds of a session had the same basic structure. First, the instructions
for the respective round were handed to subjects and read out aloud by the exper-
imenter. Afterwards, the experimenter additionally explained the main features of
the respective round via a flip chart to subjects. Subsequently, to check whether the
experimental setup was clear, a questionnaire regarding details of the setup had to
be answered (see the Appendix B). Only after all subjects filled out the questionnaire
correctly, decision sheets were distributed and filled out by the subjects, after which
the respective round ended. Only after the second round, payments were calculated,
subjects answered a post-experimental questionnaire requesting demographic infor-
18Throughout the whole experiment, we abstain from using the term “reputation” to ensure a
neutral framing. We asked subjects about the purpose of the experiment in the post-experimental
questionnaire. In their answers, none of the subjects mentioned “reputation”, and only three
explicitly speak of “herd behavior”.
19In order to ensure that both investors and principals were informed about the entire (in-
formation) structure of the game, all subjects received identical instruction sheets. To achieve
comparability, investors received decision sheets identical to the decision sheets of the first round.
Subjects were allowed to keep a copy of their first round decision sheet as a reference for the second
round.
20Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider (2005) conduct an experiment on information-based herd-
ing in financial markets, and document behavior that is quite robust across pricing rules that
make different assumptions on the behavior of investors (e.g., full rationality or different forms of
“mistakes”).
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mation as well as asking questions about the experiment. Finally, payments were
privately handed out to subjects, after which the experiment ended.
To elicit subjects’ decisions, the strategy method was used. In particular, when
acting as an investor, the respective subject was asked to state decisions V i for all
i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, for all possible histories of prices and predecessors’ decisions, and all
possible own signal realizations he might observe (i.e., the respective subject was
asked to state a decision for every information set at which an investor might have
to make a decision). For example, when acting as an investor the subject was asked
to imagine he were investor 1 and to state his decision for both the cases that he
received the signal s1 = a and s1 = b. Likewise, the subject was asked to imagine
he were investor 2 and state his (in total, four) decisions depending on whether his
predecessor had chosen A or B and depending on whether his own signal was a or
b. In a similar vein, as investor 3 he had to state 8 decisions. Similarly, subjects
who acted as principals in treatment reputation were asked to submit a bid for each
investor i ∈ {1, 2, 3} for each possible history of decisions and prices the respective
investor might have observed and for each possible realization of the state of the
world.21
Payments Subjects received a show-up fee of 4 Euro about which they were in-
formed at the beginning of the experiment. Subjects were furthermore told that,
depending on their success in the experiment, they could earn additional money,
where each additional point (the experimental currency throughout the experiment)
paid out 0.20 Euro. In each of the two rounds each subject (investors in treatment
investment and investors and principals in treatment reputation) received an initial
endowment of 20 points. Except for the show-up fee, the exact amount earned was
revealed at the end of the experiment only (and subjects were aware of this).
As we employ the strategy method, in each of the two rounds each subject’s
payoff depended on one randomly chosen decision, and we took care to explain in
detail to subjects how individual payoffs were to be calculated (see the experimental
instructions in the Appendix B). In particular, at the end of the experiment and
independently for each of the two rounds, payments were determined as follows: By
making draws from urns, (i) we randomly allocated investors into groups of three
subjects and randomly assigned the role of investor 1, 2, and 3, and (ii) according
to the probabilities described above, for each of the investor groups, we randomly
determined the successful asset and each investor’s type and signal.22 Given this
21The maximal possible bid per investor was limited to 20 points.
22That is, in all of the sessions there were six investor groups in treatment investment and four
investor groups in treatment reputation.
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information, for each of the investor groups, we then were able to obtain the decision
of investor 1 from the respective subject’s decision sheet and to calculate his payoff
from his investment decision (see (5.1) above). In a second and third step, we then
obtained the decisions (and calculate the payoffs) of investors 2 and 3 in an analogous
way (given the decisions of investor 1 and of investors 1 and 2, respectively). This
concluded the determination of payoffs in treatment investment.
As out of the 18 participants in each session, 6 randomly became principals
in treatment reputation, we had 12 investors in four investor groups. The above
procedure left us with a decision history and a successful asset for each of the
four investor groups in treatment reputation. Based on this information, principals
had to take their decisions in the experiment (for every possible combination of
V 1, V 2, V 3 and v). By looking at the decision sheets of principals, we were, hence,
able to determine the highest bid for a given investor in treatment reputation (which
determines his wage). In total, there were 12 auctions, one for each of the 12 investors
remaining. Given the respective investor’s type, we were also able to determine a
principal’s payoff from the auction for the respective investor: only the winning
principal had to pay the bid, and, if the investor was a good type, the winning
principal earned 20 points. All other principals earned zero from the respective
auction.23
5.5 Results
In this section, we present and discuss the results of our experiment.
Overview Table 5.2 provides a first overview of our results. For both treatment
investment and reputation, Table 5.2 depicts the fraction of subject that behave
in line with the theoretical prediction for all information sets of the game (i.e.,
combinations of predecessors’ choices and own signal) at which investors have to
make a decision. Note that we pool information sets that differ in labeling only, and
hence are symmetric. For example, in Table 5.2 AAb and BBa are both subsumed
23In both rounds, by experimental design, investors could never lose more money than the initial
endowment of 20 points. If, in treatment reputation, a principal won many auctions and hired
only investors of bad type, he or she may, in principle, accumulated losses that exceeded the
initial endowment of 20 points. We excluded this possibility by informing principals that the
minimum they could earn were zero points (including the initial endowment). While this limited
liability constraint might, in principle, have given principals an incentive to overbid, we do not find
evidence for this. In fact, looking at all principals, there is even evidence for some underbidding
as the average actual wage bid is equal to 6.28, while Proposition 2 would predict an average wage
bid of 8.25.
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under XXy.24 More formally, in the following we describe information sets by
combination of capital letters and small letters, where capital letters refer to the
observed decisions of predecessors (i.e., X, Y ∈ {A,B}, where X 6= Y ), and small
letters indicate the own signal (i.e., x, y ∈ {a, b}, where x = a if X = A, x = b if
X = B, y = a if X = B, and y = b if X = A).
Table 5.2: Percentage of Subjects Behaving in Line with the Theoretical Prediction
treatment
investor information set investment reputation
1 x 91.66 % 95.83 %
2 Xx 85.00 % 89.17 %
2 Xy 79.45 % 80.00 %
3 XXx 81.11 % 86.67 %
3 XXy 56.33 % 41.67 %
3 XY y 86.67 % 90.00 %
3 XY x 94.45 % 95.00 %
Note: N = 90 (N = 60) in treatment investment (reputation). With respect to the informa-
tion available to subjects, capital letters refer to the observed decisions of predecessors (i.e.,
X,Y ∈ {A,B}, where X 6= Y ), and small letters indicate the own signal (i.e., x, y ∈ {a, b},
where x = a if X = A, x = b if X = B, y = a if X = B, and y = b if X = A).
A first inspection of Table 5.2 reveals that at all information sets except XXy
behavior is remarkably close to the theoretical prediction of subjects following their
own signal independent of the investment decisions of predecessors. Indeed, Figure
5.3 below shows that in both treatments over 85% of subjects act in line with theory
if one averages over all information sets except XXy.25
In treatment reputation, investor 3 should rationally herd at information set XXy
(if the decisions of his predecessors conform). And indeed, Table 5.2 and Figure 5.3
show that a substantial fraction of subjects disregards its own signal and follows the
lead of predecessors’ decisions instead. Two observations with respect to behavior
at information set XXy are, however, surprising. First, even in treatment reputa-
tion, a majority of subjects still follows its own signal. Second, even in treatment
investment (where, according to theory, acting against one’s signal is never ratio-
nal) a similar fraction of subjects disregards its own information. A t-test reveals
that in treatment reputation as well as in treatment investment, behavior differs
significantly at the 1%-level at information set XXy compared to all other informa-
tion sets. Furthermore, if one pools behavior at all information sets except XXy
(i.e., situations where subjects should follow their signal independent of the treat-
24A paired t-test confirms that the decisions of the investors in the pairwise symmetric informa-
tion sets do not differ significantly.
25In Figure 5.3, Figure 5.4, and Table 5.3 we restrict attention to the subset of 60 subjects who
serve as investors in both treatments.
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ment), significantly more subjects (at the 5%-level) follow theoretical predictions in
treatment reputation than in treatment investment. On the contrary, at XXy the
opposite is true at the 10%-level.
Figure 5.3: Percentage of Investors 3 Behaving in Line with Theoretical Predictions
Note: ***, **, * indicate significant differences of decisions at the 1%,
5%, 10%-level, respectively.
Consequently, Table 5.3 investigates the behavior at information setXXy in more
detail. As Table 5.3 indicates, substantial fractions of subjects either follow their
own signal in both treatments (i.e., in both treatments choose Y ) or follow the lead
of their predecessors in both treatments (i.e., always choose X). At information set
AAb (BBa) only 4 (3) out of 60 subjects act rationally in both treatments. Behavior
at XXy does not differ across treatments according to a McNemar-Change-test,
which does not reject the null-hypothesis that no behavioral change occurs (Chi-
squared of 2.33, critical value for p<0.05 is 3.84.).26
Evidence on Imitative Behavior by Investors The finding that even in treat-
ment investment a substantial fraction of subjects (nearly 50%) disregards its own
signal at information set XXy is indicative of (irrational) imitative behavior on the
part of investors. If such imitative behavior is prevalent and if it is anticipated by
principals in treatment reputation, it might affect principals’ wage offers (and hence
the reputational incentives faced by investors in treatment reputation). This, in
turn, might help to explain the apparent lack of evidence for reputational herding in
26In order to guarantee independence of observations, we apply the McNemar-Change-test sep-
arately to both information set AAb and BBa. The Chi-squared are 0.82 and 1.60, respectively.
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Table 5.3: Assets Bought at Information Set XXy
reputation
X Y sum
investment X 43 14 57
Y 7 56 63
sum 50 70 120
Note: N = 60 (i.e., all subjects except principals)
in both treatments. For example, the table shows
that at information set XXy (i.e., AAb and BBa)
43 investors buy asset X in both treatments. A
McNemar-Change-test reveals no statistical signif-
icant changes between treatments.
treatment reputation. Consequently, in a next step, we provide evidence on imitative
behavior among our subjects.
To do so, in a first step, we look at the behavior of investor 2, who, independent of
the treatment, should always follow his own signal. However, it becomes clear from
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.4 that investor 2 is less likely to trust his own information at
information set Xy than at information set Xx. That is, if the predecessor’s decision
contradicts the own information some investors indeed seem to imitate the respective
predecessor. According to t-tests, the differences in behavior at information sets Xx
and Xy are statistically significant in both treatment investment and reputation
(with p-values of 0.0316 and 0.0495, respectively).
Figure 5.4: Percentage of Investors 2 Behaving in Line with Theoretical Predictions
Note: ***, **, * indicate significant differences of decisions at the 1%,
5%, 10%-level, respectively.
Further evidence for imitative behavior is provided by a regression analysis in
Table 5.4. There, we report on a probit estimation, where the dependent variable
107
is equal to one if A is chosen and equal to zero if B is chosen. We consider the
following explanatory variables: signal is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if
the signal observed by the respective investor was A, and that is 0 otherwise. The
variable history captures the net number of A-decisions by predecessors (i.e., it may
take on the values 2, 1, 0, -1, -2). The variable decision1 (decision2) is an indicator
that is equal to 1 if investor 1’s (investor 2’s) decision was A, and that is 0 otherwise.
Table 5.4: Evidence on Imitative Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
signal 0.833∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗ 0.592∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 0.614∗∗∗







Observations 180 360 720 1080 720
Log − Likelihood −50.71 −168.44 −364.41 −516.56 −346.02
PseudoR2 0.5927 0.3249 0.2698 0.3100 0.3067
Note: Probit estimates, where all regressions include a constant, and where coefficients represent marginal
effects. Dependent variable: Investor’s choice of asset (equal to 1 (0) if asset A (B) chosen). The regression
analysis studies all subjects that serve as investors in treatment investment (N = 90). Robust standard
errors (clustered at the subject-level) are shown in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Columns (1), (2), and (3) consider behavior of investor 1, investor 2,
and investor 3, respectively. Column (4) pools observations from investors 2 and 3, and column (5) considers
investor 3 only.
In the regression analysis, we restrict attention to investors in treatment invest-
ment, where, from a theoretical perspective subjects should always follow their own
signal.27 Consequently, in column (1) of Table 5.4 we regress the decision of investor
1 on his signal (columns (2) and (3) repeat the same exercise for investor 2 and
investor 3, respectively). In these regressions, we find a highly significant effect of
the own private information (where standard errors are clustered at the subject-
level). Nevertheless, coefficients are declining in the position of the investor, which
is indicative of the fact that subjects follow other information than their own signal.
In column (4), we pool observations from investors 2 and 3, who might potentially
engage in imitative behavior. There, we again find a highly significant effect of
the own signal. However, also history has a highly significant, positive effect that
demonstrates that, contrary to what theory would predict, these investors tend to
27The exclusion of investors that serve as principals in treatment reputation from the regression
for treatment investment does not affect results qualitatively. Regression results are similar in
magnitude and significance for investors in treatment reputation, where investors follow their own
signal even slightly more often. Details are available upon request.
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imitate their predecessors. In column (5), we focus on investor 3 only in order to
investigate whether investor 1 or investor 2 has a stronger influence on investor 3’s
behavior. In this regression, we find a highly significant influence of investor 1 and
a marginally significant influence of investor 2. Thus, investor 3 seems to be more
influenced by earlier decisions and is following direct predecessors less often. Taken
together, the findings of Table 5.4 provide strong evidence for (irrational) imitation.
This finding is quite surprising given the earlier experimental literature. For ex-
ample, experiments studying informational cascades in markets with flexible prices
show that herding or imitative behavior rarely occurs (e.g., Cipriano and Guarini
2005, Drehmann, Oechssler, and Roider 2005).
Wage Setting by Principals: Two Benchmarks Having documented (irra-
tional) imitative behavior on the part of investors, we now turn to the wage setting
of principals. Is their wage setting in line with theory? Given the actual behavior of
investors, do principals anticipate imitation? And if yes, does this lead to reduced
incentives for (rational) reputational herding in treatment reputation?
In order to assess the wages offered by principals, in a first step, we consider two
theoretical benchmarks: On the one hand, we consider the equilibrium wages rtheo
as proposed by Dasgupta and Prat (2008) (see Proposition 2 and the surrounding
discussion). On the other hand, as a second benchmark, we construct (behavioral)
wages rbeh that should have been optimally set by principals if they would have
correctly anticipated the actual behavior of investors in treatment reputation. To
derive the benchmark wages rbeh, we use the actual frequencies with which investors
1, 2 and 3 follow their own signal in treatment reputation in order to derive the
empirical frequencies of facing a good investor given a certain combination of history
of trades and realized value of the asset. Multiplying this empirical frequency with
the good investor’s value of 20 points, we arrive at rbeh.
In Table 5.5, we compare the benchmark wages rtheo and rbeh to the actual wages
offered to investor 3 in order to assess the reputational incentives he faces. With
respect to actual wages, we consider the average wage rall offered by all principals
participating in the auction, as well as the average rmax of the actual winning wages,
i.e., the maximum wages per session. In Table 5.5, we differentiate situations that,
from a theoretical perspective, would be indicative of herding (i.e., investor 3 makes
the same decision as investors 1 and 2) from all other situations. Moreover, we
separately consider the cases that investor 3 buys the successful respectively the
unsuccessful asset.
Looking first at settings where the history of trades is not given by XXX, Table
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Table 5.5: Average Wages Offered to Investor 3
History of trades Average wage if asset is rtheo rbeh rall rmax
6= XXX successful 12.86 11.43 10.31 16.53
unsuccessful 3.33 4.76 2.37 6.80
= XXX successful 10.00 10.37 9.42 16.10
unsuccessful 10.00 5.83 3.40 10.10
5.5 reveals that average behavioral wages rbeh are remarkably close to theoretical
wages rtheo, but that average behavioral wages if the successful (unsuccessful) asset
is bought are lower (higher) than the theoretical wage, i.e., behavioral wages are less
extreme. Given that the partially irrational behavior of investors makes it more dif-
ficult to gauge the investor’s type from the outcome of the game, this does not seem
to be surprising. Looking at situations that from a theoretical perspective would
be indicative of herding (XXX), Table 5.5 shows that, in contrast to theoretical
wages, behavioral wages vary in the success of the investment (driven by the fact
that in these situations some investors in fact trade according to their signal and do
not herd).
Averaging over actual wages set by all principals, Table 5.5 documents that rall
are again relatively close to the benchmark wages rtheo and rbeh, albeit lower than
expected relative to both benchmarks. From a qualitative perspective, the (average)
actual wage setting by principals thus seems reasonable. The actual winning wages
rmax on the other hand overshoot both benchmarks.
Wage Setting by Principals: Do they Anticipate Herd Behavior by In-
vestor 3? In the following, we look more closely at the question whether principals
in fact anticipate herd behavior by investor 3. Herding by investor 3 may arise if
both of his predecessors bought the same asset (XX ). Four cases may emerge from
the principal’s point of view. Either it turns out that investor 3 buys the same asset
as both of his predecessors or he deviates from the behavior of his predecessors.
Furthermore, the decision of investor 3 may ex-post turn out to be successful or
unsuccessful.
To investigate whether principals anticipate herding by investor 3, as a bench-
mark, in Table 5.6 we first display behavioral wages rbeh that principals should
optimally have set in the four cases described above.28 The column labeled “differ-
ence” states the average difference of the (hypothetical) behavioral wage investor 3
receives if he chooses X and the (hypothetical) behavioral wage if he chooses Y . Put
28Note that for the history of trade XXX Table 5.6 replicates the information from Table 5.5.
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Table 5.6: Wage Offered to Investor 3 if Investors 1 and 2 Act Alike
Average behavioral wage rbeh
History of trades
Average wage if asset is = XXX = XXY difference
successful 10.37 11.78 -1.41
unsuccessful 5.83 4.41 1.41
Average actual wage rall
History of trades
Average wage if asset is = XXX = XXY difference
successful 9.42 9.98 -0.57
unsuccessful 3.40 1.68 1.72∗∗∗
Average actual wage rmax
History of trades
Average wage if asset is = XXX = XXY difference
successful 16.10 16.50 -0.40
unsuccessful 10.10 6.00 4.10
Note: ∗∗∗ indicates that differences between wages offered given history XXX versus
XXY are significant at the 1%-level.
differently, if principals would have set wages optimal relative to actual behavior of
investors, principals should have “rewarded” investor 3 for not following the herd if
he bought the successful asset, while they should have “punished” investor 3 for not
following the herd if he bought the unsuccessful asset.
But why should a principal reward an investor who does not conform to earlier
investors and purchases the successful asset? The intuition is as follows: If the
investor conforms, his decision can stem either from following an x-signal or engaging
in herd behavior after a y-signal. The principal does not observe the signal and thus
it is not clear-cut to him which case occurred. On the other hand, if the investor
does not conform, this could result from an investor following a y-signal or buying
asset Y after an x-signal (contrarian behavior). In this case, it is more likely that
the investor followed his own, correct signal y. In the latter situation he is thus more
likely to be of good type (see also Table 5.2 for the respective empirical frequencies).
Next, why should an investor be rewarded by a higher wage if he conforms to
earlier investors and purchases the unsuccessful asset? In this case, the situation is
reversed to the case described above. If the investor does not conform and buys the
wrong asset Y , it seems more likely to the principal that the investor acted on his
own, wrong signal y. On the other hand, if the investor conforms, it is unclear to
the principal on which informational basis this decision is taken.
“Hiding” in the herd is thus rewarded in case of purchasing the unsuccessful asset.
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In a next step, we compare actual average wage setting behavior of principals (i.e.,
rall respectively rmax) to the wages principals should optimally have set (i.e., rbeh).
Table 5.6 reveals that investors’ behavior seems to be anticipated by principals: in a
similar vein as rbeh, actual wages vary with investor 3’s decision (and its success).29
The signs of the differences (column “difference” in Table 5.6) between actual wages
given history XXX versus history XXY are the same as in the case of rbeh (for
both rall and rmax). However, the magnitudes of the differences are not the same.
With respect to rall, a deviation from the herd is rewarded in case of the purchase
of the successful asset only modestly by 0.57 points compared to 1.41 points in the
case of rbeh. On the other hand, the punishment in terms of rall for deviating from
the herd if the investor buys the unsuccessful asset even exceeds the punishment by
0.31 points in terms of rbeh. An analogous picture emerges with respect to rmax.
Investors thus seem to anticipate behavior of investors and seem to incorporate this
into their setting of wages in the presumed direction.
Wage Setting by Principals: Are there Different Behavioral Types? One
might suspect that principals who are prone to imitative behavior themselves might
set wages differently from other principals. We can investigate this issue by using
data from treatment investment where the principals of treatment reputation acted
as investors. Therefore, we label a principal as an imitator if, in treatment invest-
ment, he bought asset A at information set AAb and bought asset B at information
set BBa (i.e., if he engaged in (irrational) imitative behavior). All 22 remaining
principals (out of 30) are labeled non-imitators.
In Table 5.7 we display the actual wages rall offered to investor 3 in treatment
reputation by imitators respectively non-imitators. Interestingly, imitators reward
investor 3 more strongly for not following the herd in case the successful asset is
purchased. For principals who are non-imitators, the relationship is even reversed.
Non-imitators in fact always reward herd behavior on average. At the same time,
imitators (more strongly than non-imitators) punish investor 3 if he does not con-
form to earlier investors and this decision turns out to be unsuccessful. This might
be interpreted as follows: Given that imitators are inclined towards imitation them-
selves, they are more likely to react to it when setting wages. Their own tendency
of imitating predecessors makes it more likely that they also react to imitation by
investors more strongly.
29Similar to Table 5.5, wages rall are lower than rbeh, while rmax overshoot the behavioral
benchmark.
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Table 5.7: Actual Wages rall Offered to Investor 3 by Imitators and Non-Imitators
Imitator in treatment History of trades
investment Average wage if asset is = XXX = XXY difference
Yes successful 8.81 11.03 -2.22
Yes unsuccessful 3.50 1.36 2.14
No successful 9.63 9.27 0.36
No unsuccessful 3.36 1.80 1.56
Note: A principal is labeled an imitator if in treatment investment he bought asset A at information set AAb and
bought asset B at information set BBa. Out of a total of 30 principals, 8 can be classified as imitators, while the
remaining 22 are non-imitators.
Wage Setting by Principals: Reputational Incentives for Investor 3 A
key question is whether the actual wage setting behavior of principals generates
incentives for investor 3 to engage in reputational herding. In order to investigate
this issue, we consider all information sets investor 3 might face (i.e., XXy, XXx,
XY x, and XY y), and for each of these four cases we derive the difference between
his payoff when he does not follow his signal and his payoff when he follows his
signal (i.e., when he trades sincerely). We calculate these payoff differences under
various assumptions on what investor 3 believes about the behavior of investors 1
and 2 and the behavior of the principals.
In column (1) of Table 5.8, we report the (benchmark) payoff differences predicted
by Proposition 2, which indicate that, from a theoretical perspective, investor 3
should engage in reputational herding at information set XXy (yielding him a payoff
that is 1.51 points higher than if he would trade sincerely), but should trade sincerely
otherwise (as indicated by the negative payoff difference).30
In columns (2) and (3) of Table 5.8 we assume that investor 3 holds the belief
that investors 1 and 2 always act in line with theory (i.e., always trade sincerely).
However, with respect to the wage offers he will receive, we assume that investor
3 correctly anticipates the actual wage setting behavior by principals and counts
on a wage of rall (column (2)) respectively rmax (column (3)). Interestingly, in
both cases reputational incentives (as predicted by theory) remain intact, and an
investor 3 holding these beliefs should still herd at information set XXy (although
his monetary payoff from doing so is weaker than in column (1)).
In column (4) and (5) of Table 5.8 we assume that investor 3 not only anticipates
actual wage setting by principals (as in columns (2) and (3)), but that he also has
correct beliefs about the actual (potentially irrational) behavior of investors 1 and
30Note that the history of trades XXY is off the equilibrium path. In order to calculate the
respective payoff difference, in line with Dasgutpa and Prat (2008) we assume that in this case
principals hold the off-equilibrium belief that investor 3 traded sincerely and they set their wage
offers accordingly.
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Table 5.8: Payoff Differences for Investor 3 from Not Following Respectively Follow-
ing His Own Signal under Various Beliefs
Investor 3 assumes sincere
trading by investors 1 and 2
Investor 3 correctly
anticipates actual behavior
by investors 1 and 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Information set rtheo rall rmax rall rmax rbeh
XXy 1.51 0.45 0.85 -1.89 -0.38 -2.76
XXx -10.50 -8.93 -11.14 -7.14 -9.23 -3.30
XY x -7.81 -6.31 -6.81 -7.59 -8.12 -6.88
XY y -7.81 -6.14 -6.91 -5.68 -6.35 -4.75
Note: The table displays the difference in expected payoff from disregarding the own signal minus following the own
signal under various beliefs on the behavior of investors 1 and 2 and principals.
2. That is, investor 3 anticipates the actual frequencies with which investors 1
and 2 do not trade sincerely, and hence, given a certain history of investor 1’s and
investor 2’s decisions, investor 3 draws correct inference with respect to the success
probabilities of the two assets. Columns (4) and (5) of Table 5.8 indeed reveal
that, given these assumptions on investor 3’ beliefs (i.e., that he perfectly foresees
the behavior of investors 1 and 2 and of principals), reputational incentives to herd
indeed disappear.
Finally, in column (6) we conduct a thought experiment. We ask whether in-
centives for reputational herding would re-emerge if investor 3 holds correct beliefs
with respect to the behavior of the other investors and if he expects optimal wage
setting by principals (i.e., wage offers rbeh). As indicated by column (6) this is not
the case as following his own signal would always yield a higher payoff in this case.
Hence, the lack of reputational incentives for investor 3 does not seem to be driven
by (defective) wage setting by principals, but rather by noisy behavior of earlier in-
vestors (where observing history XX is less indicative for the success of investment
X than the theory would suggest).
5.6 Conclusion
While herd behavior is studied in various empirical studies, it is difficult to disen-
tangle the investors’ underlying incentives and to assign the observed herd behavior
to the different motives mentioned in the theoretical literature. Therefore, we turn
to a laboratory test to study one particular reason for herd behavior, reputational
concerns, in a similar setup as outlined in a theoretical model by Dasgupta and Prat
(2008). Explicitly, it allows analyzing the incentives faced by investors.
The model by Dasgupta and Prat (2008) predicts that it is an equilibrium strategy
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of investors to engage in herd behavior if faced with reputational concerns and if
asset prices are close to the liquidation value. If prices are getting precise, gains from
trading the asset decrease. At the same time, not following predecessors induces a
reputational loss, as it becomes more likely that the asset bought turns out to be
the worthless one. The investor then appears as having observed a bad signal. The
experiment presented in this study explores in a similar, but simplified setup whether
herd behavior out of reputational concerns occurs.
The experimental results indeed show that herd behavior as predicted by Das-
gupta and Prat (2008) occurs. About half of the subjects engages in herd behavior
in treatment reputation. Surprisingly, we find that investors also imitate predeces-
sors in treatment investment without reputational concerns, although the theoretical
prediction of Dasgupta and Prat (2008) and other papers (e.g., Avery and Zemsky
1998) are clear-cut and herding should not occur. Furthermore, we find investors to
(irrationally) imitate predecessors even if prices are not precise.
By analyzing wages offered by principals, we are able to study the underlying in-
centives to exhibit herd behavior in the experiment. We find that principals, being
in charge of creating reputational incentives by offering wages, do this in a sur-
prisingly precise way. Wages set by principals are close to the wages derived on the
basis of actual behavior in the experiment. Furthermore, if investors correctly antic-
ipated the actual wage setting behavior of principals, this would provide incentives
to engage in herd behavior. However, assuming that investors do not only antici-
pate the wage setting of principals, but also the imitative behavior of other, earlier
investors, this entails that the incentives to engage in herd behavior disappear. The
lack of incentives to engage in herd behavior might thus rather be attributed to
noisy behavior of earlier investors than to principals’ wage setting.
Although reputational concerns account for a major share of the investors’ pay-
offs in our experiment (reputational incentives are twice as large as investment in-
centives), additional herd behavior compared to the treatment without reputational
concerns cannot be observed. Moreover, in line with the previous literature, investors
do not always follow their signal when expected. However, if this is anticipated by
investors and principals, wages (and also prices if a market maker anticipates this
behavior) will hardly become as extreme as necessary to induce herd behavior. Ob-
serving whether herd behavior out of reputational concerns occurs would require
earlier investors to follow their signal to a larger extent than it is found so far.
While previous empirical studies refer to reputational concerns if herd behav-
ior is observed, our findings suggest that even without reputational concerns, herd
behavior arises.
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5.7 Appendix: Theoretical Predictions with Mar-
ket Prices and Experimental Parameters
In the following, it will be shown that given the market prices for asset A and asset
B and the parameters assumed in the experiment, trade is sincere in treatment in-
vestment. Similarly, if reputational concerns are introduced in treatment reputation,
herd behavior arises if prices get precise.
Treatment Investment Table 5.9 displays the prices set in the experiment for
asset A and B, respectively, given all possible histories of trades of predecessors H i.
When setting prices, the market maker31 assumes that trade is sincere (e.g., that
the investor buys the asset V i = A if observing signal si = a) and incorporates the
investor’s decision to buy the respective asset into his price setting.
If trading sincerely, the price of the asset reflects the investor’s expected value
of the asset (compare, e.g., column (1) with column (3) in Table 5.9). Thus, the
investor’s payoff from trading sincerely is 0 as shown in Table 5.10. If not trading
sincerely, the investor incurs a loss (consider column (2), Table 5.10). The mar-
ket price of the respective asset exceeds the investors’ expected value of the asset
(compare, e.g., column (1) with column (5) in Table 5.9).
As displayed in column (3) of Table 5.10, the profits from trading sincerely versus
not trading sincerely ∆piI are positive for every H
i. Thus, if investors only receive
payoffs from trading the asset, all trading will be sincere as outlined in Section
5.3.2.32
If the decisions of the predecessors coincide for the third investor (row 4 of Table
5.10), payoffs from trading the assets become smallest. This is a key mechanism for
the results in treatment reputation.
Treatment Reputation In treatment reputation, in addition to the payoffs from
investing in asset A or B, payoffs from the investors’ reputation ri arise. We derive
the wages set by the principals according to Dasgupta and Prat (2008) in a first step.
Secondly, payoffs from trading sincerely versus not trading sincerely are determined
assuming concrete asset prices and experimental parameters.33
31Played by the experimenter in the experiment.
32This is also shown in, e.g., Glosten and Milgrom (1985) or Avery and Zemsky (1998).
33In the original paper by Dasgupta and Prat (2008) mixed strategies - namely investors only
partly engaging in herd behavior - are possible in the most revealing equilibrium. We rule out
this possibility and derive clear-cut predictions by adjusting parameters. Investors should either
exhibit herd behavior or not.
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Table 5.9: Prices for Assets A and B Given a History of Trades by Predecessors
i H i piA p
i
B Pr(A|a,H i) Pr(B|b,H i) Pr(A|b,H i) Pr(B|a,H i)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1 — 7 7 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.3
2 A 8.4 5 0.84 0.5 0.5 0.16
2 B 5 8.4 0.5 0.84 0.16 0.5
3 AB or BA 7 7 0.7 0.7 0.3 0.3
3 AA 9.3 3 0.93 0.3 0.7 0.07
3 BB 3 9.3 0.3 0.93 0.07 0.7
Note: For example, Pr(A|a,Hi) denotes the probability that asset A is the successful one, given a history of trades
Hi and investor i has observed the signal a. Asset prices are rounded to the first decimal.
Table 5.10: Payoff Differences from Investment if Following Respectively Not Fol-
lowing the Own Signal
i H i Profit if Profit if not ∆piI
trading sincerely trading sincerely
(1) (2) (3)
1 — 0 -4 4
2 A or B 0 -3.4 3.4
3 AB or BA 0 -4 4
3 AA or BB 0 -2.3 2.3
The reputational payoff in Dasgupta and Prat (2008) is derived from the prob-
ability that the investor is of good type as outlined in Section 5.3.3. The principal
takes the state of the world v and the investor’s purchase decision V i to arrive at his
wage offer.34 There are two wages that emerge in equilibrium without herding, the
wage in which the investor buys the successful asset, respectively the unsuccessful
asset.
In the first case in which v = V i, the principal calculates the probability that
the investor is of good type as r(v = V i) = αV σg+α−V (1−σg)
αV σ+α−V (1−σ) γ. Herein αV denotes the
probability that after, e.g., an a-signal asset A is bought, α−V that the asset B is
bought after the same a-signal. γ denotes the ex-ante probability that the investor
is of good type, and σ describes the average probability that a signal according to
the assets’ value is observed: σ = 0.5σb + 0.5σg = 0.7. If trade is sincere (αV = 1
and α−V = 0), r(v = V i) equals 0.6428. Thus, with a probability of 64.28 percent
the investor is assumed to be of good type.
In the second case in which v 6= V i, the investor’s reputation formed by the
principal is denoted as r(v 6= V i) = αV (1−σg)+α−V σg
αV (1−σ)+α−V σ γ, which equals 0.1667 if trade
34As outlined in Section 5.3.3, it is irrelevant whether the principal observes behavior of the
other investors in the model by Dasgupta and Prat (2008).
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is sincere. Obviously, the principal concludes that the investor is of good type with
a higher probability if the investor bought the successful asset (r(v = V i) > r(v 6=
V i)).
In case the principals assumes the investor engages in herd behavior (αV = 1 and
α−V = 1), the investor’s trade does not reveal any information about his type. The
probability the principal derives equals the ex-ante probability that the investor is
of good type r(v = V i) = 0.5, which is independent of the purchase decision V i.
The reputational payoff is denoted by ri = 20·r. Thus, wages set by the principals
amount to 12.86 (3.33) points if the successful (unsuccessful) asset is bought and
no herding occurs. Only if the principal anticipates herd behavior by investor 3 (if
H4 ∈ {AAA,BBB}) the wage amounts to 0.5 · 20 = 10 points.
Again, the model by Dasgupta and Prat takes the difference in expected payoffs
from investors investing sincerely and not investing sincerely denoted as ∆piR =
∆piI + ∆r to derive the theoretical prediction. The derivation of ∆piI has been
outlined in the previous paragraph.
∆r denotes the difference in expected reputational payoff from following the own
signal versus not following the own signal. In case of an a-signal, this is derived as
∆r = Pr(A|a,H i)(r(v = V i = A) − r(v 6= V i = B)) + Pr(B|a,H i)(r(v 6= V i =
A) − r(v = V i = B)). The first part of the equation assumes that asset A is the
successful asset (v = A) with the respective probability, while in the second part
v = B is assumed. Both parts are multiplied by the reputational payoff difference
from buying asset A instead of B. All possible information sets and the respective
payoffs can be found in Table 5.11.
Whenever both predecessors buy the same asset and investor 3 observes a con-
trarian signal, reputational losses from trading sincerely versus not trading sincerely
add up to ∆r = 3
10
(12.86 − 10) + 7
10
(3.33 − 10) = −3.81. For example, suppose
investor 3 receives an a-signal and both predecessors buy asset B. Not trading sin-
cerely (V i = B) reveals no information about the investors’ type to the principal,
thus r = 10. In case the investor purchases asset A, the wages remain informative
and will amount to 12.86 and 3.33 points.35 The probability that asset A is the
unsuccessful one is 7
10
. Thus, as prices get precise, the second, negative part of the
equation receives a higher weight. In this situation, investment gains from trading
sincerely are ∆piI = 2.3 as presented in the previous section. In total, the reputa-
tional losses therefore exceed the gains from the assets’ payoff if the investor trades
sincerely. Thereby, in the model with three periods, prices in period three become
35Dasgupta and Prat (2008) assume that in an off-equilibrium path principals believe that trades
are sincere. Thus wages remain informative.
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sufficiently precise such that investors engage in herd behavior.
As outlined in Section 5.3.3, the asset prices presented to subjects are calculated
under the assumption that trade is sincere in both treatments. In the model of
Dasgupta and Prat (2008), the market maker anticipates non-sincere trading of
investor 3 and sets market prices accordingly. However, the theoretical predictions
remain similar even with these prices, as the last two rows of Table 5.11 reveal.
Wage Setting Behavior in the First-Price Auction Among the Principals
As discussed in Section 5.3.3, we assume an explicit wage setting process through a
sealed-bid, first-price auction among six risk-neutral “principals”, where investor i’s
wage ri is determined by the highest bid. As in Dasgupta and Prat (2008), principals
can observe the entire history of trades and prices as well as the realized true state
of the world v. The winning principal has to pay his bid and additionally gets 20
points if and only if investor i happens to be good (otherwise he gets 0 points). In
case of a tie, each of the highest bidding principals wins with equal probability. The
remaining five principals get a payoff of zero each.
Suppose that, at date 4, principals hold a (common) belief r that investor i is of
good type. In the following, we show that there are two types of equilibria. On the
one hand, there is a symmetric equilibrium where all principals’ bidding strategies
are given by 20 · r (i.e., bids are equal to the respective investor’s “expected value”).
On the other hand, there is a continuum of asymmetric equilibria where at least
two principals bid 20 · r, while the remaining principals bid less than that. In both
cases, the investor’s reputational payoff (i.e., the winning bid) is the same and given
by ri = 20 · r.
To prove this claim, we proceed as follows. Let bj be the bid made by principal
j = 1, ..., 6.
First, we show in equilibrium no bid can be strictly larger than r. To the contrary,
assume that the highest bid is above r. In this case, the winning principal would
make a loss and would have a profitable deviation to some bid below r (in which
case he would either lose the auction and earn zero, or win the auction and achieve
a positive payoff). Hence, in equilibrium bids satisfy bj ≤ r for all j. In a next step,
we verify which bids can emerge in equilibrium.
Second, we show that the highest bid cannot be strictly below r. If this were the
case, one of principals could make a deviating bid that slightly exceeds this highest
bid. Thereby, he would win the auction with certainty and earn a strictly positive
profit. Hence, in equilibrium the highest bid(s) have to be equal to r.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































the remaining principals bid strictly less. In this case, the winning principal (who
bids r) would have an incentive to slightly lower his bid. Thereby, he would still
win the auction with certainty, but earn a strictly higher profit.
Finally, suppose that two principals bid r, while the remaining principals bid
weakly less. In this case, all principals obtain an expected payoff of zero, and there
are no incentives to deviate: bids above r can never be optimal. A winning bidder
could bid less, but thereby we would still earn zero. The same is true of a losing
bidder who deviates to a higher bid. This proves the claim.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 3 and 4
A.1 Instructions of Web Survey
Regarding this survey: Please try to answer all questions. If you do not know an
answer or if you prefer not answer a question, please skip it.
General Questions
• Please state: Year of birth, Federal state of birth, Gender, Mother tongue,
Nationality, Religion
• Please state: Do you speak other languages? If so, which?
• Family status: (Please choose: single, divorced, in a relationship, living sepa-
rately, married, widowed)
• Number of children: (Please choose: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more, none)
Education
• Highest school degree: (Please choose: Abitur, Realschule, Hauptschule, Son-
derschule, no school graduation)
• Please state: How many years have been in school till your highest degree?
• Education: (Please choose: university, advanced training, training, in training,
no training)
• State the name/title of your last training:
• Job: (Please choose: worker, employee, employee in public sector, civil ser-
vant, in education/training, self-employed, working at my own household, un-
employed, disabled, other)
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• Working time: (Please choose: full-time, half-time, part-time but less than
half-time, not working)
• Last executed job (Please state):
• Monthly net income: (Please choose: up to e1,000, e1,001 - e3,000, e3,001
- e6,000, over e6,001)




You will have to make ten decisions in the table below. In every row of the table you
can choose either Option A or Option B. Option A and Option B are two lotteries.
Your job is to decide on one lottery (either Option A or Option B). Consider the
first row for example: In Option A you receive a payment of e2 with a probability of
10% and a payment of e1.60 with a probability of 90%. If you imagine a ten-sided-
dice this would mean that you receive e2 if you rolled a 10 and e1.60 for rolling
any number between 1 and 9. If you choose Option B you will receive e3.85 with a
probability of 10% and e0.10 with a probability of 90%. If you again imagine the
ten-sided-dice, this would indicate that you receive e3.85 if you roll a 10 and e0.10
if you roll a number between 1 and 9.
Please decide whether you would choose Option A or Option B in each of the 10 rows:
Lottery 2
Please now consider that it is not possible for you to answer the lottery. You ask
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a close confidant to make the following decision for you. On your behalf, the close
confidant is asked to name the preferred option in every row. Please remind yourself
of the persons image and name. You are not able to communicate with your close
confident, you are not able to inform him/her about your decision. What do you
think, how would this close confident take the decisions in the following lottery?
Again you find the same table as before in which we ask you for 10 decisions. As
before, you can either choose Option A or Option B. You make your decision by
crossing the option in the column “Your choice”.
Which relationship do you have with the person (e.g., partner, friend, relative etc.)?
Other Questions
People can behave differently in different situations.
How would you describe yourself? Are you a risk-loving person or do you try to
avoid risks? People behave differently in different areas. How would you assess
your own risk tolerance in the following areas? Please choose a number on a scale
between 0 and 10. A 0 denotes “no willingness to take risks” and 10 indicates “very
high risk-tolerance”. You can gradate you assessment with the values in between.
Your risk tolerance?
• When driving? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In leisure and sports? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In your career? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• Concerning your health? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
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• In your trust in unfamiliar people? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In financial investments? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
Another question regarding your risk preferences:
Please consider what you would do in the following situation:
Imagine that you had won e100,000 in the lottery. Almost immediately after you
collect the winnings, you receive the following financial offer, the conditions of which
are as follows: There is the chance to double the money. It is equally possible that
you could lose half of the amount invested. You have the opportunity to invest
the full amount, part of the amount or reject the offer. What share of your lottery
winnings would you be prepared to invest in this financially risky, yet lucrative in-
vestment?
What fraction of you winnings do you want to wager on the risky but also profit-
promising lottery?
(Please choose: e100,000; e80,000; e60,000; e40,000; e20,000; nothing, I would
decline the offer)
What is your opinion on the following three statements?
• On the whole one can trust people (Please choose: totally agree, agree slightly,
slightly disagree, disagree totally)
• Nowadays one can’t rely on anyone (Please choose: totally agree, agree slightly,
slightly disagree, disagree totally)
• If one is dealing with strangers, it is better to be careful before one can trust
them (Please choose: totally agree, agree slightly, slightly disagree, disagree
totally)
Would you say that for most of the time, people (Please choose one of the
two possibilities)
• attempt to be helpful?
• or only act in their own interests?
Do you believe that most people (Please choose one of the two possibilities)
• would exploit you if they had the opportunity
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• or would attempt to be fair towards you?
What would you say: How many close friends do you have?
How often does it occur that
• you lend your friends your personal belongings (i.e. CDs, books, car, bicycle)?
(Please choose: very often, often, sometime, seldom, never)
• you lend your friends money? (Please choose: very often, often, sometime,
seldom, never)
• you leave the door to your apartment unlocked? (Please choose: very often,
often, sometime, seldom, never)
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A.2 Instructions of Lab Experiment
Please note:
• Comments to the instructions are printed in italic and were not presented to
the subjects.
• A horizontal line indicates whenever a new window was presented to advisors.
• To ease orientation, treatments as mentioned in the chapters are identified by
TREATMENT X.
Instructions of the Lab Experiment:
Goal and Process of the Experiment
The experiment consists of a total of two phases, in each of which you will have to
make decisions. In the first phase we will ask you a number of questions and you
will make two decisions. In the second phase of the experiment you will make the
same set of decisions for other people and your payment will depend on the accuracy
of your decisions.
The e2.65 that you receive for you participation can be used during the experiment
- more on that later. You can make money with every decision you make. We will
inform you about your compensation in every round as well as your total compen-




Please answer the following general questions. The success of the experiment de-
pends on you answering the questions carefully.
General Information
• Year of Birth:
• Height in cm:
• Gender: (Please choose: male/ female)
• Marital Status: (Please choose: single, divorced, in a relationship, living sep-
arately, married, widowed)
• How many children do you have?: (Please choose: no children, one child, two
children, three children, four children, five or more children)
• Enter your highest level of education: (Please choose: university, technical
college, apprenticeship, currently a student, completed economics major, cur-
rently an economics major, no vocational education)
• What is your current occupation?: (Please choose: white-collar employee,
white-collar civil servant, blue-collar employee, blue-collar civil servant, civil
servant with tenure, student, self-employed, working at home, unable to work,
unemployed, other)
• What are your current working hours?: (Please choose: full-time, half-time,
part-time (less than halftime), not employed)
• What is your monthly net income in e?: (Please choose: up to e1,000, e1,001
- e3,000, e3,001 - e6,000, over e6,000)
How would you describe yourself?
Are you a risk-loving person or do you try to avoid risks?
People behave differently in different areas. How would you assess your own risk
tolerance in the following areas?
Please choose a number on a scale between 0 and 10. A 0 denotes ”risk averse” and
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10 indicates ”fully prepared to take risks”. You can gradate you assessment with
the values in between.
Your risk tolerance?
• In general? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• When driving? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In leisure and sports? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In your career? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• Concerning your health? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In your trust in unfamiliar people? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
• In financial investments? (Please choose: 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
Game Decision I
We will now begin with the first game decision. Please read the instructions care-
fully; it is very important that you understand the question.
Game Decision I
Please consider what you would do in the following situation:
Imagine that you had won e100,000 in the lottery. Almost immediately after you
collect the winnings, you receive the following financial offer, the conditions of which
are as follows: There is the chance to double the money. It is equally possible that
you could lose half of the amount invested. You have the opportunity to invest
the full amount, part of the amount or reject the offer. What share of your lottery
winnings would you be prepared to invest in this financially risky, yet lucrative in-
vestment?
Your Compensation
In terms of your actual compensation, the e100,000 are equivalent to e2.50 (e80,000
correspond to e2, etc.). Your chosen amount will be entered into the lottery; the
computer draws lots to see if you double or half your wagered amount.
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Your Decision
What fraction of you winnings do you want to wager on the risky but also profit-
promising lottery?
(Please choose: e100,000; e80,000; e60,000; e40,000; e20,000; nothing, I would
decline the offer)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices af-
terwards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
Game Decision II
The second game decision is up next. Please read the instructions carefully. Take
your time. It is very important that you thoroughly understand the question, since
this question will be repeated in different variations throughout the rest of the ex-
periment.
Game Decision II
You will have to make ten decisions in the table below. In every row of the table you
can choose either Option A or Option B. Option A and Option B are two lotteries.
Your job is to decide on one lottery (either Option A or Option B). Consider the
first row for example: In Option A you receive a payment of e2 with a probability of
10% and a payment of e1.60 with a probability of 90%. If you imagine a ten-sided-
dice this would mean that you receive e2 if you rolled a 10 and e1.60 for rolling
any number between 1 and 9. If you choose Option B you will receive e3.85 with a
probability of 10% and e0.10 with a probability of 90%. If you again imagine the
ten-sided-dice, this would indicate that you receive e3.85 if you roll a 10 and e0.10
if you roll a number between 1 and 9.
There are two rational strategies in this game:
• you choose Option A at the beginning before switching to Option B for the
rest of the rows
• you choose Option B for all of the rows
We are interested in finding out in which row you first choose Option B. Please
specify the row in which you will first choose Option B below the table. If you only
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choose Option B, please enter a 1.
Your Compensation
A random row will be chosen for your actual e-payment. Your chosen option will
be applied to this row. The realization of either the higher or the lower payment for
a certain option will be chosen randomly. If the seventh row is chosen for example
and you have decided on option A, you will receive e2 with a 70% probability and
e1.60 with a 30% probability.
Your Decision
I choose option B the first time in row: (Please choose: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices af-




How do other people decide?
In the rest of the experiment you will have to estimate how other people made the
game decisions that you just made.
Game Decision 1
Ca. 22,000 participants answered the Game Decision I in a preliminary survey.
Remember, the wording of Game Decision 1 was:
To shorten the experimental instructions, we will subsequently refer to this descrip-
tion of Game Decision 1 as “DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 1”.
Please consider what you would do in the following situation: Imagine that you had
won e100,000 in the lottery. Almost immediately after you collect the winnings, you
receive the following financial offer, the conditions of which are as follows: There is
the chance to double the money. It is equally possible that you could lose half of
the amount invested. You have the opportunity to invest the full amount, part of
the amount or reject the offer. What share of your lottery winnings would you be






• Nothing, I would decline the offer
Your Compensation
You will receive e0.25 for every correct assessment.
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Do you think the average participant of the preliminary survey wagered
more, less, or the same amount of money as you did in the first game
decision?
Your Decision
I think that the average participant of the preliminary survey wagered
(Please Choose: more, less, the same amount of)
money as I did in the first game decision.
How do you think certain groups within the preliminary survey decided?
Your Decision
Who wagered more money in the lottery?
• Gender: (Please choose: men, women, both groups wagered the same amount)
• Age: (Please choose: older (40 and up), younger (below 40), both groups
wagered the same amount)
• Marital Status: (Please choose: single, married or in a relationship, both
groups wagered the same amount)
• Level of Education: (Please choose: participants with a university degree, par-
ticipants without a university degree, both groups wagered the same amount)
• Number of Children: (Please choose: participants with children, participants
without children, both groups wagered the same amount)
• Income Category: (Please choose: participants with a net monthly income up
to e1,000, participants with a net monthly income above e1,000, both groups
wagered the same amount)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices
afterwards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
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How do other people decide?
Game Decision II
In another survey 190 people responded to Game Decision II. The characteristics of
the participants were also documented.
Remember, the wording of Game Decision 2 was:
To shorten the experimental instructions, we will subsequently refer to this descrip-
tion of Game Decision 1 as “DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 2”.
You will have to make ten decisions in the table below. In every row of the table you
can choose either Option A or Option B. Option A and Option B are two lotteries.
Your job is to decide on one lottery (either Option A or Option B). Consider the
first row for example: In Option A you receive a payment of e2 with a probability of
10% and a payment of e1.60 with a probability of 90%. If you imagine a ten-sided-
dice this would mean that you receive e2 if you rolled a 10 and e1.60 for rolling
any number between 1 and 9. If you choose Option B you will receive e3.85 with a
probability of 10% and e0.10 with a probability of 90%. If you again imagine the
ten-sided-dice, this would indicate that you receive e3.85 if you roll a 10 and e0.10
if you roll a number between 1 and 9. We are interested in finding out in which
row you first choose Option B. Please specify the row in which you will first choose
Option B below the table. If you only choose Option B, please enter a 1.
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Your Compensation
You will receive e0.25 for every correct assessment.
Do you think the participants in the preliminary survey switched to Op-
tion B earlier (so in a row with a smaller row number), later, or at the
same time as you did?
Your decision
I think that on average, the participants in the preliminary survey switched to op-
tion B
Please Choose: (earlier, later, at the same place)
as I did.
How do you think certain groups within the preliminary survey decided?
Your decision
Which group switched to option B earlier (so in a row with a smaller row number)?
• Gender: (Please choose: men, women, both in the same row)
• Age: (Please choose: older (40 and up), younger (below 40), both in the same
row)
• Marital Status: (Please choose: single, married or in a relationship, both in
the same row)
• Level of Education: (Please choose: participants with a university degree,
participants without a university degree, both in the same row)
• Number of Children: (Please choose: participants with children, participants
without children, both in the same row)
• Income Category: (Please choose: participants with a net monthly income up




In this section you are supposed to estimate how other people decided in the Game
Decisions that you have just made. The better your estimation, the higher your
compensation will be. You will receive some information about the persons whose
decision behavior you are trying to predict.
It is important to understand what information is subsumed in certain character-
istics. Please carefully read the characteristics and the possible manifestations of
these characteristics.
The following characteristics are available:
1. Age




• Still in Apprenticeship
• Currently an Economics Major
• No vocational education
3. Income (current monthly net income)
• Up to e1,000
• e1,001 - e3,000















• Has no children
7. Risk disposition concerning financial investments
• Answer to the question: Are you risk-loving when it comes to financial
investments or do you try to avoid financial risks? Please choose a number
on a scale between 0 and 10. A 0 denotes ”risk averse” and a 10 indicates
”fully prepared to take risks”.
You will only have to assess how a single person decided in the two Game Decisions,
so you will have to evaluate a specific person. You are paid according to the accu-
racy of your assessment. If you correctly assess how the presented person acted in
both decisions, you will receive e0.50 for every correct prediction. In order to make
your assessment, you will make the decisions you previously made for yourself for
the specific person instead.
The information available for assessing the person will consist of a selection of the
seven characteristics presented above. You will not receive all seven of the person’s
characteristics. Instead, we will generate a random number between 1 and 7 that
corresponds with the number of revealed characteristics. If the randomly generated
number is a 3, for example, you will receive the first three characteristics of the
person that you are assessing.
You can now decide which characteristic you want to assign to the first position, the
second position, all the way to the seventh position. Make your decisions carefully;
characteristics with a higher position are revealed with a higher probability.
Your Decision
Sort the characteristics by clicking and dragging the characteristics to the positions
you want them in.
The characteristic at the top of the list has the highest prioritization; the second
characteristic has the second-highest characterization etc.
Note: The characteristics are presented in alphabetic order
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• Level of Education
• Income category
• Marital Status
• Year of Birth
• Gender
• Has Children
• Risk disposition concerning financial investments
This window appeared 4 times with differing number of characteristics shown
How do you assess other people?
The person has the following characteristics: Since x was drawn as the random
number you receive the first x of the characteristics that you had chosen for the




What decision do you think the person above made in the game’s first round?
Remember, the wording of Game Decision I was:
DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 1
Your Compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the described person, you will receive
e0.50. If your decision does not correspond with the described person’s decision,
you will not receive any money.
Your Decision
What fraction of you winnings do you want to wager on the risky but also profit-
promising lottery?
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(Please choose: e100,000; e80,000; e60,000; e40,000; e20,000; nothing, would de-
cline the offer)
Game Decision II
What decision do you think the person described above made in the game’s second
round? Remember, the wording of Game Decision 2 was:
DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 2
Your Compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the described person, you will receive
e0.50. If your decision does not correspond with the described person’s decision,
you will not receive any money.
Your Decision
Please try to make the same decision as the person described above made. We are
interested in finding out in which row you first choose Option B. Please specify the
row in which you will first choose Option B.
The person chooses Option B for the first time in row: (Please choose: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices af-
terwards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
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TREATMENT SIMULT PAY
This and the following window appeared 4 times.
How do you assess other people?
In this round you will have to assess four other people again. As in the previous
round, you will be given a selection of the seven characteristics shown above to help
facilitate your decision-making process. This time, however, you can choose which
of the characteristics of the person you are assessing you want to have revealed. You
have to pay for every revealed characteristic.
As you can garner from the table below, the costs of the characteristics vary. The
first characteristic costs e0.01, the second e0.02 etc. The seventh characteristic
costs e0.50. The right-hand column of the table displays the total costs. If you
want to see all seven characteristics of the person you are assessing, for example,
you will be charged e0.99.
Cost of Characteristic Total cost
1. Characteristic e0.01 e0.01
2. Characteristic e0.02 e0.03
3. Characteristic e0.03 e0.06
4. Characteristic e0.06 e0.12
5. Characteristic e0.12 e0.24
6. Characteristic e0.25 e0.49
7. Characteristic e0.50 e0.99
Your compensation is as follows:
Compensation for Game Decision I + Compensation for Game Decision
II - Payment for Characteristics
As in the previous round you will receive e0.50 for Game Decision 1 and e0.50 for
Game Decision 2 if your assessment proves to be correct.
The costs of buying certain characteristics will be subtracted from your compen-
sation. If, for example, your assessment for Game Decision I is correct and your
evaluation for Game Decision II is not and you have bought three characteristics,
you will receive (e0.50 + e0 - e0.06=e0.44).
Please note: Since you have winnings from previous rounds and the e2.65 that we
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put at your disposal at the beginning of the game, your total compensation cannot
be negative.
Please decide on the characteristics that you want to buy now:
• Age





• Risk disposition concerning financial investments
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices af-
terwards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
How do you assess other people?
The person has the following characteristics:





What decision do you think the person above made in the game’s first round?
Remember, the wording of Game Decision I was:
DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 1
Your compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the described person, you will receive
e0.50. If your decision does not correspond with the described person’s decision,
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you will not receive any money.
Your Decision
What fraction of you winnings do you want to wager on the risky but also profit-
promising lottery?
(Please choose: e100,000; e80,000; e60,000; e40,000; e20,000; nothing, would de-
cline the offer)
Game Decision II
What decision do you think the person described above made in the game’s second
round?
Remember, the wording of Game Decision 2 was:
DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 2
Your Compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the described person, you will receive
e0.50. If your decision does not correspond with the described person’s decision,
you will not receive any money.
Your Decision
Please try to make the same decision as the person described above made. We are
interested in finding out in which row you first choose Option B. Please specify the
row in which you will first choose Option B.
The person chooses Option B for the first time in row:
(Please choose: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices af-
terwards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
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TREATMENT PICT
This window appeared 4 times for picture number 1,2,3,4.
How do you assess other people?
In this round you will assess four different persons. You will receive a picture of the
person you are assessing in order to help you make your decision.
We have placed a brown envelope (C4 format) on your seat. The envelope contains
a sheet with four pictures. Please consider picture number X.
Game Decision I:
What decision do you think the person above made in the game’s first round?
Remember, the wording of Game Decision I was:
DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 1
Your compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the described person, you will receive
e0.50. If your decision does not correspond with the described person’s decision,
you will not receive any money.
Your Decision
What fraction of you winnings do you want to wager on the risky but also profit-
promising lottery?
(Please choose: e100,000; e80,000; e60,000; e40,000; e20,000; nothing, would de-
cline the offer)
Game Decision II
What decision do you think the person above above made in the game’s second
round?
Remember, the wording of Game Decision 2 was:
DESCRIPTION GAME DECISION 2
Your Compensation
If you make exactly the same decision as the person above, you will receive e0.50.




Please try to make the same decision as the person above made. We are interested
in finding out in which row you first choose Option B. Please specify the row in
which you will first choose Option B.
The person chooses Option B for the first time in row:
(Please choose: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot change your choices af-
terwards. Your compensation will be revealed at the end of the experiment.
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Questions
Please answer the following questions.
Note: The questions refer to the entire experiment.
1. Do you know one of the persons on the pictures? If yes, which one(s)?
2. Which of the people on the pictures would you trust most with you money?
Please indicate a picture number.
3. Do you think that the provided information was sufficient? What additional
information about the individuals you assessed would you have liked to have
had?
4. Do you generally believe that it is possible to evaluate the decisions of other
people?
5. Were you more confident making you assessments on the basis of the picture
or of the profile (with the characteristics)?
6. Did you have a certain strategy in making your assessments? If yes, please
describe briefly.
7. When you think back to your last counseling session at your bank, did you
have the feeling that you counselor could assess your preferences/wishes well?
(Professionals : How many years of counseling experience do you have?)
By clicking on NEXT your choices are saved. You cannot edit your answers after-
wards.
Your compensation
Calculation of your compensation




Game Decision 1 ex
Game Decision 2 ex
Part 2
Pre-survey Assessment Game Decision I ex
Game Decision II ex
Part 3


















We will make the payments according to your ID (identification number)
You will find a receipt among the documents in front of you. Please enter your total
compensation, your ID, and selected other information in the acknowledgment form.
Important: Do not close the browser window. Raise your hand as soon as you are
finished.
Thank you for your participation
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 5
B.1 Instructions of Lab Experiment
In the following we present an English translation of the German instructions.
Please note: Text written in italic was not part of the experiment, but offers addi-
tional information for the reader.
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Participants enter the lab and draw a random number that determines their winning
number throughout the experiment. Participants are then seated in cabins.
The whole experiment has been “paper and pencil”-based. The instruction (except




Welcome to our experiment. The laboratory for experimental economics at the Uni-
versity of Heidelberg’s Department of Economics – AWI Lab (game administrator:
Professor Roider) wants to test different scientific theories with this experiment.
Payment
You support our academic work with your participation in our experiment. By
participating in the experiment, you are guaranteed to receive e4. You will have
the possibility to receive additional compensation for the decisions you make during
the experiment. The more considered your decisions are, the higher your potential
payment. A more detailed explanation of your payment will be provided later.
Each point earned in our experiment corresponds to e0.20. The experiment will
take approximately 120 minutes.
The Experiment
The experiment consists of two rounds that are independent of each other. In each
round the players are randomly assigned to an investor group (which will change
from round to round) and must make investment decisions – as well as the other
participants in the investor group. In order to facilitate your decision, you will
receive information about the prospect for success of the investment decision as well
as information about how previous players in your group decided.




One group of investors includes 3 investors, who make their investment decisions
one after another. Every investor must choose between two stocks (A and B). Only
one of the stocks will ultimately be successful and have a value of 10 points at the
end, the other stock will close with a value of 0 points. Which of the two stocks
will be successful will be determined before the first investor of the investor group
decides. The successful stock is therefore the same for all of the investors in your
investor group. Without additional information you can therefore assume that
stock A will be successful 50% of the time and stock B will be successful 50% of
the time.
Additional Information
Every investor can observe the investment decisions of the other investors in
his investor group that have decided before him.
Moreover, every investor receives an additional clue about whether stock A or B
is successful prior to making his decision. The accuracy of the clue depends on
which of two possible sources of information the investor draws on: a good source
of information or a bad source of information. Which information source an
investor draws on is determined randomly and can differ from investor to investor
within an investor group: The probability of drawing on a good source of information
is 50% and is the same for every investor. The probability of drawing on a bad source
of information is 50% for every investor as well.
No investor knows the quality of his information source or the quality of the infor-
mation source that any other investor is drawing on.
Bad source of information: Investors who “draw on a bad source of information”
will privately be shown a randomly drawn ball from an urn with 5 “A-Balls” and 5
“B-Balls.” A new ball will be drawn from the 5:5 urn for every investor, so that the
investors might be receiving different clues. The balls are returned to the urn after
they have been shown to the investor.
Good source of information: Investors who “draw on a good source of infor-
mation” will privately be shown a randomly drawn ball from an urn in which the
number of “A-Balls” and “B-Balls” depends on which stock is successful. If stock A
is successful, the urn will contain 9 “A-Balls” and 1 “B-Ball.” If stock B is success-
ful, however, the urn will include 9 “B-Balls” and 1 “A-Ball.” Every investor with
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a good source of information will be shown a new ball from such a 9:1 urn, so that
the investors might be receiving different clues here as well. The balls are returned
to the urn after they have been shown to the investor.
Only the investor who receives the clue knows the clue; the other investors do not
have access to other players’ clues.
Summary: Every investor in your investor groups is facing the same problem that
you are. He has to decide whether to buy stock A or stock B. Every investor receives
a clue in form of an “A-Ball” or a “B-Ball” that only that investor can observe. None
of the investors know the quality of their information source or the quality of the
information sources that the other investors are drawing from. Every investor does
see the decisions that the other investors in his investor group have made before him
(if applicable) and the prices (or price development) of the stocks.
Prices
Every investor that has decided on buying a certain stock must pay the valid current
purchase price. The experiment program adjusts the current purchase price of the
stocks upwards or downwards on the basis of the observed investment decisions.
Every investor receives a starting budget of 20 points for the first round.
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.We request the decision for every possible decision situation
In the following we will ask you for your decision for every possible decision situation
that can occur. That means we will ask you to put yourself in the position of investor
1 and make a decision for the case that you see an A-Ball as well as for the case
that you see a B-Ball. Afterwards we will ask you to put yourself in the position of
investor 2 and make a decision for every possible combination of investor 1 decision
and possible clue that you might receive. Finally we will ask you to put yourself
in the place of investor 3 and again make a decision for every possible decision
situation.
Calculation of your payment
How do we calculate the payment that you receive at the end of the game? After
the end of the experiment and after all investment decisions have been made, the
conductor of the experiment will randomly choose who will occupy the role of in-
vestor 1, investor 2, and investor 3 in every investor group. Afterwards, by drawing
lots in the manner described above, a) the successful stock will be determined, b)
the urn from which the clue for the respective investor is picked, and c) the clue
itself will be drawn from the respective urn.
Assume, for example, that you have been assigned the role of investor 1 and that
the A-Ball has been picked for investor 1. In that case, the decision you made for
investor 1 given that he has received an A-Ball would determine your payment.
Assume that you have been assigned the role of investor 2. Furthermore, suppose
that investor 1 in you investor group has bought stock B (given the random draws
specified above), and you as an investor have received an A-Ball. In this case, the
decision you made for Investor 2 in the case of (Investor 1: Bought B, your clue:
A-Ball) would determine your payment. Your payment for the case that you are
investor 3 will be determined by the decision that you made for the situation that
you received a certain ball and the two players that went before you bought a certain
stock.
That is how the decision that determines your compensation is determined. The
number of points that result from this decision depends on the actual value of the
bought stock and the price you paid for the stock. The purchase price of the stock
that you decided to buy will be subtracted from you starting budget. That is the
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payout for the round if your stock is not successful. If the stock you have purchased
is successful, you will receive 10 additional points. Thereby, in this round one of
your decisions made will be payoff relevant.
The composition of your investor group will ensue anonymously; you will not get to
know your fellow players by name.
The experimenter again explained the main information of the first round to the
participants. Afterwards participants had to fill out the following questionnaire.
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Have you understood everything?
Please answer the following questions before you continue so that we can ensure
that you have understood everything:




2. Assume that you have access to the good source of information. With what
probability do you receive a ball that shows the correct value?
• 50%
• 90%




4. What information does player 1 receive before he makes his decision?
• His clue in form of a ball and the price of the stocks
• His clue in form of a ball and the quality of his clue’s source of information
• His clue in form of a ball, the quality of his clue’s source of information,
and information on which stock has a value of 10
5. What information does player 2 receive before he makes his decision?
• His clue in form of a ball and the price development
• His clue in form of a ball and the quality of his clue’s information source
• His clue in form of a ball, the price development, and the decision of
player 1
• His clue in form of a ball, the quality of his clue’s source of information,
and information on which stock has a value of 10
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6. What information does player 2 receive before he makes his decision?
• His clue in form of a ball, the quality of his clue’s source of information,
and information on which stock has a value of 10
• His clue in form of a ball and the quality of his clue’s source of information
• His clue in form of a ball and the price development
• His clue in form of a ball, the price development, and the decisions made
by players 1 and 2
7. Assume player 1 receives the A-Ball as a clue. What clue does player 2 receive?
• Player 2 also receives an A-Ball
• A new ball is drawn for player 2
8. Assume players 1 and 2 receive the A-Ball as a clue. What clue does player 3
receive?
• Player 3 also receives an A-Ball
• A new ball is drawn for player 3
9. Suppose that you have bought stock A and stock A has a value of 10. The
purchase price amounts to 7. Your starting budget is 20 points. How high is





10. Suppose that you have bought stock A and stock A has a value of 0. The
purchase price amounts to 4. Your starting budget is 20 points. How high is





Participants have to answer all questions. Answers are checked. After all partici-
pants answer all questions correctly, the following decision sheets are distributed.
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Decision Situations Round 1
Your Task
Put yourself in investor 1’s shoes:
Suppose you receive a certain ball as a clue and must then decide whether to buy
stock A or stock B for the indicated price. The price in bold print is the price that
you have to pay for stock A or stock B. Please indicate if you want to buy stock A
or stock B in the decision situations described below:
Decision Situation 1
Price stock A 7,0
Price stock B 7,0
You receive an A-Ball. I buy o Stock A o Stock B
. . . .
Two decisions in total, available upon request.
Put yourself in investor 2’s shoes now:
Suppose you observe both investor 1’s decision and the price development in addition
to a certain ball you receive as a clue. Please indicate if you want to buy stock A or
stock B for the indicated price in bold print in the respective decision situation.
The price in bold print is the price that you have to pay for stock A or stock B.
The prices to the left are the prices that the investors before you had to pay.
Decision Situation 1
Investor 1 2
Price stock A 7,0 8,4
Price stock B 7,0 5,0
Decision A ?
You receive an A-Ball. I buy o Stock A o Stock B
. . . .
Four decisions in total, available upon request.
Put yourself in investor 3’s shoes now:
Suppose you observe the investment decision of the first two investors, the price
development, and certain ball as a clue. Please indicate if you want to buy stock A
or stock B for the indicated price in bold print in the respective decision situation.
The price in bold print is the price that you have to pay for stock A or stock B.
The prices to the left are the prices that the investors before you had to pay.
Decision Situation 1
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Investor 1 2 3
Price stock A 7,0 8,4 7,0
Price stock B 7,0 5,0 7,0
Decision A B ?
You receive an A-Ball. I buy o Stock A o Stock B
. . . .
Eight decisions in total, available upon request.
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Notes
Participants have the possibility to save their decision of the first round by filling
out this sheet after they made their decision. This sheet can be kept.
The decision situations in round 1 and 2 are similar. If you want to, you can take
notes on the decisions you made in round 1. You can make the decisions in round
2 without notes from round 1.
Decision Situation Number A B
Investor 1/ Decision 1
Investor 1/ Decision 2
Investor 2/ Decision 1
Investor 2/ Decision 2
Investor 2/ Decision 3
Investor 2/ Decision 4
Investor 3/ Decision 1
Investor 3/ Decision 2
Investor 3/ Decision 3
Investor 3/ Decision 4
Investor 3/ Decision 5
Investor 3/ Decision 6
Investor 3/ Decision 7
Investor 3/ Decision 8
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After all decisions of the first round are made, decision sheets are collected and
participants have to draw a slip of paper which indicates whether in the second round
they become “observer” or remain “investor”. Afterwards, the instructions for the
second round are distributed and read out. Except for the questionnaire and the
decision sheets, the instructions distributed are identical for investors and observers.
Round 2
The rules of the game are the same in the second round as in the first one, only
the calculation of your compensation differs. There will be observers in addition
to investors in this round. If you have drawn a card with an “I” you are still an
investor. If you have drawn a card with a “B” you are now an observer. 6
players have now anonymously and randomly been drawn to assume the role of the
observers.
The observers will not invest themselves but will evaluate the investment decision
made by the investors. The observers are no longer part of an investor group. The
identity of the investors and the observers will not be revealed.
Apart from the calculation of the compensation nothing changes for the investors.
Payment Calculation
This stays the same:
We will ask for you decision in all possible decision situations just like in the first
round.
Every investor and every observer will receive a starting budget of 20 points for
the second round.
After the experiment ends and after all investors and observers have made their
decisions, the conductor of the experiment will randomly arrange the investors in
new groups. Every investor will have different teammates than in round 1.
Afterwards, the roles of investor 1, investor 2, and investor 3 will be assigned ran-
domly. By drawing lots in the manner described above, a) the successful stock, b)
the urn from which the clue for the respective investor is picked, and c) the clue
that every investor receives, are then picked again.
That is how the decisions that determine your compensation are made. As in round
1, for each investor only one of the investment decisions that you will now make
will determine your compensation.
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This changes:
The value of the stock will continue to affect the investors’ compensation. The stock
value will no longer affect the observers’ compensation, however.
The additional compensation that the investors receive will depend on the eval-
uation by the observer. The observer will no longer have to choose between the 2
stocks. Instead, the observer will have to estimate with what probability the in-
vestors had access to a good sources of information when making their decision and
will have to offer the individual investors wages.
The observers are willing to pay a wage because they can win points by employing
an investor with a good source of information. If the observer hires an investor who
has access to a good information source, the investors employment is helpful and the
observer will receive 20 additional points. The observer is not rewarded for hiring
investors who have access to bad information. An observer who hires an investor
who has a bad source of information receives 0 points.
For every possible decision situation and every investor, the 6 observers have to
submit a wage offer between 0 and maximally 20 points that they would be willing
to pay the investors. The observer that submits the highest of the 6 wage offers for
a single investor will win the bid and pay the investor the stated wage. The other
5 investors that did not win the bid do not receive points, but also do not have to
pay any wages. There are now 4 investor groups with a total of 12 investors.
The observers submit their wage offers at a point in time where the actual value of
the stock is already publicly known. On top of that, the observers can only observe
the investment decisions of the individual investors and the price development of
the stocks. They cannot observe the clue that every investor receives or the quality
of an investor’s source of information.
Sequence of events
After all investors and observers have made their decisions for all possible decision
situations, as in round 1, the decision that determines the compensation within the
investor groups and the value of the stock will be established.
The wage offers that the 6 observers have made for the investors in the established
decision situation will then be compared and the highest bidding observer will win
the bid. That is how the compensation for every investor in every investor group
and the paying observer will be determined.
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It is important to remember that the observers to not know what clue or what
source of information the investors received. The observers only see the investment
decision itself, the actual value of the stock, and the price development.
The points you receive are calculated as follows:
Payment Observer
If an observer has submitted the highest bid for an investor, the observer pays the
investor a wage commensurate with his bid for the investor. If the particular investor
had a good source of information, the observer receives an additional 20 points. If
multiple observers submit the same (high) bid for a particular investor, the winning
bidder will be determined randomly among the group of the highest bidders by a lot.
If an observer has not submitted the highest bid for an investor, the observer does
not have to pay a wage and does not receive any additional points. It is therefore
possible for a single observer to submit the highest bid for none, one, multiple, or
even all 12 of the investor(s). Please note: The observer cannot lose money. Even if
an observer ends up losing money in this round, he or she will still be credited for
0 points.
The decisions the observers make influence both their own compensation and the
compensation of the investors.
Payment Investor
The starting budget, the value of the stock minus the price paid for the stock,
and the wages received from one of the observers add up to the investor’s total
compensation.
Again, the main parts of the experiment are explained to the participants by the
experimenter.
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Questions distributed to observers (Observers receive different questions than in-
vestors.).
Questions for Observers
Have you understood everything?
Please answer the following questions before you continue so that we can ensure
that you have understood everything.
1. Assume that you have submitted a wage offer of 9 points and won the bid.
The investor whom you are paying 9 points bought stock A and stock A has a
value of 10 points. The investor had a starting budget of 20 points and bought
stock A for 6 points. Moreover, the investor had a good source of information.









(c) How high is your compensation if the investor had a bad source of infor-









2. You have bid 14 points for an investor, which is exactly the same amount one
other observer’s bid for the same investor. Who wins the bid?
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• Both of the observers win the bid; the profit is divided
• The winner of the bid is decided by lot
• None of the observers wins the bid
3. What information can you use to decide on your wage offers?
• The investors’ sources of information and the actual value of the stock
• The investors’ clues and the actual value of the stock
• The investors’ decisions and the price development
• The investors’ decisions, the price development, and the actual value of
the stock
Participants have to fill out the questions. Answers are checked. After all partici-
pants answer all questions correctly, the following decision sheets are distributed.
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Questions distributed to investors (Investors receive different questions than ob-
servers.).
Questions for Investors
Have you understood everything?
Please answer the following questions before you continue so that we can ensure
that you have understood everything.
1. The observers have submitted the following wage offers for the decision that






2. Assume that you your wage from the observer equals to 9 points. You have
bought stock A and stock A has a value of 10 points. You had a starting
budget of 20 points and bought stock A for 6 points. Moreover, you had
access to a good source of information.




(b) How high is the compensation of the observer who has won the bid and










(d) How high is the observer’s compensation if you had a bad source of in-





3. What information can the observer use to decide on his or her wage offer?
• The investors’ sources of information and the actual value of the stock
• The investors’ clues and the actual value of the stock
• The investors’ decisions and the price development
• The investors’ decisions, the price development, and the actual value of
the stock
Participants have to fill out the questions. Answers are checked. After all partici-
pants answer all questions correctly, the following decision sheets are distributed.
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Decision sheets for Investors and Observers are different; each group only observes
its own decision sheets.
Decision Situations Round 2 (Investors)
Please note: Your decisions in round 2 are completely independent of round 1.
Decisions taken by Investors are identical to decision in Round 1. See “Decision
Situations Round 1”
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Decision sheets for Investors and Observers are different; each group only observes
its own decision sheets.
Decision Situations Round 2 (Observer)
Your Task:
You can now see all decision situations that occur. Please indicate what wage offer
between 0 and 20 you want to make for the respective investor. You can make
separate offers between 0 and 20 points for every investor 1, 2, and 3.
Moreover, you can observe the price development, the prices the investors had to
pay for the stocks, the stocks that the investors eventually bought and the successful
stock.
Decision Situation 1:
Investor 1 2 3
Price Stock A 7,0 8,4 7,0
Price Stock B 7,0 5,0 7,0
Decision A B A Successful Stock: A
Your wage offer for Investor 1:
Your wage offer for Investor 2:
Your wage offer for Investor 3:
Decision Situation 2-15 are similar, available upon request.
Decision Situation 16:
Investor 1 2 3
Price Stock A 7,0 5,0 3,0
Price Stock B 7,0 8,4 9,3
Decision B B B Successful Stock: B
Your wage offer for Investor 1:
Your wage offer for Investor 2:
Your wage offer for Investor 3:
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After all decisions are taken, decision sheets are collected. The experimenter then
randomly draws (by urn draws) the decisions situations of round 1 and 2 that de-
termine the payoffs for all players. Participants are then asked to fill out a final
questionnaire while the payoffs are calculated via the actual decisions taken by the
participants.
Payment Notification
Thank you for your participation in the experiment. We will now calculate your
point total, convert that total into Euros, and then pay you. This can take a few
minutes. Please fill out the following questionnaire in the meantime.
Please do not speak with other participants and refrain from using your cell phone
until the end of the experiment.
As soon as we have determined your compensation, we will call your number.
Thanks again for your participation!
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Personal Data and Questionnaire
Personal Data
Please answer the following questions. The results of the experiment will naturally
be anonymized and it will not be possible to connect the information to your personal







• a doctoral candidate
• employed
• other:
If student or doctoral candidate:
Subject:
If student: semester number:
Questionnaire
Please take some time to answer the following questions.
1. Please consider what you would do in the following situation: Suppose you
have just won e100,000 in a lottery. Immediately after being given the
e100,000 you receive the following proposal for a new lottery:
There is the chance to double your money. It is equally possible that you
could lose half of the amount you invested.
You can wager your entire e100,000, a fraction thereof, or you can choose not
to take part in the lottery at all.
What fraction of you winnings do you want to wager on the risky but also
profit-promising lottery?






• Nothing, I would not take part in the lottery
2. Do you think that player 1 always acted according to the clue he received in
form of a ball?
3. Do you think that player 2 always acted according to the clue he received in
form of a ball? If not: When did he not act in accordance with his clue?
4. Do you think that player 3 always acted according to the clue he received in
form of a ball? If not: When did he not act in accordance with his clue?
5. What did you base your decisions on while in your role; your own ball or the
other players’ investment decisions?
6. What do you think was the purpose of this experiment?
7. In the decisions you make daily, you follow
• Other people’s advice
• My own assessment
• Other people’s advice in some situations and my own assessment in others
Thank you for filling out the questionnaire and for taking part in the
experiment. Please wait until your number is called.
Participants wait until they are called to come forward for payment. Participants
are asked to remain silent until then. Participants leave the lab.
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